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Abstract 
 
Since 2001 Muslim communities in Britain have largely been governed through the educational 
policy framing of integration and segregation. This Manichean bio-construct sees mono-cultural 
ethnic schools as problematic spaces, whilst integrated schools as the liberal ideal. By drawing 
upon the subaltern studies approach, this study provides a space for Muslim pupils and parents to 
articulate their own discourses on integrated and segregated schools in Britain. In doing so, it 
allows Muslim communities a position of power, by giving them agency to construct their own 
narratives on the policy debate on integration and schooling.  
This thesis attempts to make sense of Muslim discourses through a theoretic interpretation drawn 
from Muslim intellectual history.  By using Ibn Khaldun’s (d. 1406) sociological theory of 
‘asabiyya this study provides a broader theoretical context to the Muslim voice.  The empirical 
and the theoretical perspectives contained in this study attempts to make significant contributions 
to the study of race, religion and Muslim studies in Britain. 
 Public policy discourses has often seen the concept of integration as a linear cultural process, 
with minority groups gradually adopting the social mores of the host society. Evidence presented 
in this study sees integration as an analytical process and not as a fixed cultural template. It 
shows how the concept of integration can often be used, by political actors, as a tool for anti-
Muslim racism.  
The discourses of Muslim parents and pupils have much in common with each other, especially 
when rejecting the idea of self-segregation, or highlighting the importance of ‘asabiyya based on 
religion, but they have little in common with the public policy framing of Muslim communities. 
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Sociological studies have often demonstrated the disjuncture between public policy and lived 
experience. This study confirms this observation by elucidating the disconnect between political 
discourse of integration and lived cultural experience of Muslim communities. The discourses of 
Muslim communities in this study suggest a complex, paradoxical, intersectional reading of 
integration, which is fundamentally rooted within social constructionism. Most importantly it 
dismisses the integration and segregation binary, as seen within the educational framing of 
Muslims, whilst recognising the importance of Muslim group solidarity, or ‘asabiyya in Muslim 
discourse.  
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 Transliteration 
 
The transliteration system adopted throughout this thesis is the ‘IJMES System’, which is the 
system is used by the International Journal of Middle East Studies.    
 
 
        a, i, u =   
 
b =  
 
t =  
 
th =   
 
j =   
 
Î =   
 
kh =  
 
d =  
 
dh =  
 
 r =  
 
z =  
 
s  =  
 
sh =  
 
 Ò  =  
 
 Ã  =  
 
Ô =  
 
Û =  
 
Ý =  
 
gh =  
 
f =  
      q   =  
 
k =  
 
 l =  
 
m =  
 
 n =  
 
h =  
 
w =  
 
 y =  
 
  Þ   =    
 
 
Long vowels:  = Á,   = Ð,  = Ù 
Diphthong: ay = ; aw =  
TÁÞ marbÙÔa  
Has been left out with no following iÃÁfa a 
Has been included with following iÃÁfa at 
ÍurÙf shamsiyya 
Have been transliterated as written, rather than as pronounced. Example: al-shams 
TanwÐn 
Has been ignored unless it was necessary to use it.   
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1.0 Introduction 
Since the events of the 2001 riots, 9/11 and the terrorist attacks in London in 2005, we have 
witnessed in Western Europe a crisis in multiculturalism combined with a policy debate on 
integration of Muslim communities within a heightened security context. These policy debates 
within the last decade have played a significant role in the way in which Muslims are positioned. 
It is often argued that, despite Muslim community settlement in the UK since the 1960s, 
Muslims have failed to integrate mainstream British society. Instead, they have chosen to live 
socially isolated and self-contained lives with ephemeral connections to the wider host society.   
This thesis will focus on the UK context and explore three major themes associated with 
this discursive positioning. The first theme will explore the robust educational policy imperative 
which has emerged during the last decade and has attempted to address the ‘Muslim question’ 
through ethnic integration, segregation and de-radicalisation policies. Major socio-political and 
security events at an international and domestic level have given way to policy approaches 
attempting to address the ‘Muslim question’. The first approach views Islam as essentially anti-
modern and antithetical to Western secular mores. The role of integration policies is to require 
Muslim communities to reject the key tenets of Islam, and to assimilate into Western secular 
liberalism. This can be summarised as the ‘Islam problematic’ given that attention is drawn to 
the religion and not to the adherents. Thus it is not surprising to note the following irony 
expressed by Australia’s Senator Bernardi: "Islam itself is the problem - it's not Muslims" 
(Harvey & Lewis 2011). The second approach sees no major conflict between Islam or Muslims 
and integration. The problem lies not in the ‘text’, but rather in the interpretation. The future of 
Islam and Muslims in the West lies in a liberal, depoliticised reading of the text.  This can be 
5 
 
seen as the ‘Muslim problematic’ given that the focus of attention is placed less on the religion 
and more on the followers’ ‘practice’ of segregation and extremism. 
The second theme will aim to address the meta-narrative on the ‘Muslim question’. It 
acknowledges the significant absence of the Muslim subaltern ‘voice’. ‘Subaltern’ is used here as 
the Marxist term associated with the works of Antonio Gramsci (d. 1937), later adopted by the 
Subaltern Studies Group. The exact meaning of ‘subaltern’ is widely debated and contested 
(Spivak 1994). I have taken the idea of subaltern to mean a person or a group who is 
marginalised and powerless (Young 2003). Exploring the ‘Muslim voice’ lends itself to the 
following question - what right does a relatively new minority community have to have their 
voice heard?  In responding to this question, this thesis has factored the following points. (i) 
Democracy and the principle of equality enshrined in the Equality Act require the voices of 
minority communities to be heard and heeded. (ii) Connected to the first point is the pressing 
urgency to ensure that the political rhetoric with regard to equalities measures up to reality. 
Milner (2007) has noted how ‚‘people of colour have been misrepresented, exploited, silenced 
and taken for granted in educational research‛ (Milner 2007:387). (iii) Subaltern and Critical 
Race Theorists have all recognised the importance of minority groups’ ‘narratives, counter-
narrative and naming of one’s own reality in education’ (Milner 2007:390) 
The third theme will attempt to fill the void in the theoretical understanding of integration 
and group dynamics within the Muslim intellectual tradition by exploring the works of the 
fourteenth-century Muslim sociologist Ibn Khaldun.  
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 The overall aim and objective of this thesis is to address the above three themes through 
the following:  (i) to examine the key debates on ethnic integration and segregation concerning 
mono-cultural schooling. Mono-cultural schools, as understood within this thesis, include 
independent and voluntary aided Muslim faith schools and state schools with majority Muslim 
cohort. The attempt by some local authorities to use school academies as an attempt to 
merge/close mono-cultural state schools with a view to creating ethnically diverse ‘mixed 
schools’ will be examined in light of the underlying value structures. Three value structures in 
particular will be at the forefront of the assessment: ‘forced integration’, assimilation and de-
radicalisation.  (ii) To recognise the absence of empirical work on Muslim discourses on 
integration and schooling but to compensate for this lacuna by evaluating pupil and parental 
discourses on this same matter. This section will be concerned with assessing a number of 
questions associated with ethnic integration, segregation and schooling, such as (a) What are the 
discursive categories used by Muslim students to make sense of integration, segregation and 
schooling? (b) Do these discursive categories differ within the contexts of mono-cultural and 
mixed schools? I will explore, through the parental discourses on schooling, the framing around 
integration and schooling against that of ‘self-segregation’, faith and parental choice. (iii) To 
contextualise the pupil and parental discourses within a wider theoretical underpinning - the 
works of Ibn Khaldun (d.1406) and his concept of ‘asabiyya will be used to interpret dominant 
themes associated with Muslim group dynamics, including group feeling, group loyalty and 
group solidarity.  ‘Asabiyya is a sociological term that is used by Ibn Khaldun to describe and 
explain a number of themes associated with group dynamics, including Muslim group solidarity, 
group loyalty and group cohesion.    
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 For the purpose of this study the concept of integration will be understood as a discursive 
category and emphasis will be placed more on what ethnic integration within the context of 
schools means to the Muslim community. This thesis will attempt to assess the category of 
integration within Muslim discourse through Potter & Wetherell’s (2010) methodology of 
discourse analysis. It is envisaged that an understanding of what integration means to the Muslim 
community will help inform the public policy discourses on integration.  
 
Research Context  
The research context was shaped by two important factors; first, northern mill towns with 
significant Muslim populations were identified for the purposes of this research, namely 
Blackburn, Burnley and Oldham. These local authorities were determined by external policy 
factors responding to growing levels of residential and school segregation (Burgess et al. 2005), 
connected with this, was the attempts made be some local authorities to address ethnic 
segregation through integrated schools (Taylor 2009). Second, whilst conducting the research 
within schools, I was conscious of the fact that the majority of the Muslim respondents were 
from the Indian subcontinent.  A wider sample from Manchester (Moss Side, East Didsbury and 
Eccles) and East London was chosen to gather data from Yemeni, Somali, Arab and convert 
communities, so that a broad assessment of Muslim voices could be explored.  
Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis will be divided into six parts, with eleven individual chapters. A brief outline of each 
part is provided as follows. Part 1 of this thesis will comprise a review of the literature that forms 
part of the Muslim discourse with regard to educational policy and integration.  Chapter 1 aims 
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to provide an outline of the contours of integration by looking at the various ways in which 
integration is studied. Chapter 2 provides a general outline of the literature that addresses 
education with regard to Muslim communities and the integration debate. This chapter also 
examines the policies of the New Labour and Coalition governments on schools and integration 
as a way of demonstrating contemporary discourses on integration and educational policy.  
Chapter 3 includes Muslim discourses on integration through the scholarly debates of Euro-
Islam. The general theme of part 1 acknowledges the absence of empirical data on Muslim 
community narratives on education and integration.  
 Part 2 examines the methodological principles employed in this thesis. Parts 3, 4 and 5 
will include the research findings which aim to bridge this gap by exploring Muslim pupil (Part 
3) and parental (Part 4) discourses on integration, segregation and education. The meta-narrative  
at the centre of both of these parts is characterized by the different ways in which Muslim pupils 
de-construct the binary opposites of ‘mono-cultural’ schools as ‘bad’ and  ethnically mixed 
schools as ‘good’. Instead, what the pupil discourses make clear is the importance of group 
solidarity based on faith within schooling, whilst recognising the importance of ‘doing 
multiculturalism’ by ‘mixing’ and ‘getting to know each other’. The parental discourse also 
supports the importance of faith, race and class inter-sectionality but rejects the idea of ‘self-
segregation’ and instead advocates the importance of integration through faith within a broadly 
mixed schooling environment.  Part 5 explores the discursive repertoires Muslim parents used to 
de-construct the public discourse on integration.  Part 6 uses the Khaldunian sociology of 
asabiyya to provide a theoretical platform to interpret the importance of group dynamics within 
Muslim communities as noted in Parts 2 and 3 of this thesis.  
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Chapter One:  
1.0 Contours of Integration Discourse 
 Debates on integration within the public, academic and policy arenas, given the current 
socio-political milieu, may appear to some as a relatively new phenomenon. In reality the 
intellectual antecedents of integration can be traced back to the US and particularly to the works 
of Gordon (1964) and Park and Burgess (1969).  Both Gordon (1964) and Park and Burgess 
(1969) viewed integration as a linear process, whereby immigrant communities migrating to US 
were seen  to gradually adopt the culture, language, values and beliefs of the host society. This, 
they argue, was achieved through four successive stages, starting with contact, and followed by 
completion, accommodation and finally assimilation. Integration within this context was largely 
viewed as a process of assimilation grounded upon the principles of Anglo-conformity. An 
analysis of the debates on integration within academic and public policy discourse shows the 
lack of consensus as to the precise meaning of integration. This point is further reinforced by 
Joppke & Morawska (2003) who cite sociological studies that have questioned the validity of a 
society that has reached consensus on fully integrating its migrant population. They highlight: 
 Post-classical sociology, even before the arrival of ‘globalization’ has shown  that 
 such a ‘society’ does nowhere exist, except in the imagination of some  (especially 
 political) actor…However an academically more adequate  picture of modern society 
 is that of a multiplicity of autonomous  interdependent ‘fields’ (Bourdieu 1989). 
        (Joppke & Morawska 2003: 3). 
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 In order to make sense of the complex hermeneutics and the political usage of the term 
‘integration’, this chapter will provide a summary of the various conflicting ways in which the 
idea of integration has been used. This chapter also aims to provide an overview of the diverse 
ways in which the idea of integration is debated within public discourse. The first part of this 
chapter intends to provide the broader historical context of integration and community cohesion 
debates within Britain. The second part of this chapter considers four dominant approaches to 
integration. The first approach will provide a critical assessment of integration based upon the 
works of Bauman (1991), Bauman and Testler (2001), Green (2006) and Gillborn (2008). Most 
of these approaches draw upon the interplay between post-modernism, sociology and critical 
race studies. The second approach will debate the discourse of integration as a way of framing 
anti-Muslim prejudice. The third approach will evaluate the idea of integration through the 
prisms of key political actors and their speeches on ‘shared values’. The final approach will 
explore the pluralist or multicultural approach to integration based upon the principles of 
diversity and identity politics.  
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1.1 From assimilation to integration  
 Within the context of Britain, ‘assimilationist’ thinking played an important role during 
the influx of post-war Commonwealth migration during the 1950s and the early 1960s (Gillborn 
2008; Tomlinson 2008; Mullard 1980;). A new politics of managing cultural difference through 
multiculturalism was introduced by Jenkins (1967), who rejected the ‘inherently racist nature of 
the assumptions underpinning the assimilationist model’ (Mullard 1980) and, rather than ‘a 
flattening process of assimilation’, advocated instead an integration based upon ‘equal 
opportunity accompanied by cultural diversity in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance’ (Jenkins 
1967). Joppke & Morawska (2003) have noted how a shift from assimilation to the discourse of 
integration ‘conceived [immigrants] not as objects of manipulation and control but as subjects of 
freely willed integration, for which the state can at best set parameters, but never guarantee a 
specific result’ (Joppke & Morawska 2003:5). Integration was thus seen as a two-way process 
and rooted in the broader public sphere (Saggar 2008). Integration did have a degree of influence 
on educational policy, particularly during the 1960’s and 1970’s educational policy of bussing 
(Halstead 1988; Tomlinson 2008), which was later abandoned largely due to public protest 
(Halstead 1988). During the 1980s, integration as an educational policy and public discourse was 
extended by different approaches to multiculturalism (Modood 2007, 2010; Philips 2007; Parekh 
2000; Taylor 1992; Kymlicka 1989;). The shift from assimilation and integration to 
multiculturalism is highlighted succinctly by the Swann Report (1985), which influenced 
educational multiculturalism in the UK: 
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It has generally been accepted that attitudes towards the educational needs of ethnic 
minority pupils fall into a clearly defined chronological pattern, moving from early days of what usually termed ‚assimilation‛, through attempts to give at least some recognition 
in schools to backgrounds of ethnic minority children - usually known as ‚integration‛ - 
to the more recent moves towards multicultural education.  
(Swann Report 1985: 191).  
 Multiculturalism within public policy and academic discourse has often been presented as 
drawing to a close after the race riots, 9/11 and 7/7 (Goodhart 2004; Philips 2005). In fact, the 
idea of multiculturalism has always been contested (Okin 1999; Hesse 2000; Barry 2001; Hewitt 
2005; Kundanani 2007; Joppke 2009).  
 Multiculturalism as a state policy and its emphasis on cultural recognition through 
government policy and on providing an equal say for minority groups was seen as an 
inappropriate way of meeting the contemporary challenges arising from recent political events. It 
was argued that, hitherto, policies of multiculturalism had been promoting a sense of ‘difference’ 
which nurtured a sense of racial and religious ‘separateness’. The concept of community 
cohesion was developed and promoted as a way of meeting the new challenges post race riots 
and 9/11. For Cantle (2008) the key task for multicultural societies is: 
 To come to terms with domains of difference and to develop a greater 
 consensus…bonds between fellow citizens require greater sense of  commonality. 
 Furthermore, agreement about how to achieve such a  consensus will also be 
 required and it is suggested that this will depend upon  breaking down the 
 separateness between the minority and majority  community  and between the 
 different minority communities themselves.  Mutual trust and common sense of 
 belonging will only be created through  constant interactions and shared 
 experiences.   
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 For Cantle, a ‘new framework for race and diversity’ based upon the philosophical 
tradition of communitarianism (Etzioni 1993; Robinson 2005) is required in order to nurture a 
sense of ‘commonality’. This, he argues, can be nurtured through promoting the ideas of ‘active 
citizenship’, ‘shared values’, ‘common vision’ and a strong sense of ‘shared identity’ (Cantle 
2008). Cantle (2008) maintains that this can be achieved through the social contact theory 
(Hewstone & Brown 1986; Halabi 2000; Hewstone et al. 2006, 2007; Hewstone 2006; Wagner et 
al. 2006) which, he argues, is ‘a cornerstone of community cohesion practice’ (Cantle 2008:116).  
The social contact theory is  grounded upon the works of Hewstone & Brown(1986),  
Hewstone et al. (2006, 2007) and Hewstone (2006) and is based upon the premise ‘that repeated 
cross-cultural and intergroup contact  have direct effects on reducing prejudice, increasing levels 
of forgiveness, building group trust and reducing levels of anxiety’ (Hewstone 2006:277).  
Cantle’s (2008) thesis is largely a policy response to the perceived pervasive questions on 
‘parallel lives’ (Cantle 2004), ‘sleep-walking to segregation’ (Philips 2005) and the ‘virtual 
apartheid’ nature of schools in the UK (Ouseley 2001).  
 Cantle’s (2008) idea of community cohesion has been hugely welcomed by local 
authorities and its principles of social contact have been used as a key tool of public policy, 
especially within the field of education and housing (Cantle 2008). Despite its influence on 
public policy, community cohesion, as a concept, has also attracted a number of critics. For 
example, Robinson (2005) sees community cohesion as a ‘sound right’ policy which provides a 
commonsense rather than empirical justification for policy intervention. For Robinson 
(2005:1415), conceptually speaking, community cohesion ‘represented an empty vessel into 
which the pre-occupations of contemporary public policy were poured'. McGee (2003) is critical 
of how, within a multicultural, multi-ethnic and multi-faith society, one can achieve consensus 
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over shared values.  Despite these criticisms, the idea of social contact, shared values, common 
vision and shared identity have played a crucial role in framing the concept of integration.   
 
 1.2 When integration means assimilation: Integration as a rhetorical category  
Integration is not publicly debated. It is a categorical imperative, a general norm that is imposed 
on everyone but particularly one group: immigrants and all those gravitating around them. 
(Narcira Guenif Souilmas, quoted in Fekete 2008:12)  
The best form of integration is assimilation.  
(Otto Schily, quoted in Caldwell 2009:125) 
 Integration, assimilation and acculturation are all idioms that are frequently used 
interchangeably within the public discourse. Integration is considered by many social thinkers as 
a rhetorical category which is best understood through a detailed analysis of the variety of ways 
in which it plays as a reified normative construct, aimed at achieving certain socio-political 
objectives. Writers within this tradition do not view integration as a linear progression with 
‘outsiders’ gradually becoming ‘insiders’; nor do they view integration as a social or moral 
imperative. Instead, they view integration as a highly politicised construct which is riddled with 
paradoxes (Rumbaut 1997), politically motivated interest convergences (Bell 2004) and, above 
all, lacking in empirical evidence (Finney and Simpson 2009). They all share the view that 
integration, as a category, should be subjected to rigorous systematic analysis and critique.    
 The idea of integration implies an objective towards equilibrium in society between the 
host society and the ‘new’ community. The role of an academic, Bauman (2001) argues, should 
be ‘to cast a suspicious eye on any claim that the social world operates in an orderly way and 
with a tendency towards equilibrium’ (Bauman & Tester 2001:11). 
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 Bauman (1991) provides a useful theoretical framework for understanding the discourse 
of integration and its association with modernity.  He argues that one of the main objectives of 
modernity is maintaining public order in society. One of the ways in which nation states achieve 
this order is by ensuring that all migrant communities are fully assimilated into the dominant 
cultures of the nation state. The process of so doing, Bauman (2001) argues, creates a sense of 
‘otherness’ in those who don’t fit in. By using the Jewish experience of pre-war Germany, 
Bauman (1991) highlights how assimilation can lead to a sense of contradiction, spiritual 
isolation and loneliness and, most importantly, a feeling of ambivalence. Moreover, he 
demonstrates how the Jews were identified as having a ‘problematic presence’ (Bauman & 
Tester 2001). This is further articulated as follows: 
Acculturation did not incorporate the Jews into German society, but transformed them 
into a separate, ambivalent and incongruous, non-category category of ‘assimilated Jews’, prised from the traditional Jewish community as much as from native German 
elites... The assimilating Jews acted under the pressure to prove their German-hood, yet 
the very attempt to prove it was held against them as the evidence of their duplicity and, 
in all probability, also of subversive intentions. 
        (Bauman 1991:190-19).  
Following the same outlook as Bauman (1991), Santiotis (2004), drawing upon the works of 
Jackson (1998) and Sardar (1998), has argued how, within the contemporary context, a sense of 
ambivalence is ascribed to Muslims through misrepresentation and categorisation as ‘pariahs’ 
(Santiotis 2004).  
  A number of critical perspectives on integration have been developed drawing upon the 
traditions of Foucault (1969), Said (1978), Bell (2004) and Van-Dijk (1997).  A range of studies 
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have argued that the best way of viewing the popular discourses of integration is through the 
analysis of the different ways in which integration is used in political speech.     
Nancy Green (2006) has demonstrated how the concept of assimilation needs to be ‘re-
examined not as a description of immigration history but as an analytical category 
constructed…over different time frames’ (Green 2006:239). Drawing upon critical race theory, 
Gillborn (2008), in his review of educational policy relating to race, highlighted how 
contemporary discourses on ‘integration’ and ‘cohesion’ are best understood as code names for 
contemporary assimilation (Gillborn 2008: 81). This has been confirmed by a number of other 
writers, who have argued that integration is far from being a neutral term. They argue that, in 
fact, the idea is politically motivated and hermeneutically loaded, and is used to mean 
‘assimilation’ (Banton 2001; Back et al 2002; Fekete 2008; Kalra 2008) and ‘domination’ 
(Banton 1967). Bowskill et al. (2007), in their analysis of British print media and Muslim 
schooling, argue that integration is best understood through a series of liberal hegemonic 
positioning. In sum, most of the writers who view integration as a rhetorical category see the 
function of integration as a device by which the West is projected within a reified construct 
whilst the ‘other’ is viewed through the pessimistic lenses of essentialism (Philips 2007).   
Gillborn (2008) has also highlighted how the contemporary discourse of integration 
following the July 2005 London bombings is best described as ‘aggressive majoritarianism’. 
This occurs when ‘majority dislike and prejudice towards Muslims are enforced in the name of 
common sense, integration and even security’ (Gillborn 2008:81).  Kundnani (2007: 123) also 
showed how the concept of ‘new integrationism’, as developed within the political milieu of 
9/11, has redefined integration as ‘effectively assimilation.’ Crozier et al.’s (2008) research on 
young Muslim children’s experience of schooling highlighted the ways in which teachers will 
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use ‘integration’ as a tool to criticise Muslim pupils for not mixing with their white peers and 
failing to attend school trips or participating in extra-curricular activities - even though these 
actions were motivated by a complex set of factors including  acceptance of anti-Muslim 
prejudice and racial harassment by both staff and pupils (Crozier et al. 2008). van-Dijik (1993, 
1997) views these forms of political discourses on integration as forms of racism which seek to 
maintain and legitimise dominance (Van-Dijik 1993).  Crozier et al. (2008) echo van-Dijik’s 
observation by demonstrating how integration is not about sharing ‘cultures and values’ but 
rather an educational imperative which is used to maintain conformity, control and people 
knowing their place.    
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1.3: Framing Muslims: Politics of Anti-Muslim Prejudice  
 One of the most pervasive assumptions in discourse of European Muslim integration is that 
Muslim religiosity threatens Europe. 
         (Mogahed 2007: 14)  
 Islam is often presented as being diametrically opposite to the West. The former is often 
projected as obscurantist, undemocratic and misogynistic, whilst the latter is seen as secular, 
advanced and grounded upon the principles of liberalism. Whilst this type of reasoning has 
gained particular momentum following the events of 9/11 and 7/7, the ideological antecedents 
have a long intellectual and historical tradition. These can be traced back to the 8th century with 
the rise of Islam as a dominant political force (Southern 1979; Djait 1985; Daniels 1991; Said 
1978/1997; Sardar 1999; Macfie 2000). Furthermore, a strong critical response to this form of 
Manichean framing of the ‘other’ has also been developed by a number of academics and policy 
analysts. For Said 1978/1997 and Tibawi (1980) the framing of the ‘other’ or the non-European 
is largely associated with the colonial positioning of the non-European inferior, antiquated and 
alien subject of the West. They see the ‘other’ largely as a product of western ideological biases 
articulated through scholarship and systems of thought.  Whilst Beck et al. 2002; Fekete 2008, 
2009 and Kalra 2008 see the current treatment of Muslims, as a continuation of the colonial 
legacy, but also the part of the racialised political treatment (Goldberg 2002) of minority 
communities in Britain.  
Integration is often associated with a normative cultural embodiment of Britishness and 
national cohesion.  The increasing Muslim presence in Europe, together with the growing 
security concerns about Muslim communities, has given rise to this  discursive framing of the 
Muslim problematic, which is often associated with anti-Muslim racism (Kundnani 2007) and 
Islamophobia (Marranci 2004; Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia 2004; Allen 
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2010). Anti-Muslim racism and Islamophobia are dominant approaches which have attempted to 
make sense of the current discourse on integration within a wider context of ‘new racism’ 
(Barker 1981).   
The concept of anti-Muslim racism1 is used to explain the phenomenon of ‘new racism’, 
which focuses less on the hostility against Islam and more on the aggression and prejudice 
against Muslims -  that is to say anti-Muslim prejudice focuses on the ‘lives of Muslims’ in the 
West (Malik 2009).  Poynting & Mason (2007) see the current portrayal of the Muslim 
problematic arising out of a transition from anti-Asian racism, revolving around the essentialised 
‘Paki’, to anti-Muslim racism - with the objective of the hate being transferred from race to 
culture. For Kundnani (2007), contemporary discourses on ‘integrationism’ are grounded upon 
concerns over anti-Muslim political culture associated with the war on terror, self-segregation, 
alien values and forced assimilation.  
Meer & Modood (2005) have also rejected the ‘narrow view of racism’ as advocated by 
Malik (2009) by highlighting four factors that have given weight to the ‘refutation of racism in 
the ‘‘Muslim question’’’. First, they contest the argument that Muslim identity is based on 
choice, whilst racial identity is involuntary. Second, they challenge the idea that animosity is 
directed towards religion in general and not Muslims in particular. Third, they critically assess 
the view that the general population is more at ease with ethnic identity as opposed to religious 
markers. Finally, they challenge the notion that some find it difficult to sympathize with a 
minority that is perceived to be disloyal or associated with terrorism, a view that leads to a 
perception of Muslims as a threat rather than as a disadvantaged minority. 
                                                          
1
 In fact a number of similar concepts are used to describe the same phenomenon. For example Kundnani (2007) and 
Poynting and Mason (2007) prefer to use ‘anti-Muslim racism’, Malik (2009) uses ‘anti-Muslim prejudice’ whilst 
Halliday (2002) chooses to use ‘anti-Muslimism’.  
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Islamophobia came to public attention following the publication of Islamophobia: A 
Challenge for Us All by the Runneymede Trust (1997). The report  provided a definition of 
Islamophobia as ‘referring to dread or hatred of Islam and, therefore, to fear or dislike of all or 
most Muslims’. Thus it is not surprising to note that the Runneymede Trust places anti-Muslim 
prejudice within its subtext2.  The report articulates the ‘hatred of Islam’ by exploring the Closed 
and Open Views of Islam3 and a detailed assessment of anti-Muslim prejudice within education, 
the criminal justice system, the media and religiously motivated attacks, thus combining the 
macro framing of Islam with the micro experiences of Muslims in Britain. This is further 
articulated by the following: 
The term Islamophobia refers to the unfounded hostility towards Islam. It refers also to 
the practical consequences of hostility in unfair discrimination against Muslim 
individuals and communities, and to the exclusion of Muslims from mainstream political 
and social affairs.  
       (Runneymede Trust 1997:1) 
The Runneymede Trust’s follow-up report Islamophobia: Issues, Challenges and Action 
(2004) highlighted how hostility towards Islam and Muslims has taken various forms over 
‘different times and different contexts’ (Runneymede Trust 2004: 7). The report acknowledges 
how, within the context of 9/11 and 7/7, Islamophobia has become pervasive and has developed 
a global reach, with an increasing characterisation of a humanised West and a de-humanised 
‘other’.  Marranci (2004), also drawing upon a contextualised reading of Islamophobia, suggests 
                                                          
2 In fact, the title of chapter two of the report is ‘Islamophobia: The Nature of Anti-Muslim prejudice’. Despite this, 
Allen (2010) is highly critical of the way in which Islamophobia is used to refer to Muslims of Asian heritage, thus 
associating religion with ethnic identity. According to Allen (2010:62) the report substitutes ‘Muslim’ with markers of South Asian heritage 127 times, which is ‘equivalent to 70.5 per cent of all references in the text’.   
3 Closed and Open views of Islam are tabulated based upon to 8 distinctions of Islam. These distinctions are then 
compared with an open and a closed view of Islam. For example, is Islam monolithic or diverse? A closed view will 
view it as monolithic whilst an open view of Islam will consider it as diverse with internal differences.  Other 
distinctions include: whether Islam is separate/interacting, inferior/different, enemy/partner, manipulative/sincere, 
criticisms of the West rejected/considered, discrimination defended/criticised and Islamophobia seen as 
natural/problematic.  
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that it’s not  an unfounded prejudice against Islam, but rather that its roots lie in European 
perceptions of Islam acting as a ‘transruptive force’ with regard to Judeo-Christian values. 
Marranci (2004:2) goes on to argue that some of the contemporary concerns about 
multiculturalism lie in ‘Europe’s fear that, in a real multicultural environment, Islam might 
transform what Europe is today’. Fekete (2009) further demonstrates how the discourses of 
integration function: they accuse Muslim cultural practices of representing a ‘threat’ to Europe 
from within. She also notes how ‘the adherence to Islamic norms and values threatens the notion 
of Europeaness itself’ (Fekete 2009:44).   Similarly, Allen (2010) sees Islamophobia as akin to a 
new racism which essentialises and demonises Muslims as the ‘other’; as a result, Muslims are 
likely to be on the receiving end of discriminatory practices. This is further clarified by Allen’s 
(2010) following definition of Islamophobia:  
Islamophobia is an ideology, similar in theory, function and purpose to racism and other 
similar phenomena, that sustains and perpetrates negatively evaluated meaning about 
Muslims and Islam in contemporary setting in similar ways in which it has historically…As a consequence of this, exclusionary practices - practices that 
disadvantage, prejudice or discriminate against Muslims and Islam in the social, 
economic and political sphere ensue, including the subjection to violence - are in 
evidence.  
        (Allen 2010:190).  
The materials covered above draw upon three salient arguments. First, they recognise the 
ways in which the discourse of integration positions itself in opposition to the Muslim ‘other’. As 
we will observe in chapter 8, this process has a significant impact on the way in which Muslims 
define themselves.  Second, the wider historical context of Orientalism and the representation of 
the ‘other’ are significant in understanding anti-Muslim prejudice and Islamophobia. Finally, the 
role of ‘new racism’ is crucial in examining contemporary prejudice against and exclusion of 
Muslims.  
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 1.4 Integration as Shared Values 
 In the last decade there has been a growth in the use of the term ‘shared values’ by 
political actors as a way of responding to and dealing with a range of problematic policy 
concerns. Social problems, such as segregation or violent extremism, are seen as arising largely 
due to the weakening of collective identity. These political actors draw mainly on the 
communitarian approach (Etzioni 1994) which argues that a decline in moral standards and an 
increase in social ills are largely due to the expansion of citizens’ rights. According to the 
communitarian logic, civil rights need to be balanced with responsibilities; it’s only through a 
collective political project that the social problems in society can be addressed.  
 Diwan (2008), in her study of citizenship and education, notes how leading civil servants 
argue that the current problem of ‘Islam and Muslims’ can only be addressed through an asserted 
emphasis on shared values.  
This section examines the speeches made by leading UK politicians on   integration and 
the Muslim question from the perspective of the value base of the host society. Whilst these 
approaches differ in both style and substance, it will be made clear that they envisage a singular 
narrative of Britain through a set of British values imposed upon migrant communities. What 
these approaches further undermine is the articulation of an integrated society based upon 
universal values of human rights, justice and democracy (Osler & Starkey 2000; Kundnani 2007; 
Diwan 2008).  
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 Blunkett and Integration through Citizenship  
 David Blunkett, the Home Secretary during the race riots of 2001, was one of the early 
pioneers of the use of shared values in addressing the question of integration. Blunkett’s vision 
of integration can be found in the Crick Report (1998) which he commissioned. The Crick 
Report (1998) focused on the political notions of ‘education for citizenship’ for minority 
communities. This, he argued, is ‘about learning laws, codes and conventions’ or what Crick 
(1998) terms ‘common citizenship’. Essentially, what the Crick Report was advocating was the 
importance of addressing the question of political apathy with regard to poor voter turnout during 
local and national elections. The report focused on pupils’ understanding of political institutions 
in the UK and also on the importance of participating in political life through democracy and 
‘active citizenship’, which Crick (1998) saw as volunteering, cooperation and participation in 
society.   
 The Crick Report (1998) was to have a significant influence on Blunkett4; this is clear 
from the contents of the important White Paper and integration strategy published in 2002 - 
Secure Borders, Safe Haven: Integration with Diversity in Modern Britain    
 Secure Borders, Safe Haven sees the process of migration and globalisation as an 
inevitable reality of the modern world. In order to respond to these challenges, nation states need 
to ensure that integration of minority communities in general and immigrant groups in particular 
takes place. In order for this to happen, the Paper argues that ‘we need to be secure within our 
sense of belonging and identity’ and only through a collective shared identity will ‘we’ be able 
‘to embrace those who come to the UK’ (Home Office 2002:1). The White Paper used the 
                                                          
4
 David Blunkett was also a student of Bernard Crick. Blunkett appointed him to head up an advisory group on 
citizenship education  when Labour came to power in 1997. 
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perspective of the Crick Report put a strong emphasis on active citizenship based upon ‘shared 
identity’ and ‘common values’ (Home Office 2002:11).  Secure Borders placed an urgency upon 
active citizenship which is the ‘ability of new citizens to participate in society and to engage 
actively in our democracy’ (ibid). This will help people understand both their ‘rights and their 
obligations as citizens of the UK and strengthen bonds of mutual understanding between people 
of diverse cultural backgrounds’ (ibid).   
 Blunkett’s approach to integration is based upon the idea of active citizenship, whereby 
Britishness is largely measured through political participation and involvement in democratic 
structures.  A number of writers have criticised Blunkett’s idea of citizenship. Osler & Starkey 
(2000) are critical because he doesn’t cover racism in depth, which they find rather puzzling 
especially given the publication of the Lawrence Enquiry.  Furthermore, they argue that ‘there is 
an implied process of assimilation or integration which requires more effort on the part of 
minorities than for white British’ (Osler & Starkey 2000). Instead, what Osler (2000) and Diwan 
(2008) argue is to use the principles of the human rights model within schools as a way of 
understanding and tackling structural inequalities and discrimination and also to support young 
people to develop identities within the context of diversity.     
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Blair and duty of Integration 
 Tony Blair (2006), in his seminal speech on multiculturalism to the Runnymede Trust, 
chose to define integration through a set of values which unifies people as citizens. The London 
bombers of 7/7, in Blair’s understanding, were not integrated into British society despite the fact 
that all of the perpetrators were born in Britain and went to state schools. For Blair (2006), 
integration is defined through a set of British values which cannot be measured through culture 
or lifestyle choices, but are rather based upon a set of reified British values.  Blair (2006) stated: 
 When I talk about integration… It’s not about culture or lifestyle. It’s about  values. 
 It is about integrating at the point of  shared, common unifying  British values. It isn’t 
 about what defines us as people, but as citizens, the  right and duties that go with being a 
 member of our society. 
 
 The ‘rights and duties’ that Blair (2006) chose to use to define the essential values that 
made someone integrated were the ‘belief in democracy, rule of law, tolerance, equal treatment 
for all, respect for this country and shared heritage’. It is only by buying into these duties that we 
can claim ‘the right to call ourselves British’.  
 The deliberate use of and rhetorical reference to ‘our’ society, and also the ‘right to call 
ourselves British’, are grounded upon the notions of Britishness predicated upon a set of values 
that all citizens in general, but outsider Muslim communities in particular, had to fully embrace.  
After all, Blair (2006) argues that ‘the right to be in a multicultural society was always implicitly 
balanced by a duty to integrate’.  For Blair (2006), the above-defined values should be asserted 
within the public realm through set policies; this should also ensure that ‘we expect everyone to 
conform to them’.  
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Brown, patriotism and a patriotic purpose  
Gordon Brown (2006), in his Fabian New Year Conference lecture on identity and Britishness, 
almost 11 months prior to Blair’s speech on Britishness and integration, focused on the idea of 
patriotism and patriotic purpose as a way of tackling the question of integration and the Muslim 
question. Muslims are required, as a way of integrating into the political community, to 
demonstrate their allegiance, commitments and patriotism to Britishness, which for Brown 
(2006) is defined through ‘liberty, responsibility and fairness’.  
 For Brown, patriotism is based upon notions of progressive forms of Britishness which is 
defined through three fundamental values drawn from political philosophy. Brown sees ‘British 
patriotism and patriotic purpose founded on liberty for all, responsibility by all and fairness for 
all’. For Brown (2006), references to ‘patriotism owe more to progressive ideas than right-wing 
ones’. So: 
Modern progressive view of Britishness as I set out in a speech a few weeks ago does not 
retreat into self-interested individualism, but leads to  ideas of empowerment; 
responsibility does not retreat into a form of  paternalism, but is indeed a commitment to 
the strongest possible civic society; fairness is not simply a formal equality before the 
law, but is in fact a modern belief in an empowering equality of opportunity for all. 
Cameron and muscular liberalism  
More recently, the prime minster David Cameron (2011) presented his ideas on integration at a 
security conference in Munich to delegates of EU ministers and heads of state. The speech 
conflated multiculturalism and integration with security and counter-terrorism policies. First, 
Cameron made the distinction between ‘good’ Muslims who see ‘Islam as a religion practised by 
people’ and ‘bad’ Muslims who are ‘Islamic extremists’ who view Islam as a political ideology’.  
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Secondly, he uses the ‘slippery slope’ argument to draw a link between violent extremism and 
extremist or illiberal views. This, he argues, is: 
 At the furthest end of those who back terrorism to promote their ultimate       goal: 
 an entire Islamist realm, governed by an interpretation of shariah. Move  along  the 
 spectrum, and you find people who may reject violence, but who  accept various parts 
 of the extremist worldwide, including real hostility  towards  Western democracy 
 and liberal values.  
 
For Cameron (2011), one of the main causes of the Muslim problematic is the weakening 
of collective identity through an emphasis on cultural difference through state multiculturalism. 
This is further articulated as follows: 
 Under the doctrine of state multiculturalism we have encouraged different  cultures to 
 live separate lives, apart from each other and apart from the mainstream.  We’ve  even 
 failed to provide a vision of society to which they  feel they want to  belong. We’ve 
 even tolerated these segregated communities  behaving in ways  that run 
 completely counter to ours.  
 A potential way forward in addressing the Muslim question is through the idea of 
‘muscular liberalism’. Although Cameron did not define what he meant by muscular liberalism, 
his choice of a strong rhetorical vocabulary provides an insight into the hard-line approach 
against ‘tolerance’ of cultural difference. Cameron argues that ‘frankly, we need a lot less of the 
passive tolerance of recent years and a much more active, muscular liberalism’. Moreover, 
Cameron argues that belonging to the state is to believe in the principles of liberalism which are 
based on ‘freedom of speech, democracy, rule of law and equal rights of race, sex or sexuality’.      
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Critical overview of values discourse 
 To address the question of integration, Blair (2006), Brown (2006) and Cameron (2011) 
used the discourse of values as an oppositional positioning for the Muslim problematic. Whilst 
there are subtle nuances in the above approaches to shared values, a certain moral panic can 
nevertheless be seen to have been generated through the essentialised Muslim presence.  
 In addition to the oppositional positioning, there are also a number of fundamental flaws 
in the way in which shared values are conceptualised. First, given the starting premise of the 
debate, it is difficult to see how the values discussed by the above political actors are ‘shared 
values’;  rather, it is clear from the style and content of the debate that these are essentially 
values enforced by a politically dominant group on to a powerless minority group (Halstead 
1996). Second, the above discourse of values has been described as ‘aggressive majoritarianism’, 
whereby majority dislike of and prejudice towards Muslims are enforced in the name of common 
sense, integration and even security’ (Gillborn 2008:81). Third, in light of Leicester’s (1989) 
theoretical approaches to shared values, the above political positioning is grounded on an 
‘absolutist position’, which is based upon the dominant values of the host society. This position 
is compared with a ‘cultural relativist’ approach which sees the ‘shared values’ approach as 
difficult to achieve, as it is socially and culturally defined. In order to provide an exit between 
the ‘absolutist’ and ‘cultural relativist’ approach, Leicester (1989) provides a ‘limited relativist’ 
position which views shared values as a collective project that is on-going and negotiated by all 
concerned.  Finally, integration as ‘shared values’ approaches views Islam through an Orientalist 
lens - Islam is essentially different from Western secular mores and it’s only through adopting an 
enlightened Western secular world-view that Muslims can have a future in the West.  Moreover, 
the political speeches by Blair (2006), Brown (2006) and Cameron (2010) carry an implicit 
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rejection of Islam and seek to relegate it to the private sphere. According to Diwan (2008:58) 
‘this may be due to the perception that religion and, in particular, Islam cannot be relegated to 
the private sphere, and that it’s a whole way of life threatening Western values'.   
1.5 Cultural Identity and Difference: The Politics of Recognition 
This section will explore ideas of integration through the principles of pluralism. This 
position maintains that there are a number of ways in which a person can be ‘British’, which may 
ultimately require us to ‚rethink ‘Europe’ and its changing nature, so that Muslims are not a 
‘Them’ but part of a plural ‘US’, not sojourners but part of its future‛ (Modood 2005:209).  
Cultural difference is an essential feature of contemporary society. It is principally a 
result of globalisation, and economic and ecological migration. This has led some sociologists to 
describe many cities within Europe as ‘super-diverse’. According to Vertovec (2006), this 
incorporates a level of cultural difference which ruptures previous ethnic diversity within UK 
cities based upon conventional migration from the Commonwealth or countries with colonial 
links. Instead, ‘super-diversity’ comes from migration resulting from a complex, dynamic set of 
variables which results in ‘new, often small, scattered groups with multiple origins and 
transnational connected groups’ (Vertovec 2006:1).  Patterns of super-diversity have also made 
space for diverse and vibrant Muslim heritages; Muslims from South Asia no longer have a 
monopoly over the ‘Muslim voice’, but rather form a single voice along with other voices from 
Libya, Turkey, Somalia and Yemen.   
 The question of understanding cultural difference may appear to be a relatively new 
discipline but Parekh (2006), in a comprehensive assessment of various philosophical approaches 
to cultural diversity, demonstrates how our understanding of cultural difference can be traced 
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back to early Greek philosophers.  According to Parekh (2006) the early approaches using 
Christianity as a normative  world view were interested in moral monism, which argues ‘that 
only one way of life is fully human, true or the best, and that all others are defective to the extent 
that they fall short of it’ (Parekh 2006:16). Parekh (2006) further highlights how different forms 
of moral monism were used by liberal theorists, such as J.S Mill (d.1873) and others, to argue 
that liberalism, with its emphasis on autonomy and self-determination, is considered the ‘true’ 
way of living. Whilst this approach was later criticised by many contemporary liberals (Parekh 
2006), a number of other approaches to cultural difference were developed within the liberal 
tradition (Rawls 1971; Taylor 1994; Kymlicka 1995; Modood 2007). It is worth looking at two 
approaches to cultural diversity (Taylor 1994; Modood 2005, 2007, 2010), especially given their 
prominence in chapters 5 and 6.  
 
Politics of Multiculturalism   
The politics of recognition acknowledges two crucial points: first, there is a failure to recognise 
the cultural identity of minority and other underprivileged groups in society; and, second, this 
failure to recognise cultural difference has socio-psychological implications for the individuals 
or groups concerned. Taylor (1994), drawing upon a long tradition within Western philosophy, 
recognises the importance of cultural difference with its emphasis on equal respect, human 
agency and self-expressive choice. He sees the importance of the ‘politics of human dignity’, 
which he argues is closely associated with equal worth and respect. For Taylor (1994), equal 
worth and respect as a ‘universal human potential’ happens when each person is made to feel 
they deserve respect and recognition.  
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  One of the crucial elements of cultural difference is the need to recognise that human 
beings are born in and influenced by their cultural communities. Thus it is critical to appreciate 
the fact that cultural difference has value.  For Taylor (1994:68), ‘just as all must have equal civil 
rights and equal voting rights, regardless of race or culture, so all should enjoy the presumption 
that their traditional culture has value’.   Not only do all cultures have value, they also start with 
the position of equal worth which demands recognition and nurture.  
The demand there that we let cultures defend themselves, within reasonable bounds [is 
important]. But the further demand we are looking at here is that: we recognize the equal 
value of different cultures; that we not only let them survive, but acknowledge their 
worth.   
(Taylor 1994: 64). 
  Taylor’s (1994) concept of cultural recognition provides a generic template in 
understanding the necessity of cultural difference in contemporary society; it also appreciates the 
meanings and significance of culture and the role it plays in enriching the daily lives of citizens. 
Furthermore, Taylor’s (1994) conceptual framing of cultural diversity has policy implications for 
the way in which schools and the educational curriculum are constructed and administered. For 
Taylor (1994), part of the politics of recognition requires major institutions to provide 
recognition of cultural difference   in the ethos, curriculum and functioning of schools. 
  Taylor’s approach to multiculturalism has had a significant impact on the way in which 
cultural difference is perceived and articulated by a range of academics. However, Taylor’s 
model does not offer any concrete examples of how the politics of recognition work in practice. 
Modood (2007), throughout his career, has attempted to do this by articulating the recognition of 
Muslim communities within a secular liberal context.  
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 The question of Muslim integration, Modood (2007, 2011) argues, should be understood 
within the context of multiculturalism or the ‘politics of difference’. The politics of difference 
for Modood (2007) is not an individualised project but a collective group process. Moreover, the 
politics of difference, for Muslims, means that it aligns itself to other minority groups, such as 
gender, race and sexuality – this, for Modood (2007), is the ‘3+1 principle’.  Muslim groups, 
according to this principle, are not requesting any additional rights but rather advocating that the 
same rights and recognition that have been granted to the three cited groups be extended to them. 
Thus: 
 Marginalized and other religious groups, most notably Muslims, are now  utilizing the 
 same kind of argument and making the claim  that religious  identity, just like gay 
 identity, and just like certain forms of racial identity,  should not just be privatized 
 or tolerated, but should be part of the public  space.  
        (Modood 2007:70) 
Modood (2007) rejects the argument that Muslim identity cannot be associated with 
gender, sexuality or race because these are ‘ascribed and involuntary’ identities, whilst religious 
identity is essentially a matter of choice; thus religious groups should  have less recognition, 
legal protection and claim on the public space. Modood (2007) sees this argument as 
‘sociologically naive’ because: 
 No one chooses to be or not to be born into a Muslim family. Similarly, no one 
 chooses to be born into a society where to look like a Muslim or to be a  Muslim 
 creates suspicion,  hostility or failure to get a job you applied for.  
         (Modood 2007:71) 
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Cultural Identity 
A central feature in Taylor’s (1994) and Modood’s (2007) works lies in the fundamental question 
of the ‘self-concept’.  How people see themselves or define their identity is crucial to 
understanding the works of Modood and Taylor. As already noted in the works of Modood 
(2007), cultural identification is crucial in contemporary society. In fact, many people identify 
themselves, associate with others and make political claims   based on a range of cultural 
markers, such as gender, race, sexuality and religion.  In recent years there has been an increase 
in identity politics, whereby social interest groups have articulated their own narrative or made 
political claims and demands based on the above markers of identity.    
 Modood (2005), drawing upon a decade of research, articulates the pivotal role played by 
religion for second-generation South Asian communities. Modood et al. (1997) were among the 
first academics to point out the significance of recognising faith-based markers of identity for 
Muslims.  
 Modood’s (2005) works challenge the dominant conceptualisation of race and racism 
which, he argues, is embedded within the ‘Atlantocentric’ perspective, arising from the 
American experiences of racism and the civil rights movement. According to Modood this 
standpoint is rooted in the Black experience and fails to conceptualise the Muslim experience of 
racism, which is often motivated ‘by cultural motifs such as language, dress, religion and family 
structure’ (Modood 2005).   
 The recent political events in Europe and America , such as  9/11 /  7/7,  the murder of 
Theo Van Gogh in 2004, the War on Terror and the Danish Cartoons, to name but a few,  have 
played a critical role in shaping the public imagination of Muslims. Meer (2010), in light of these 
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developments, has also demonstrated the rise of Muslim identity based upon the idea of Muslim 
consciousness. Meer (2010) uses DuBois’ (2007) idea of double consciousness as a way of 
understanding the rise of Muslim consciousness through a detailed assessment of Muslim 
schools and the depiction of Muslims in the media. Double consciousness, within a Du-Boisian 
context, is a psycho-social phenomenon model used by Black or oppressed groups to negotiate 
their experiences. This is further explained as follows: 
 [T]he negro is ... born with a veil, and gifted with a second-sight in this   
 American  world - a world which yields to him no true self-   
 consciousness, but only lets him see himself through the revelation of   
 the  other world. It is a peculiar sensation, this double  consciousness,  
 this sense of  always looking at one’s self through the eyes of others,  
 of measuring one’s soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused   
 contempt and pity. One ever feels his twoness, an American, a Negro;   
 two souls, two thoughts, two un-reconciled strivings; two warring ideals   
 in one dark  body,  whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being  
 torn asunder. The history of the American Negro is the history of this     
 this longing to attain self-conscious manhood, to merge his  double  into a              
 better and  truer self. In this merging he wishes neither of the  older     
 selves be lost...He simply wishes to make It possible to be both a Negro   
  and an American, without being cursed and spat upon by his fellows, without  
 having the doors of  Opportunity  closed roughly in his face. 
         (Du Bois 1999:10-11) 
 
Meer (2010) uses the key principles as highlighted above, such as a) sense of looking at one’s 
self through the eyes of the other, b) longing to attain self-consciousness, and c) the idea of 
twoness, to understand the rise of Muslim consciousness. Meer (2010) argues that Du Bois’ idea 
is helpful because, instead of rejecting the double self, he rather attempts to reconcile the 
differences. He argues how ‘living in the two worlds at once furnishes the minority subjectivity 
with powers to see what the majority are blind to and so, through second sight add something to 
the equation of diversity’ (Meer 2010). The Muslim contribution lies within a multicultural 
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framework, where conception lies not in assimilation or separatism but rather in a sense of 
‘enduring hyphenation’.  
 The works of Modood (2007) and Meer (2010) provide a broader context of Muslim 
identity. Three other approaches, each providing their own accounts of identity, will also be 
helpful in understanding pupils’ and parental construction of Muslim identity. The first of these 
approaches explores Muslim identity as hybridised; the second approach sees Muslim identity 
based upon a connection to the Muslim ummah (community), whilst the last considers Muslim 
identity as a secularised and individualised identity.  
 
 New Ethnicities  
The sociology of identity carries a central feature which has challenged the conventional 
thinking of identity as implying sameness, stability and continuum with a central coherent 
essence which   persists throughout one’s life.  Instead, research on identity has pointed out that 
it is a socially constructed phenomenon.     
 One of the dominant approaches to identity is the notion of hybridity, which has been 
articulated mainly through post-colonial theorists such as Hall (1992) and Bhabha (1994).  They 
argue that identity is not ‘fixed’ but rather constantly in a state of flux. Bhabha (1994) rejects the 
notion of the essentialised ‘other’ with its unchanging antiquated and obscurantist world view. 
Bhabha’s (1994) work has demonstrated how hybridity within a colonial context generated a 
sense of ambivalence in the colonial administrators, which then led to the changing of the power 
dynamics between the colonisers and the colonised.  He argues that this was done largely 
through the process of mimicry which ruptures the notion of ‘fixity’ in the ‘other’. Furthermore, 
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Bhaba (1994) notes how ‘hybridity intervenes in the exercise of authority not merely to indicate 
the impossibility of its identity but to represent the unpredictability of its presence’ (Bhabha 
1994:163). For Bhabha (1994): 
  The time for ‘assimilating’ minorities to holistic and organic notions of cultural  values 
 has dramatically passed. The very language of cultural community  needs to be 
 rethought from a postcolonial perspective, in a move similar to  the profound shift 
 in the language of sexuality, the self and cultural  community, effected by feminists 
 in the 1970’s and the gay community in the  1980’s.      
   
         (Bhabha 1994: 251).  
    Hall (1996) has a slightly different approach to identity from that of Bhabha (1994). For 
Hall (1992) identity is a construct and a process, which is never completed and forever in the 
process of ‘becoming’; it is a process which is steeped in the diasporic experience. This point is 
further articulated as follows: 
 This new politics of representation has to do with awareness of black  experiences as 
 a diaspora experience and the consequence which this  carries for  the process of 
 unsettling, recombination, hybridizing and cut-and- mix.  
          (Hall 1992: 258)  
 
What the above argument of ‘new ethnicities’ or the ‘hybridity’ argument developed  by Hall 
(1992, 1996) suggests is that there is more than one way of defining and structuring one’s 
identity. New Ethnicities, for Hall (1992), provide a multiplicity of ways of being in a globalised 
consumer culture.  
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Muslim Identity in Britain or British Muslim Identity  
 
 There are three major approaches that help explore the idea of British Muslim identity. 
The first approach sees the association between British Muslim identity and the experiences of 
discrimination ‘as a fact of life’ (Archer 2003; Seddon 2010).   Seddon (2010), drawing upon 
extensive ethnographical research on the Yemeni Muslim community in Manchester, notes:  
 The combination of prejudice, discrimination and exclusion appears to have 
 heightened emphatic self-definitions of religious identity, often ruling out any 
 proximity to being British. The assertion of ‘‘Muslimness’’ in opposition to a 
 discriminatory hegemonic British identity provides a universal  ‘‘belongingness’’ 
 which further undermines the national identity. 
    
         (Seddon 2010:557) 
 
   In light of the socio-political events of the last decade, the British Muslim experience, 
according to Seddon (2010), is marked by hostile negativity. For Ansari (2000), this particular 
experience informs an identity construct based upon a resistance to hegemonic British identity 
(cited in Seddon 2010). Muslim identity is thus an identity which acts as a transruption of a 
reified hegemonic whiteness, and is essentially an oppositional discourse. Identity construct 
within this context takes a reactionary form to a hostile agent who refuses the acceptance of the 
‘other’ based on equality and equity (Modood 1992). 
 The second approach to Muslim identity observes a symbolic shift in identity- construct 
from the first generation of Muslims in Britain with their cultural ties embedded in the countries 
of their origin  to the second and third generation of Muslims born in the West whose identity is 
seen as de-culturalised, de-territorialised and, above all, highly individualised (Roy 2004). This 
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perspective perceives identity as a product of globalisation which has witnessed the significant 
transfer from the localised and traditional forms of identity of their parents to the more 
individualised forms of religiosity. According to Roy (2004), contemporary discourses on 
religiosity have the following key facets: ‘individualisation, the quest for self-realisation, 
rethinking of Islam outside the framework of a given culture and the recasting of the Muslim 
ummah in non-territorial terms’ (Roy 2004:232).  
 For Roy (2004) cultural forms of contemporary Muslim religious loyalty are grounded 
not in integration or civic or ethnic nationalism but rather in the worldwide ‘Muslim ummah’. As 
Roy (2004:19) has pointed out, ‘the Muslim ummah no longer has anything to do with a 
territorial entity. It has to be thought of in abstract or imaginary terms’.  Roy (2004) has also 
noted how the process of Westernisation through globalisation has resulted not in an increase in 
liberalism or secular humanism but rather in an appetite for religious fundamentalism because ‘it 
acknowledges without nostalgia the loss of pristine cultures, and sees as positive the opportunity 
to build a universal religious identity delinked from any specific culture, including the Western 
one perceived as corrupt and decadent’ (Roy 2004:25).  
 
 The final approach to Muslim identity sees the process of contact between Muslims and 
secular space resulting in the social and religious transformation of the Muslim community. 
Cesari (2004) sees the contact between Muslim immigrant communities in Europe as resulting in 
individualised and secular forms of religious identity which are transforming the way in which 
Muslims view their religion. Three types of religious identity are noted by Cesari (2004). For 
Cesari (2004), ethical Islam requires Muslims to hold dear the ethical tenets of religion, 
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including the legal and the ethical codes. Emotional Islam sees the connection to religion through 
an emotional contact. The manifestation of emotional Islam can be seen in donations to Muslim 
charities during times of natural disaster or political upheavals. Cultural Islam implies that 
Muslims continue to practise their faith largely on cultural grounds without heeding the deeply 
religious reasons.  
  The above approaches to Muslim identity within the context of the West may appear to 
have a number of advantages, especially as they see identity as a construct rooted in socio-
political experiences. However, there are a number of criticisms associated with the approaches. 
First, they can be seen as contradictory rather than complementary. Take, for example, the 
approach of Cesari (2004) which broadly provided an optimistic, secularised identity compared 
to the deeply fundamentalist account of Roy (2004).  Second, each perspective on identity 
explores the relationship between the subject (a Muslim) and the socio-political context, without 
exploring or examining the textual or the theological imperative for Muslim behaviour, such as 
acts of charity.  
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1.6 Conclusion   
This section provided a summary of the different ways in which integration is debated within 
distinctive socio-political contexts. The first part of this chapter provided a brief overview of 
public policy debates on integration through the prisms of community cohesion. The theme of 
community cohesion is continued in chapter two to demonstrate the intersectional nature of 
community cohesion and to explore the former government flagship project in tackling violent 
extremism and contemporary discourses in education. 
 Four distinctive and often conflicting approaches to integration were also debated in this 
chapter, namely the rhetorical approach, integration as ‘shared values’, integration as a form of 
anti-Muslim prejudice and the multicultural approach to integration. The rhetorical approach to 
integration will prove to be helpful in understanding some of the pupil and parental discourses on 
integration. Integration as ‘shared values’ is discussed further in chapter two when considering 
the educational policy on segregation. Integration as a form of anti-Muslim prejudice forms part 
of parental meta-discourse in chapter 9. The multicultural approaches to integration will also 
prove to be of relevance when examining parental discourses on integration. Some of these 
approaches are also developed and expanded throughout this dissertation.  The purpose of this 
chapter was to examine the complex and conflicting literature with regard to integration as a 
socio-political idea through which we view society.  
 Two major themes emanate from the literature review of integration; firstly, the policy 
discourse often perceives integration from a dualistic perspective, in that it sees integration as the 
liberal ideal for maintaining the social order in a complex and changing social world.  The policy 
of liberal consensus has become increasingly muscular following the events of 7/7, as 
documented in David Cameron’s (2011) speech in Munich. Secondly, there is a significant void 
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in the literature which allows Muslim communities to become active agents in shaping the 
discourse of integration. Muslims are often the object of talk, seldom are they allowed a voice to 
articulate their experiences on an important policy framing which influences their various aspects 
of their life.  In responding to both these themes, Chapter 2 will attempt to provide a critical 
overview of approaches to integration within schooling by focusing on the policy of community 
cohesion and the controversial Prevent policy. Chapter 3 will focus on the Muslim scholarly 
discourse on integration by exploring the different ways in which Muslim communities of 
Europe are debated.   
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Chapter 2: Educational Policy, Muslims and ‘Self-Segregation’ 
 
2.0:  Introduction 
 
What is the role of public policy in addressing pervasive issues such as racial and ethnic 
segregation?  For some, such debates on segregation are politically constructed myths which lack 
detailed empirical evidence (Finney and Simpson 2009); for others, they are emerging threats 
that require urgent and radical public policy intervention (Phillips 2005; Cantle 2008). A range 
of policy reports dating back to the 2001 riots in the North of England have captured the public 
‘concerns’ over segregated communities in general and non-white mono-cultural schools in 
particular.  Among them, Sir Herman Ouseley (2001) discussed the ‘virtual apartheid’ nature of 
schooling in Bradford, the Cantle Report (2001) warned of ‘parallel lives’ created by the 
schooling system, whilst the Ritchie Report (2001) encouraged Oldham to adopt policies that 
would lead to better integration and the desegregation of schools. The public discourse 
surrounding segregation reached its peak following the publication of two studies which warned 
of the pervasive nature of ethnic segregation in UK schools. The first analysis was conducted by 
Burgess and Wilson (2004) using principles based on indices of isolation and dissimilarity - two 
widely-used measures of ethnic segregation (Massey & Denton 1988). They reported high levels 
of ethnic segregation in secondary schools in England, and also suggested a relationship between 
high levels of school segregation along ethnic lines and the towns that experienced the riots 
during 2001. They thus reinforced earlier policy reports which made correlations between spatial 
segregation and racial conflicts. The second study by Johnson et al. (2006), drawing on the 
analysis of the ethnic composition of all schools in England, echoed these  findings; they 
43 
 
demonstrated how the issue of ethnic segregation is a major concern,  especially given that 
school segregation  along ethnic lines is greater than residential segregation along those same 
lines. They argued: 
It has been shown herein that not only is there ethnic segregation in the country’s primary 
and secondary schools, but also in addition – for both the South Asian populations and 
for the Black Caribbean and Black African populations – that school segregation is very 
substantially (and significantly) greater than is the case with residential segregation. 
 
 (Johnson et al. 2006:988) 
  
Despite some of the criticisms of the above approaches to measuring segregation, as 
highlighted by Banton (2001) and  Finney & Simpson ( 2009), popular discourses on ethnic 
segregation further expressed  fears of ‘Muslim ghettos’ (Carey 2008) and ‘no-go areas’ (Nazir-
Ali 2008) for white people in some northern towns. Segregated communities, parallel lives, 
Muslim ghettos and insular communities have subsequently become part of collective folk 
wisdom, which continues to influence political agendas both in the UK and in other EU countries 
with sizable Muslim populations (Kepel 2004; Bown 2007; Laborde 2008; Thomas 2011; 
Caldwell 2009).  
This chapter intends to build upon the discussions highlighted above by providing a 
detailed analysis of contemporary thinking on education and integration with particular regard to 
Muslim communities.  Two major themes are explored in this chapter; the first part provides a 
generic outline on the debates concerning Muslim communities, schooling and segregation, 
whilst the second part provides a detailed analysis of the New Labour policy of using school 
academies to tackle racial segregation in order to prevent violent extremism.   
 
44 
 
2.1: Muslim Communities and ‘self-segregation’ 
 The segregation thesis has become a dominant discourse shaping Muslim geographical 
space within the UK (Cantle 2008; Thomas 2011) and also within a range of other European 
countries such as France (Bowen 2007; Laborde 2008).  Segregation is often seen through the 
lenses of the 2001 race riots and the events of 9/11 and 7/7. Thus, the segregated nature of some 
European cities is seen by many political actors as highly problematic. The problem of 
segregation is seen to contribute towards racial tension (Cantle, 2008), violent extremism 
(Davies 2009) and questioning of loyalty (Bowen 2007).  
High levels of segregation are seen by many as being reinforced through kinship and 
family ties. The Biraderi system, in particular, within the Pakistani community is seen by some 
as playing a pivotal role in sustaining high levels of segregation (Peach 2006).  High levels of 
endogamy within some Muslim communities are also thought to play a vital role in maintaining 
closeness within community and family groups. For example, Peach (2006), drawing upon the 
2001 Census data, highlighted how 96 per cent of Muslim women married within their own faith. 
Moreover, levels of first-cousin marriages within communities in Bradford and Birmingham are 
also seen to be sustaining high levels of endogamy and homogamy; Peach (2003) estimates that 
at least 55 per cent of British Pakistani couples are first cousins.   
Ali (2010) argues that segregation of Muslim communities is best explained through the 
Islamicate5 concept of 'convivencia'. Convivencia is a Spanish concept used to describe religious 
and cultural coexistence. It allowed Muslims, Jews and Christians during the 9 - 14th century to 
                                                          
5
 Hodgson (1974), in his three-volume The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in a World Civilization, made 
the distinction between Islamic and Islamicate practices. The former description entails all religious practices based 
upon the tenets of faith, whilst the later included cultural practices, founded in Muslim societies, which do not have 
a religious basis (Hodgson 1974: v. 1: 59). 
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develop their own identity and culture, each creating and managing their own space, a situation 
accepted by the Muslim rulers and the respective communities. Ali (2010), a critic of this 
convivencia, shows how it ‘is neither a fruit juice nor a fruit salad but it is like the individual 
baskets of different fruits in a fruiterer's shop' (Ali 2010:188).  For Ali (2010), convivencia 
encouraged an idea of separateness and isolationism despite some positive features. Ali’s (2010) 
criticisms echo those of Marranci (2011) expressed through his idea of ‘hydra-multiculturalism’ 
taken from the Greek mythical monster which had independent heads (on a single body) 
occasionally fighting one another.  One of the important ways of overcoming hydra-
multiculturalism is through education, which can be used to transform Muslim communities 
living in the West. 
 This transformation has to take place through education, a field in which  urgent 
 reforms are needed to create an integrated society in the  future... Education 
 should not only teach rights and responsibilities but most  importantly for 
 developing the faculty of critical thinking, which is  internationally suppressed 
 by  Muslim religious orthodoxy... In short, the  new generation of students 
 must  be  educated not only in values of  citizenship, democracy and 
 cultural pluralism  but also to think critically  and  analyse objectively all 
 received  wisdom.  
                                                 (Ali 2010:189). 
The above debate on [self] segregation constitutes the meta-narrative for framing debates 
on the Muslim community.  Over the years a number of counter-narratives have also been 
developed which challenge this position. First, the empirical evidence to sustain the segregation 
thesis is critically scrutinised by Finney & Simpson (2009). Evidence presented in their study 
includes census and survey data together with detailed sociological commentary on some of the 
national headlines which debates on integration have hitherto informed. Finney and Simpson 
(2009) aim to counter a series of ‘myths’ surrounding the following  sensationalised media 
headlines: ‘Britain is becoming a country of ghettos’, ‘minorities do not want to be integrated’ 
46 
 
and   ‘minority whites cities’. Perhaps the most important feature of their work is  their 
exploration of how the collection and analysis of race statistics has become a highly political 
process which is further used to set political objectives. They argue how the discourse of 
‘segregation’ has become a growing issue largely due to speeches [cited below] made by Trevor 
Phillips, Chair of the Equalities and Human Rights Commission.  
Some districts are on their way to becoming fully fledged ghettos - black holes  into 
which no one goes without fear and trepidation...The walls are going up  around many 
of our communities and the bridges... are coming down.  
 
 Finney & Simpson’s (2009) study highlights how such statements by leading public 
figures help to generate a sense of moral panic which owes more to sensationalised media 
headlines than to empirical fact. The above comments, they argue, cannot be substantiated by 
any concrete evidence; they argue that no towns or cities in the UK can be classified as ghettos - 
in which 90-100% of the population is made up of one ethnic group. Furthermore, Simpson et al. 
(2007) reject the idea of self-segregation; they cite evidence, based upon census data, of Muslim 
communities in Oldham and Bradford gradually moving out of traditional Muslim areas and into 
‘non-traditional’ white neighbourhoods.  
 Second, evidence in support of Simpson is also provided by Phillips (2010). Drawing 
upon the idea of Muslim spaces of hope, Phillips (2010) highlights a number of spaces in which 
cross-cultural contacts between Muslim communities and the wider public is the norm. For 
example, Phillips and Iqbal’s (2010) study on the role of Muslim communities in the anti-war 
movement assesses the debates on the political mobilization and organizational intricacies of 
collaborative, political activities by Muslim groups in, for example, the Stop the War Coalition 
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during the Bush years. Documenting this particular part of Muslim history is immensely 
important as it shows Muslim willingness to transcend differences and to share platforms with a 
range of various political groups  to work on shared struggles.   
 Finally, Werbner (2005), drawing upon extensive anthropological data, provides a 
critique of self-segregating isolationism; her analysis traces the historical process of Muslim 
migration and settlement in Britain to show how ‘dislocations and relocations of transnational 
migration generate two paradoxes of culture’. The first, she argues, is that, in order to sink roots 
in a new country, transnational migrants begin by setting themselves culturally and socially 
apart. They form ‘encapsulated communities’. Second, within such communities, culture is 
conceived not as homogenous but rather as conflictual, open, hybridising and fluid.  
2.2: Muslim Faith Schools and ‘self-segregation’  
 Faith schools in general and Muslim schools in particular are often viewed through the 
prisms of divisiveness and segregation (Short 2002; Merry 2005; McCrery 2007; Odone 2008; 
Halstead 2009). In fact the above discourse of Muslim segregation, marked by a problematic 
presence, is extended to the Muslim faith school debate. Since the events of 9/11 and, more 
importantly, the London bombings of 7/7, Muslim schools have often been seen as incubators of 
extremism, and the reaction to fundamentalism has shaped the popular discourse with regard to 
Muslim faith schools.  
  Muslim faith schools are often projected as sectarian institutions. Grillo (1999), for 
example, singles out Muslim schools with ‘separatist beliefs’. He claims that they are determined 
to maintain and sustain culturally detached institutions. The social-cultural ethos of Muslim faith 
schools is seen as the antithesis of secular Western mores.  The educational content and values of 
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Muslim faith schools are according to David Bell (2005), chief Inspector of Schools and the head 
of the Office for Standards in Education, Muslim schools are deemed to be undermining the 
process of equipping Muslim students for life in modern Britain (Smitthers 2005). The ‘strict’ 
gender segregation of girls from the age of puberty is seen as one of the popular drivers for 
Muslim schools (Afshar 1989; Haw 1994; Basit, 1997). Gender segregation is interpreted as a 
medium through which segregation of culture is achieved and sustained.  Thus it is not surprising 
to note that, for Afshar (1989), the role of Muslim faith schools is to define Muslim women as 
potential moral and cultural anchors. For Basit (1997), Muslim faith schools are seen as a way in 
which British Muslims socialise their ‘daughters to construct a British identity by adopting and 
rejecting aspects...of British ethnicities through a combination of freedom and control (Basit 
2997: 425). Meanwhile, McCreary et al. (2007) highlight major concerns regarding Muslim faith 
schools, arguing that they are defined in opposition to the liberal West and also pose challenges 
‘to our own educational beliefs and values’ (McCreary et al. 2007:203).  More recently, 
following the same sentiments, MacEoin (2009) sees some of the Muslim faith schools rejecting 
integration and putting great emphasis on difference and on desertion of and resistance to 
Western influences.  He notes how Muslims see: 
Non-Muslim countries as part of the realm of unbelief and they see education as a 
process of inoculating children against infection by  Western ideas. As far as possible 
they try to shield children from Western influence—hence the prohibition of art, music, 
and drama—but above all children are taught to reject the Western tradition of learning 
through discussion and argument.  
         (MacEoin 2009: 9) 
Moreover, MacEoin (2009), echoing the popular discourse on Muslim faith schools, highlights 
three possible consequences:  
 There are three especially disturbing consequences of separatism. First, the 
 children in these schools are not being prepared to be the successful citizens  of a 
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 free society. Second, children who are taught to suspect and sometimes  despise 
 mainstream British culture will be more vulnerable to appeals from  violent 
 extremists. And third, the new sectarianism is undermining the  religious toleration 
 that has been the hallmark of this country for many years. 
          (ibid.) 
  To sum up, Muslim schools are seen as defining a cultural space which is grounded upon 
extended family honour and loyalty to religious tradition, all of which are seen to be in 
opposition to Western secular liberalism (Merry 2005; McCrery et al. 2007). To address some of 
these issues a number of academics have long advocated the idea of ‘common school’. The ideas 
of common schooling can be traced back to the writings of John Dewey (1916) in which he 
argued that the objective of schooling should be based upon a process that nurtures a common 
purpose or an outlook for a better future. A key process that allows this to take place is the 
sharing of social space which encourages communication between pupils. Dewey (1916) 
maintains that ‘communication is a process of sharing experience till it becomes a common 
position’ (Dewey 1916:8).   
 Pring (2008) and others (Levinson 2008; Alexandar 2008), following the spirit of 
Dewey’s (1916) notion of ‘education as a social function’ (Dewey 1916:9-19), see the purpose of 
education as creating and sustaining a ‘common culture’. Faith schools, or by extension mono-
cultural schools, are considered to be the antithesis of the desired objective of common schools. 
Common schools within this perspective are seen as promoting a sense of equality, equal respect 
for others and a sense of social justice (Pring 2008). Pring (2008) argues that if the formal 
education: 
...of young people were to achieve its fundamental purpose of preparing the next 
generation to live harmoniously together, despite the important differences in culture that 
the students bring to that community. More positively, the intermingling of those 
differences in the community of the school would be seen as an enrichment of those very 
differences. 
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        (Pring 2008:1).  
 Halstead (2008) and Haydon (1987, 2008) provide a detailed response to Pring’s (2008) 
argument by highlighting a number of anomalies. First, they scrutinise the notion of ‘common 
values’. For Halstead (2008), ‘common values’ usually translates as the ‘dominant values of the 
society’, which ‘some might see as promoting one set of loyalties (to the state) at the expense of 
another set of loyalties (to a religion, for example)’ (Halstead 2008:323). The values system 
presented within the common school can be seen as an ‘absolutist approach’ to shared values 
which, according to Leicester (1989), is grounded in the dominant values of the host societies, as 
opposed to a  limited relativist position, which views values in society as an on-going, collective 
negotiated activity.  Diwan (2008), in her work on education and citizenship, has also provided a 
critique of ‘shared values’. She argues that the focus of citizenship education within schools: 
 Should be a process of inclusive communication and collective problem- solving, 
 rather than trying to achieve the outcome of ‘shared values’.  Whilst it is 
 important for social cohesion to have substantive commonality of  values, what is 
 often not addressed however is how such commonality and  shared values is arrived 
 at. That is, the process of reaching shared values is  as least as important as shared 
 values themselves. If this is not addressed  then shared values cannot move beyond 
 merely a synonym for assimilation  into a mono-culturalism based on a numerical 
 majority.  
         (Diwan 2008:59). 
  The arguments against Muslim faith schools have also been rigorously contested by 
Halstead (2009) and Halstead & McLaughlin (2005); they see the above hypothesis of 
separatism and segregation as based upon empirically unstable and highly politicised ‘inaccurate 
and mischievous claims’ (Halstead 2009: 50). Moreover, they have defended the rights of faith 
schools in general and Muslim faith schools in particular from a framework of liberalism.  
  The argument about female autonomy and cultural control of Muslim women is 
questioned by Odone (2008). She views Muslim girls who have attended Muslim faith schools as 
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having agency. She points out how a significant number of Muslim girls attending Muslim faith 
schools go on to attend university.  
 The ‘divisive’ and ‘ghettoised’ nature of Muslim faith schools has been challenged by 
Halstead (2009), Halstead & McLaughlin (2005) and Meer (2009). Meer (2009) questions the 
notion that Muslim faith schools reject integration; instead, he demonstrates how Muslim faith 
schools actively engage in constructing and negotiating a British Muslim identity. Meer (2007) 
also questions the essentialised construct of Muslim faith schools and instead views Muslim faith 
schools as evolving spaces which recognise the importance of reflective and critical thinking. 
Most importantly he argues, echoing the works of McLaughlin (1992), that Muslim faith schools 
engage with principles of ‘delayed integration’, the idea being that the nurturing of one’s own 
faith in a formative period of schooling allows people to integrate in the future.  
 
2.3: New Labour, School Academies and the de-radicalisation imperative  
Following the July 7 bombing, British Muslims have increasingly been seen through a set of 
pathological lenses; Muslim neighbourhoods have been viewed as ‘ghettos’ which are hotbeds of 
terrorism. McGhee (2008), drawing upon published government reports, has observed soft and 
hard approaches to the Muslim question. For McGhee (2008), hard approaches include anti-
terrorism legislation, such as the Crime and Security Act 2001 (linked to internment of foreign 
national terror suspects), the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 (connected with placing terror 
suspects with control orders) and the Terrorism Act 2006 (clamping down on extremist 
influences with the introduction of acceptable and unacceptable behaviours).   
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               Soft approaches to de-radicalisation include a ‘community-relations’ approach to 
fighting terrorism, which ‚examines the central problematic associated with presenting Muslim 
communities as suspect communities in the ‘war on terror’‛ (McGhee 2008:8). Part of this 
‘community relations’ approach, which includes Cantle’s (2005) thesis of ethnic segregation 
leading to racial conflict, was extended to argue that ethnic segregation could lead to 
radicalisation and extremism (Davies 2008). The extension of community cohesion to national 
security is a theme that can be identified in the Department for Children, Schools and Families’ 
prevention of violent extremism toolkit, titled: ‘Learning Together To Be Safe’, which was 
launched after the conviction of Hamand Munshi - the youngest British person to be convicted 
under the UK Terrorism Act. Munshi was arrested in West Yorkshire on his way home from a 
GCSE chemistry exam in 2006 and sentenced to two years imprisonment for ‘downloading 
information about bomb-making material from the internet and hidden notes about martyrdom 
under his bed’ (Gammell 2008).  This toolkit provides ‘advice’ and ‘guidance’ to schools with a 
three-tiered approach to countering the extremist narrative carried out in the name of Islam. The 
first tier is defined as ‘universal actions’, which include the school ‘promoting community 
cohesion and promoting equality and wellbeing’. The second tier strengthens targeted work, 
which includes schools using the ‘curriculum to challenge extremist narratives’. Finally, and 
perhaps most controversially, is the specialist tier which encourages schools to ‘form good links 
with police and other partners to share information’.  
               Birt (2009), Dodd (2009) and Kundnani (2009) have highlighted major concerns with 
the above principles of preventing violent extremism.  They have shown how the emphasis on 
tackling violent extremism puts the integrity of the teaching profession at risk as teachers are 
increasingly expected to ‘become the eyes and ears of counter-terrorism policing’ (Kundnani 
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2009, 7).  Dodd (2009) has shown how ‘the government programme aimed at preventing 
Muslims from being lured into violent extremism is being used to gather intelligence about 
innocent people who are not yet suspected of involvement in terrorism (Dodd 2009, 1). Dodd 
(2009) revealed how a ‘nine-year-old schoolboy in east London was referred to the authorities 
after allegedly showing ‚signs of extremism‛ – the youngest case known in Britain. He was 
apparently "de-programmed" according to a ‚source with knowledge of the case‛ (ibid.).   
              The Coalition-led government’s revised Prevent Strategy (HM Government 2011) also 
reinforced the partnership work between the Department of Education (DoE) and the Office for 
Security and Counter Terrorism (OSCT) with the support of £4.7million to work with local 
authorities and schools. A further £950,000 of regional funds was also allocated to embed the 
above toolkit within schools. The revised Prevent Strategy (HM Government 2011) also placed 
the Channel Project at a strategic and central role in the fight against terror. The Channel Project 
is the government’s multi-agency risk management initiative, which despite the strong criticism 
highlighted by Kundnani (2009) together with the submissions made to the Preventing Violent 
Extremism Select Committee (House of Commons 2010), for its possible human rights 
infringements, given that young students are referred to the police for expressing controversial 
opinions. The Prevent Strategy (HM Government 2011) further integrated the Channel Project 
within the government’s child protection and safeguarding policies. The implication of this 
approach is that it blurs the boundaries between security, counter terrorism and education. It 
further undermines and puts the integrity of the teaching profession at risk, as they are 
increasingly expected to become the eyes and ears of counter-terrorism policing (Kundnani 
2009) 
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              One of the leading government figures to champion this policy of national security and 
educational policy was Sir Cyril Taylor. Taylor was a key figure in contemporary educational 
policy and his influence on both Conservative and New Labour educational thinking is clear. He 
served as an advisor to ten successive Secretaries of Education starting with the Thatcher era and 
ending in 2007.  Taylor also served as chairman of the Specialist Schools and Academies Trust 
from 1987-2007. Taylor’s (2009) policy drive makes the link between integration through 
schooling and de-radicalisation. For Taylor (2009), it’s the Muslim community  which displays a 
problematic presence. He argues that, unlike other migrant communities, the Muslim community 
has yet to be assimilated (Taylor 2009, 111). The failure to ‘assimilate’, which Taylor uses 
interchangeably with ‘integrate’ (ibid), can allow:  
 Extremist views and ideologies to be propagated resulting in radicalisation of 
individuals and leading to increased racial and religious tensions, criminal and anti-
social behaviour, and ultimately a breakdown of cohesion within the community. What, 
therefore can be done to better integrate our ethnic minorities into their communities and 
to resolve these problems? The most important way is to avoid racial and religious 
discrimination of all kinds, but a particularly effective way is to better integrate children 
at school age.  
(Taylor 2009: 112). 
 Taylor (2009) argues that Muslims can be integrated into mainstream society through the School 
Academies programme and the reason for this is grounded in a de-radicalisation imperative, 
which is summarised in the following interview:  
Our Muslim communities are much more likely to help the police over atrocities such as 
the July 7 tube bombings if they are better integrated. It is a radical step but I believe a 
multi-faith community academy initiative can create new schools in socially deprived 
areas with a far more balanced intake of pupils.  
      (Taylor, in Garner 2007)    
Taylor  is one of the senior educational advisors supporting a model of schooling which 
Gillborn (2008) has described as ‘aggressive majoritarianism’, whereby ‘majority dislike and 
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prejudice towards Muslims are enforced in the name of common sense, integration and even 
security’ (2008, 81).  The following sections provide concrete examples of Taylor’s (2009) 
policy of ‘aggressive majoritarianism’ with particular reference to the School Academies 
programmes in Blackburn, Burnley, Leeds and Oldham. 
2.4 School mergers and ethnically ‘mixed schools’  
An assessment of four local authority areas in the North of England demonstrates how some 
local authorities are using the School Academy programme as a way of tackling the issue of 
school segregation by merging schools with different ethnic cohorts.  This approach to 
desegregation typically involves a school with a mainly Muslim cohort merging with a school 
with a predominantly white intake. Table 1 provides examples of four local authorities in the 
North of England that have adopted such an approach.  
Whilst the schools highlighted in this study are not the only local authorities to have 
adopted such a measure to address the problem of racial and ethnic segregation in UK schools, 
the four local authorities used in this section nevertheless provide a better insight into the impact 
of this approach. It is crucial to note that the four local authorities that have adopted such a 
measure have not been selected randomly; all four areas in question have witnessed excessive 
media coverage of their Muslim communities. Oldham and Burnley were faced with the 2001 
summer riots. Blackburn was thrust into the media spotlight following Jack Straw’s (2006) 
article for the local Lancashire Telegraph on the niqab controversy. Finally, Leeds attracted 
international media attention after it was identified that three of the four 7/7 bombers were from 
that city; in fact two of these bombers, Hasib Hussain and Mohammad Siddique Khan, were ex-
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pupils of Mathew Murray High School in Holbeck, Leeds - which was one of the schools 
involved in the school merger (see table 1). 
 An evaluation of the school merger programme adopted by the local authorities under the 
School Academies highlights the following key trends. Firstly, schools with a predominant or 
growing Muslim cohort are a) closed down and merged with schools with mainly white intakes 
or b) closed down so that the pupils are dispersed throughout the borough. Secondly, the school 
merger changes the school boundaries and therefore limits the problem previously caused by the 
existence of mono-cultural primary feeder schools, opening up the new school to a broader 
geographic boundary. Thirdly, the physical location of the new buildings which arise from the 
school merger is most often in mainly white residential areas. Finally, all of the schools 
highlighted below have been strongly opposed by the local communities and, in the case of two 
of the schools (Leeds and Burnley), there were to experience ‘bitter warfare’ (Hutchinson and 
Roser 2005)  with ‘rising levels of racial tensions’ ( Roser 2005) which culminated in ‘full-scale 
riots’ (Murphy 2008). This is also confirmed by research on a national level, which has highlight 
the routine experience of racism and racist abuse by Muslim students as part of their schooling 
(Crowzier and Davies 2008). Furthermore, Archer’s (2003) study of Muslim boys, masculinity 
and schooling, also noted how experiences of racism can reinforce Muslim group solidarity.  
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Table 1: Details of School Academies surrounding ‘mixed schools’.  
Local 
Authority 
Predominantly Muslim school 
cohort  
School merger with 
mainly white school 
cohort  
New school created from 
merger  
Status(As of March 
2012)  
Blackburn with 
Darwen  
Beardwood High School Pupils dispersed 
throughout borough 
 - Developmental  
Burnley Ivy Bank School Habegam School Hameldon Community 
College 
Operational 
Leeds Mathew Murray High School   Merlyn Rees Community 
High 
South Leeds Academy Operational  
Oldham  Grange School - EACT - Eductrust 
Academies Charitable 
Trust - relocation mainly in 
white neighbourhood).  
Developmental(New 
Build 2013) 
Oldham Kaskenmoor Secondary School South Chadderton School Oasis Academy Developmental (New 
Build 2012) 
Oldham Breeze Hill School Counthill School Waterhead Academy     Developmental(New 
Build 2012) 
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2.5: Social Contact and Group Dynamics   
The above approach to integration and schooling is based upon principles associated with the 
social contact thesis. A number of academics (Cantle 2008; Hewstone 2006; Wagner et al. 2006; 
Thomas 2010) have highlighted empirical evidence in support of the idea that greater contact 
between different ethnic groups is a useful indicator for reducing levels of prejudice between 
groups. But Hewstone (2006) has ‘argued that integration is and must be about meaningful 
contact, anything else will not do’ (Hewstone 2006:245).  
Social contact theory6 has been used by a number of local authorities as ‘a cornerstone of 
community cohesion practice’ (Cantle 2008:116), and there is ample evidence to support this 
theory (Cantle 2008; Hewstone 2007; Wagner et al. 2006; Thomas 2011). Nevertheless, it is 
broadly agreed amongst social contact theorists that declining levels of prejudice towards 
different ethnic groups is predicated on a range of issues, such as the duration of contact, the 
voluntary or non-voluntary nature of contact and the nature of group perception (Allport 1954; 
Hewstone & Brown 1986). In fact, as Amir (1969) and Cook (1978) have identified, there are 
five conditions for effective social contact (cited in Short 2002). First, the social space must 
provide an opportunity for ‘real acquaintance’; the people in question ‘should get to know each 
other as individuals’ (Short 2002: 568).  Second, the social space should be free from prejudice 
or the reinforcing of any stereotypes. Third, contact between groups should be a coming together 
                                                          
6
 There is compelling evidence that supports the idea of social contact to reduce prejudice within schools. Academic 
literature from the United States, which has operated a policy of racial de-segregation since the case of Brown v 
Education 1954, has been a focal point for academic research assessing social contact within schools.  Evidence in 
support of social contact within the US post-Brown vs. Education can be found in Wells et al. (2005) and Erick 
(2010). Research which questions the success of the racial de-segregation of schools using empirical evidence can 
be found in Stephan & Feagin (1980), Cohen (1980) and Taylor (1986). A detailed theoretical critique of the racial 
de-segregation of schools in the US can be found in Bell (2005).  There are also many criticisms of the social 
contact model.  For example Dixon et al. (2005) have argued that contact only works within a laboratory context, 
whilst Levin et al. (2003) have argued that reduction in prejudice leads to contact rather that meaningful contact 
leading to reduction in prejudice.  In other words, less prejudicial people are more likely to seek out contact.  
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of groups of equals. Fourth, it ‘should be [a] mutually interdependent relationship’ (ibid.). 
Finally, contact should be based upon ‘equality and   equalitarian inter-group association’ (ibid.). 
The above School Academy policy to create integrated schools as a way of reducing ‘extremism’ 
through cohesion or social contact should be interpreted in the light of the above conditions of 
social contact.  
The role of history is also important in shedding light on the effectiveness of the above 
measure as advocated by New Labour policies. In fact, the above policies revive the memory of 
the 1960s policy of bussing which, according to Tomlinson (2008), was adopted by 11 local 
authorities with significant BME population. Troyna (2004) notes how the policy of bussing was 
restricted after a ‘group of white parents in the Southall district in London complained to the 
Minister of Education, Edward Boyle. They claimed that the educational progress of their 
children was being inhibited in those schools containing large numbers of non-white, mainly 
South Asian pupils’ (Troyna 2003:71). Troyna (2004) further notes how ‘Boyle’s law’ was 
introduced, requiring a 30% cap on BME pupils in a given school, when it was supported by the 
Department of Education and Science in 1965. The broader objective of the 1960s idea of 
bussing, as noted by Troyna (2003), is further described by Halstead (1988): 
The first was to assist the language development and general integration of minority 
children in the city ensuring that no schools, even in areas where the ethnic minorities 
were concentrated, had a majority of such children; the original limit of 10 per cent of 
immigrants in a school was quickly raised to 25 per cent, and raised again in 1969 to 33 per cent’.  
(Halstead 1988:27). 
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The current policy agenda also needs to acknowledge the importance of parental choice 
in shaping and maintaining racial separatism (Cumper 1994). Perhaps the most famous example 
of this was captured by Parental Alliance for Choice in Education (PACE) which supported the 
predominantly white parents of Thornhill in refusing to send their children to a school in a 
predominantly Asian area of Savile Town, as required by Kirklees Council, West Yorkshire.  
The important theme arising from this case-study is the way in which the campaign and, 
ultimately, the ‘white flight’ was framed as tension ‘between individual freedom and the public 
good’ and the shortcomings of ‘multicultural education’. More recently, Dench et al. (2006) have 
documented in their study of the East End how education was instrumental in residential ‘white 
flight’. They found a number of strategies adopted by white parents to maintain educational 
segregation. Dench et al. (2006) demonstrate, in the following, how white flight operates:   
They can get their children to white or whiter schools within the borough. They  can 
 move their children out of the borough without changing residence themselves. Or the 
 family as a whole can move elsewhere.  
       (Dench et al. 2006: 145).  
The East End study presents the ‘white flight’ as a rational act which is grounded in the 
white residents’ view of the local Asian community lowering the standards of education. They 
also perceive the local schools to be neglecting the educational needs of white children. 
Whilst the above studies highlight the importance of parental choice with regard to 
schooling, the study by Kintrea et al. (2008) demonstrated  the  importance of factoring  the issue 
of ‘territorial space’ when dealing with young people.  Kintrea et al. (2008) found how 
territoriality is a part of everyday life for many young people, particularly secondary school 
children between the ages of 13 and 17.  Territoriality was identified as ‘long-standing’ and 
‘generational’ and territorial identities were ‘frequently expressed in violent conflict with 
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territorial groups from other areas’ (Kintrea et al. 2008:4). Given the strong relationship between 
ethnic segregation in the above towns and the locations of these schools, it is interesting to note 
how opposition to the schools can be framed within a discourse that combines territoriality with 
ethnicity. 
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2.6 Conclusion 
 
Two major themes were debated in this chapter. The first theme critically explored the picture of 
segregation and isolation of Muslim communities, through mono-cultural school experiences, as 
marked by the perception of a problematic presence. Dominant discursive repertoires that are 
used to support the segregation thesis were also examined.  The salient point which the first part 
of this chapter tried to explore is the deeply contested nature of the study of segregation 
involving Muslim communities.  
The second part of this chapter examined the New Labour school academy policy of 
creating ethnically mixed schools as a de-radicalisation imperative. This part explored the public 
policy framing of Muslim communities through de-radicalisation strategies. Some of the themes 
associated with this section are developed within part 2 of this thesis through pupil discourses on 
mixed schools. This will attempt to shed light on how Muslim pupils involved the idea of 
integration within the context of schooling in the above ‘merger debate’.    
  This chapter provided two concrete examples of integration policies with objective of 
ensuring social order in society. The community cohesion and the Prevent approaches to 
integration are essentially social order discourses, both of these approaches attempts to reduce 
social unrest or prevent act of extremism. Mixed schools were seen to facilitate the process of 
integration, whilst mono-cultural state schools in general and mono-cultural Muslim faith 
schools in particular were seen as hampering the process of integration. This was further 
demonstrated by Taylor’s (2009)  policy discourse on community cohesion within the school 
academies policy, which  was seen to reflect an aggressive majoritarian approach (Gilborn 
2009), grounded in the political ideas of de-radicalisation and not on a desire to create a 
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‘common school’ (Pring 2008; Levinson 2008) based upon the liberal principles of equality, 
social justice and fairness. 
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Chapter 3:  ‘Euro-Islam’ and Muslim Discourse 
3.0 Introduction  
 The position of Muslims living in non-Muslim lands as minority communities has been a 
topic of lengthy debate amongst Muslim theologians dating back to the eighth century (Abou El 
Fadl 1994; Lewis 1994; Michot 2006). In fact, approval was given for Muslims to live in 
Christian lands by the Prophet Muhammad during the formative years of Islam (Lings 1988). 
With the expansion of the Islamic empire (Hodgson 1974) from the eighth to the eleventh 
century C.E, the topic of Muslims living under non-Muslim rule was further debated by the four 
juristic schools of thought within Sunni Islam.  In an assessment of these debates Abou El Fadl 
(1994) demonstrates how the legality of Muslims living in non-Muslim lands in the first ‘Islamic 
centuries was cryptic and ambiguous’ (Abou El Fadl 1994:141). A systematic theological 
position only matured after the twelfth century as a response to the historical and political 
changes and challenges. Abou El Fadl (1994) further notes how the ‘various positions adopted 
by the jurists were a function of specificity and reflected a dynamic process of legal 
development’ (ibid).  Contemporary debates on Muslim integration have taken a significant turn 
following the events of September 11th, covering a range of theological (Ramadan 2009, 2010), 
socio-political (Modood 1992, 2005, 2007) and historical themes (Matter 2000, 2008; Ansari 
2004; Seddon 2007; Geaves 2009; Halliday 2010)7.  
                                                          
7  The literature on the Muslim presence in the UK is vast. Matter’s (2008, 2000) contribution has been particularly valuable.  Halliday’s (2010) and Seddon’s (2007) research on the Yemeni lascars in the UK pre-1945 has provided 
valuable ethnographical insights into the Yemeni communities in Cardiff, South Shields and Birmingham. More recently, Geaves’ (2009) biography of William Abdullah Quilliam has made a useful contribution to the field of 
Muslim communities in Victorian Britain.  
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This chapter will consider the theological, anthropological and sociological works of 
mainly Muslim academics and theologians on the integration of Muslims in the West.  The first 
part of this chapter will provide a brief overview of the debates within the Muslim academic and 
theological communities. The second part will focus on a critical study of two conflicting 
approaches to integration within Europe. The final part will provide an overview of Ibn Khaldun 
and his concept of ‘asabiyya. ‘Asabiyya is a sociological term dating back to the 14th century. I 
will use it to explore, within a classical Islamic framework, the contemporary questions of group 
solidarity and the cohesion of Muslim communities.   
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3.1: Overview of MaqÁÒid al-SharÐÝa and Fiqh al-Aqalliyya  
Al-Affendi (2009) sees the emerging European Muslim identity as grounded in independence 
and creativity. For him, the integration of Muslims in Europe is not a passive act of conformity 
to existing cultural norms and values but rather a ‘positive one ‚building a new Europe‛ that can 
be richer and better’ (Al-Affendi 2009:25). Two important theological developments have 
shaped the European Muslim discourse on integration, namely the renewed interest in ‘maqÁÒid 
al-SharÐÝa and fiqh al-Aqalliyya’.    
 Fiqh al-Aqalliyya or ‘fiqh for minorities’ (Islamic jurisprudence for Muslims living as 
minorities) provides a theological imperative for the Muslim community to integrate into Europe 
whilst preserving their religious and cultural identity as Muslims living in the West (Al Alwani 
2003). Fiqh al-Aqalliyya is a new term for an old idea that used to be called fiqh al-nawÁzil, or 
‘jurisprudence of momentous events’ (Keller 1995). It captures the understanding that Muslims 
living in the West need to develop their own jurisprudence without resorting to the opinions of 
scholars from Muslim majority countries. This understanding views jurisprudence as a ‘specific 
discipline which takes into account the relationship between a religious ruling, the condition of 
the community and the location where it exists. It is a fiqh that applies to a specific group of 
people living under particular conditions with special needs that may not be appropriate for other 
communities’ (Al Alwani 2003:3). Nuh Keller (1995) notes how Fiqh al-Aqalliyya played a 
central role amongst Islamic jurists dealing with the condition of Muslim minority status. This 
was particularly the case with the Muslims living in Cordoba, in southern Spain, after the 
Christian conquest in the thirteenth century. The MÁlki madhhab (school of jurisprudence), the 
dominant school of thought for Muslims living in southern Spain, developed a body of literature 
known as the nawÁzil ahl al-QurÔuba, or the ‘momentous events of the people of Cordova’ 
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(Keller 1995).  This rich, scholarly strand of work can be seen through the fatawas, (the formal 
legal opinions of a jurist) of the MÁliki scholar Ahmad al-WanshirÐsÐ in his twelve-volume al-
MiÝyÁr al-mughrib Ýan fatÁwÁ ÝulamÁÞ IfrÐqiya wa al-Andalus wa al-Maghrib [The standard, 
expressing the fatwas of the scholars of Tunisia, Andalus and Morocco] (ibid).  
 The importance of geo-political culture in shaping Islamic theology has long been 
acknowledged by Islamic jurists from diverse schools of thought. Muslim theologians base this 
precedent on the early founders of Sunni legal thought, such as the writings of  ImÁm al-ShÁfiÝÐ 
(d.820) who  was ‘flexible with certain rulings and opinions, changing them according to the 
realities of a particular situation or specific reason which arose as they moved from one country 
to another’ (Al Alwani 2003:8).  
 Rosen’s (1989) detailed study of Islamic Shariah courts in Morocco demonstrates how 
legal opinions were framed not within strict legal parameters but through a cultural paradigm. In 
other words, judicial discretions were applied for detailed and specific cultural reasons. More 
recently, the work of Jackson (2005) has contributed towards a creative space for Black Muslim 
identity rooted within the rich cultural tapestry of African-American cultural experience. 
Furthermore, Abdullah (2004), writing within the context of broader convert communities in the 
West, has highlighted the Islamic cultural imperative: 
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 For centuries, Islamic civilization harmonized indigenous forms of cultural expression 
 with the universal norms of its sacred law. It struck a balance between temporal  beauty 
 and ageless truth and fanned a brilliant peacock’s tail of unity in diversity from  the 
 heart of China to the shores of the Atlantic. Islamic jurisprudence helped facilitate 
 this creative genius. In history, Islam showed itself to be culturally friendly and, in 
 that regard, has been likened to a crystal clear river. Its waters (Islam) are pure, sweet, 
 and life-giving but—having no color of their own - reflect the bedrock (indigenous 
 culture) over which they flow. In China, Islam looked Chinese; in Mali, it looked 
 African. Sustained cultural relevance to distinct peoples, diverse places, and different 
 times underlay Islam’s long success as a global civilization. 
        (Abdullah 2004: 1) 
 
MaqÁÒid al-SharÐÝah is an approach to Islamic theology that can be traced back to the works of 
ImÁm al-JuwaynÐ (d. 1085), his student, AbÙ ÍÁmid Al-GhazÁlÐ (d.1111) and, most importantly, 
the writings of al-ShÁÔibÐ (d.1388). The current framing of this approach can be seen in the 
writings of Yusuf al-Qardawi, Faisal Mawlawi, Muhammad al-Ghazali (d.1996) and Tariq 
Ramadan.  
   MaqÁÒid al-SharÐÝah is a complicated science which sees the nature of shariah from an 
ethical, rational and multi-dimensional perspective. The key objective of this approach is ‘the all-
encompassing principle of those higher objectives to promote good and ward off evil’ (Ramadan 
2009:71). Ramadan’s approach to MaqÁÒid al-SharÐÝah echoes the classical views of al-QarÁfÐ 
(d.1868) who stated that ‘a purpose (maqÒid) is not valid unless it leads to the fulfilment of some 
good (maÒlaÎa) or the avoidance of some mischief (mafsada)’ (Auda 2008:4).  
 The consensus amongst the ÝulamÁÞ (religious scholars) is that MaqÁÒid al-SharÐÝah lies in 
the higher objective of shariah, which constantly shifts and embraces different socio-cultural 
landscapes. For Ghazali (d.1111) the maqÒid consist of the preservation of i. religion, ii. life, iii. 
mind, and iv. lineage v. wealth. Ibn Ashur (d.1973) expanded the concept of maqÒid to include 
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freedom as one of the main purposes of shariah, whilst Muhammad al-Ghazali (d.1996) included 
principles of equality and human rights (Al Awani 2003).     
 It is clear that both of the above approaches to shariah in the West have played a crucial 
role in the Muslim discourse of integration.  It is crucial to note that the hermeneutical structure 
in which these debates are framed is grounded in a theological epistemology which places 
emphasis upon religious tradition. This meta-narrative of integration is constructed within an 
Islamic paradigm which draws upon key features of Islamic jurisprudence, including the QurÞÁn, 
sunnah, qiyÁs (analogy) Ýurf (culture) and ijtihÁd (consensus) (Kamali 1991).     
 Recently, different approaches to integration have emerged which transcend theological 
hermeneutics by using an Islamicate memory drawn from the history of MuÝtazilite8 rationalism 
(Martin et al 1997) and secular Western liberalism. This perspective on integration embraces the 
core principles of liberalism and secular public space. A number of approaches have emerged 
which attempt to achieve this, including the collective writing of the Progressive Muslim Union, 
which advocates the re-reading of Islamic texts with an emphasis on gender, justice and 
pluralism (Safi 2003).      
                                                          
8   The MuÝtazilite School influenced Muslim theology and philosophy between the 8th and 10th centuries; they 
assimilated Greek logic into Islamic philosophy and theology.  The MuÝtazilite were rationalist. They rejected 
deterministic theology and upheld principles of free will [Watt 1985].   According to Martin et al. (1997), there has 
been a growing interest in the ‘spirit of Mutazilite discourse’, especially in the works of Muhammad Arkoun 
(France), Hassan Hanafi (Egypt), and Harun Nastution (Indonesia).  It is important to stress that most of these 
writers have been at the margins of the Muslim community.   
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3.2: Tariq Ramadan: Integration a Textual Perspective  
 Ramadan is seen by many as one of the foremost Muslim intellectuals in the world9, and 
his writings and talks are accessed by Muslims and non-Muslims throughout the Western and 
Muslim majority countries. His writings have brought admiration and praise, but also criticism 
(Fourest 2007).  Ramadan’s grounding in the Western and Islamic sciences allows him to speak 
with authority on traditional Muslim scholarship and secular sciences alike.   (He holds two 
PhDs; his first thesis was on Arabic and Islamic Studies, while his second thesis focused on the 
works of Nietzsche. He also completed his traditional Islamic studies at Al-Azhar University, 
Cairo). 
 Ramadan is the author of many books that are written in French and translated into 
English. His early works examine the question of Muslim identity and political and cultural 
integration (Ramadan 1999, 2001), his later works assess the challenges of Islamic reform 
(Ramadan 2004, 2009) and, more recently, his work has attempted to develop a philosophy of 
pluralism (Ramadan 2010). His writings usually follow a set template with the first section of 
most of his books (Ramadan 1999, 2001, 2004, 2009) attempting to read and re-read Islamic 
textual sources ‘in light of a new Western context’ (Ramadan 2004:4), whilst the second section 
of his books deal with the practical implementations of his ideas. In sum, Ramadan’s works 
attempt to deal with the question of [religious] text and its application within a secular Western 
context.  
 
                                                          
9 The American Foreign Policy magazine in 2009 considered Ramadan one of the top 100 contemporary 
intellectuals in the world.  
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 In order to create a space for Islamic reform, Ramadan (2009) expands the principles of 
MaqÁÒid al-SharÐÝah as developed by al-GhazÁli (d.1111) and others, by including dignity, 
justice, creativity and diversity as objectives of the shariah. He positions himself with other 
twentieth-century Muslim reformers in developing and expanding upon the concepts of ‘iÒlÁÎ’ 
and ‘tajdÐd’ (Ramadan 2009)10. Ramadan (2009) sees an important distinction between ‘adaptive 
reform’ and ‘transformational reform’. The former sees religion merely adapting to the socio-
economic environment of the West, whilst the latter ‘is indeed imperative…it means observing 
the world, noting its changes then coming back to the text to suggest new readings, alleviations, 
or exceptions in their implementation’ (Ramadan 2009:33).   
 Ramadan’s writings have made three important contributions in developing and nurturing 
a sense of Western Muslim identity. Firstly, his writings have rejected the classical Muslim 
typology of viewing the world as dÁr al IslÁm (abode of Islam) and the West as dÁr al Îarb 
(abode of war), in other words as diametrically opposed to each other. This idea of a bipolar 
view of Islam and the West is reinforced by a number of Western writers (Huntington 1997) and 
also a world view that continues to exist within the al-Qaeda discourse (Kepel 2004; Michot 
2006). For Ramadan (2004) the West is no longer part of dar al Îarb (abode of war) but rather 
components of dÁr al ShahÁda (abode of testimony). He argues, ‘Muslims can now enter into the 
world of testimony, in the sense of undertaking an essential duty and a demand…to promoting 
goodness and justice’ (Ramadan 2004:77).    
                                                          
10 Abu Khalil (1995) sees ‘iÒlÁÎ’ as reform, such as we see manifested in the reformist writings of Abduh (d. 1905) and Rida (d.1935. The idea ‘revolves around the need for fulfilling the ethical requirements of Islam by addressing 
modern problems and by introducing modern answers that are drawn from the Quran’. TajdÐd is understood as 
Islamic revival, which according to prophetic tradition, involves the belief that God will send down someone to 
renew the faith every thousand years (ibid).  
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 Secondly, Ramadan draws a distinction between the al-ThÁbit (immutable) and the al-
Mutaghayyir (changing) within Islamic textual sources. Ramadan argues that there are key 
aspects of the text which are immutable and transcend time, space and critical inspection. These 
consist of the vertical relationship between God and His subjects, such as the Islamic creed and 
worship. The changing elements of Islamic sources deal with social affairs or horizontal 
relationships (muÝÁmalÁt) between people within a given society. For Ramadan, muÝÁmalÁt 
matters are based upon the principle that everything is allowed except for what is explicitly 
prohibited within the scripture. This, he argues, opens the prospect of: 
 …fields of rationality, creativity and research. So long as they remain  faithful to 
 principles and respect prohibitions, their intellectual, scientific, artistic and more 
 generally social, economic, and political productions are not innovations,  but instead 
 welcome achievements for the welfare of humankind  
             (Ramadan 2009:21).  
 
Finally, Ramadan’s (2009) approach to Islamic ethics is very critical of the ‘Islamic’ prefix 
before many disciplines, such as ‘Islamic economics’, ‘Islamic art’ or ‘Islamic education’. He 
argues: 
 There is no ‚Islamic economy‛ just as I said; there is no ‚Islamic  medicine‛. What 
 can be found in the Islamic Universe of reference is a series of principles  outlining 
 an ethics, a general philosophy of the economy’s goals, but there is no  such thing 
 as an economy which is  ‚Islamic‛ by essence or through some specific 
 disposition. There is no ‚Islamic economy‛, therefore, but an Islamic ethics. 
(Ramadan 2009:242).  
 
Ramadan’s (2009) guiding principle of Islamic ethics is based upon the ethos of MaqÁÒid al-
SharÐÝah, which, he argues, should respect ‘the dignity of humankind, nature and all living 
species…protect  the welfare and their development, their diversity as well as fraternity, justice 
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and solidarity’ (Ramadan 2009:243). Thus it is not surprising to note that Ramadan is a strong 
critic of Islamic schools; he argues that schools following an Islamic ethical framework ‘will 
instil a sense of diversity, human solidarity, cultural and artistic creativity’ (Ramadan 2009:280).  
Ramadan’s concept of Islamic ethics allows Muslims to move beyond the idea of integration to a 
discourse of ‚post-integration‛ which entails ‘involvement, contribution and participation’ 
(Ramadan 2010: 67-73).11 
 Ramadan has come under intense scrutiny for his works on Muslim integration; sadly 
most of these criticisms have been targeted against the ‘person’12 (Kepel 2004; Fourest 2007) as 
opposed to his ideas. Regarding Ramadan’s ideas, three major criticisms can be noted which 
have significant impacts on the construction of a Western Muslim identity. Firstly, Ramadan 
perceives Europe as a monolith. His ideas do not take into account the diverse history and socio-
political makeup of different European countries; neither does his theory account for the nature 
of public space and its approach to religious communities throughout Europe. Thus, European 
Muslim identity will naturally differ in France which has a policy of laïcité13 and in Britain 
which has traditionally recognized religion within the public space14.  Secondly, Ramadan’s 
distinction between the vertical and horizontal domains of Islam, such as the al-ThÁbit 
(immutable) and al-Mutaghayyir (changing) aspects of Islamic practice, is rather dualistic and 
                                                          
11 Philips & Iqbal (2009) provide a valuable example of a ‘post-integration’ case-study of Muslim participation and 
contribution in the anti-war movement.   
12  Ramadan is the grandson of Hasan al-Banna the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood; some of the criticisms 
against Ramadan are essentially character assassinations, unjustifiably linking Ramadan and Islamism.  
13 A number of EU countries have developed policies which radically undermine the role of Islam in the public 
space. For example Belgium, Italy and The Netherlands have legislation or pending legislation outlawing the veil in  
public. Sweden has introduced legislation which bans the construction of minarets. 
14 Fetzer & Soper (2005) provide useful account of various nation states in Europe that have provided spaces for 
religious communities.  
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bipolar. In reality there are a number of aspects of Islam which are based upon both horizontal 
and vertical relationships between ‘Man’ and God, such as marriage.  Finally, Ramadan’s 
application of MaqÁÒid al-SharÐÝah to Islamic ethics is rather contradictory. He seems to be using 
the MaqÁÒid approach as a way of transcending or often undermining key aspects of Muslim 
scholarly consensus (ijmÁÝ). For example Ramadan (2009:250-251) seems to suggest that poultry 
which are certified as organic can be classified as ÎalÁl without going through the traditional 
ritual slaughter15. These ideas not only go against the ijmÁÝ of the scholars but also go against the 
basic principles which Muslims feel are necessary components of Islamic belief.  
3.3: Bassam Tibi:  Integration - A Liberal Perspective  
Bassam Tibi was born in Damascus and educated in Germany; he is currently professor of 
International Relations at the University of Gottingen. Tibi has also served as the ‘A.D. White 
Professor at Large’ at Cornell University. In recognition of his work the German president 
Roman Herzog (b.1934) awarded him the Federal Cross of Merit - Bundesverdienstkreuz - in 
1995 for his work on Islam and the West.  
 Tibi’s works are published in German and English covering a range of topics, including 
Islamism, modernity and Euro-Islam. This section will provide an outline of Tibi’s works on 
Euro-Islam and the question of Muslim integration. In order to do this it will be necessary to 
cover Tibi’s ideas on Islamic politics and modernity as this will provide a context in which to 
understand his ideas on integration 
                                                          
15
 Ramadan is interested in understanding the principles that inform the legal position. For Ramadan, MaqÁÒid al-
SharÐÝah would necessitate the treatment of animal welfare as an important component of the act of ritual slaughter.  
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 Tibi’s works provide a critical assessment of traditional Islam in engaging in   an 
academic study of Muslim culture which embraces the idea of ‘re-thinking Islam’ (Arkoun 
1994). For Tibi it is of paramount importance that Islam be reformed so that it is compatible with 
secular Western modernity (Tibi 2002, 2008). In order for this to take place, Muslims need to 
reject some of the core elements of Islam, such as Islamic Shariah (Tibi 2008:63) and the 
concept of JihÁd (Tibi 2008:64). This, he believes, should not only be abandoned altogether but 
also replaced by an Islamic acceptance of democracy and cultural pluralism (ibid). 
   Tibi is highly critical of political Islam or Islamism, seeing Islamism as a totalitarian 
idea based upon the concept of FutuÎÁt or expansionist Islam. For Tibi (2008), ‘Islamists 
envisage replacing Westphalian order by a Global Islamicate, in which dÁr al-IslÁm (House of 
Islam), based on Íakimiyyat AllÁh (God’s rule), is enhanced to encompass the entire globe.’ 
(Tibi 2008:103) For the West,  he maintains, this should be particularly worrying, especially 
given that ‘the goal to be achieved by an ‚Islamic world revolution‛ is the pax-Islamica of a new 
world order that replaces the present one based on a Westphalian synthesis’ (ibid). He further 
adds, ‘in summing up the preceding analysis of Islamist-Jihadist internationalism resulting from 
the politicization of Islam in a ‚revolt against the West‛ it can safely be stated that the major 
target is the existing secular order’ (Tibi 2008: 118). 
  Political Islam is a topical area of academic study, especially after the events of 9/11. A 
glut of academic publications has allowed researchers to contextualize Tibi’s works. Thus it is 
not surprising to detect a number of key flaws within Tibi’s idea of Islamism. For example, 
political Islam is grounded in a number of contrasting approaches, not all of which are based 
upon Tibi’s totalitarian and expansionist thesis of challenges to Western political order. Esposito 
(1997) and Tamimi (2001) have both demonstrated how political Islam can flourish within the 
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framework of democracy. Turkey’s ruling A.K.P (Justice and Development Party) is an example 
of a political party grounded in political Islam which is eager to make the necessary political and 
judicial changes to become a member of the European Union. Moreover, Tibi’s work is rather 
dated as it does not take into account the idea of post-Islamism (Bayat 2007) or the political 
reality in most Muslim countries which have rejected Islamic parties at the ballot box (Roy 
2004). 
 The study of Muslim culture and, most importantly, the location of culture within 
changing contexts of society are pivotal in Tibi’s understanding of Islam.   For Tibi, Islam does 
not necessarily comprise theological and ritualistic aspects of the religion. Tibi argues, ‘I should 
go beyond religious doctrine and propose a view of religion as cultural systems which are in fact 
symbolic systems offering a way to perceive reality’ (Tibi 2008:29). It is within this evolving 
cultural context that Tibi locates his concept of Euro-Islam. He sees this concept as an important 
socio-political and, most importantly, a cultural imperative for Muslims living in Europe. For 
Tibi, Euro-Islam should not be complete anathema to Muslims; after all, he argues, there exists 
African and South Asian Islam.  The cultural imperative of Euro-Islam is summarized as 
follows: 
 The background to the concept of Euro-Islam comes from the observation of 
 customary, i.e. lived, Islam. In Western Africa Islam, though Arab culture by origin, 
 is basically African, just as in Indonesia it is Indonesian, accommodated to 
 adat/traditions of local cultures. In non-Arab traditions of Islam, one encounters 
 varieties of cultural accommodation. Then one may ask: why cannot Islam be 
 European in Europe, along similar lines? 
        (Tibi 2008:192) 
Moreover, given the secular liberal outlook of Europe, Euro-Islam will essentially adopt a 
secular liberal framing. He summarizes this point as follows: 
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 By the notion of Euro-Islam I denote a cultural pattern of Islam adjusted to the 
 political culture of civil society and to the separation between culture and politics. 
 This liberal design of Islam could result from a process of indigenization of Islam in 
 which Islam could become European as much as Afro-Islam in Africa is African.  
 
        (Tibi 2001:206) 
 Tibi’s analogy of African Islam or South Asian Islam is not entirely accurate because 
Islam came to Africa and South Asia as a political force. The relationship and the dynamics of 
power is completely different from ‘Euro-Islam’ especially given that Muslims came to Europe 
as migrant communities and as post-colonial subjects. Moreover, a review of Hodgson’s (1974) 
classical text on the history of Islam suggests that it was African and South Asian culture which 
adjusted to Islam rather than Islam adjusting to the political culture of a given society. More 
recently, Roy (2004) has demonstrated the ways in which Muslim communities, particularly in 
the West, are increasingly becoming individualized, de-territorialized and, more significantly, 
uprooted from local culture.  What seems to be defining the Muslim presence in Europe for Roy 
(2004) is the globalization of an imagined Muslim Þummah and the idea of Euro-Islam.  
 One question regarding Euro-Islam that Tibi is dealing with is: what does Euro-Islam 
look like? Is it an abstract or a reified term or does it work in practice? What type of cultural 
form might Euro-Islam adopt? In addressing some of these pressing questions, Tibi (2008) sees 
that ‘the substance of the notion of Euro-Islam is aimed at the incorporation of European values 
of democracy, laicite, civil society, pluralism, secular tolerance and individual human rights into 
Islamic thought’ (Tibi 2008: 157). By aspiring to or actively pursuing Euro-Islam, Muslims will 
not be rejecting their cultural heritage because ‘Euro-Islam is the very same religion as 
Islam…which is culturally adjusted to the civic culture of modernity’ (Tibi 2002: 37). In fact 
Muslims should be aware that: 
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 Identifying with the precedents of the Hellenization of Islam between the ninth and 
 twelfth centuries, which gave birth to medieval Islamic rationalism, is pertinent. The 
 Muslims of today need to revive this tradition in their heritage to open their minds, 
 thus ensuring a better future against the claims of totalitarian political Islam. 
                 (ibid.). 
 Once again, Tibi’s analogy between the Hellenization of Islam and Euro-Islam is 
problematic, for example his reference to the MuÝtazilite School which adopted and incorporated 
Greek rationalism within Islam. This was only a passing phase within Islamic history during the 
rule of al-MaÞmÙn (813-833).16 The MuÝtazilite School was rejected and replaced with 
conservative Asharite theology. Given the fact that the majority of Muslims embrace the 
Asharite or Marturidi17 creed of Islam it is difficult to envisage Tibi’s Euro-Islam embracing the 
legacy of Hellenistic Islam.  
 The idea of Euro-Islam (2010) provides an outlet for its supporters from the public policy 
impasse of segregation and the communitarian ghettoization of Muslim communities in Europe 
on the one hand and the majoritarian assimilationist rhetoric on the other. As Tibi (2001:205) 
notes, ‘the question is whether Muslim migrants would become European citizens and in my 
phrasing Euro-Muslim or whether they would prefer to live in a communitarian ghetto’.  Euro-
Islam, for Tibi, is based on the philosophy of pluralism (Grillo 1998) which provides advantages 
for both Muslims and non-Muslims. According to Karic (2002:441) Euro-Islam can be seen as 
‘liberating Muslims from self-ghettoization and ghettoization of Islam in western Europe’. For 
non-Muslims Euro-Islam provides a useful approach to the integration of Muslims into Europe 
                                                          
16
 Al-MaÞmÙn (d.833) was an Abbasid Caliph; he was closely associated with the MuÝtazilite school.  Al-MaÞmÙn 
was responsible for the miÎna (inquisition) based on the nature of the Quran which was a key doctrine of Mu’tazilite 
rationalism.  The doctrine lasted until a few months before the death of Al-MaÞmÙn in 850AD.  
17 The Asharite and Maturdi form    the dominant creed of the Muslim world. These schools of ÝAqÐda (Creed) are 
named AbÙ al-Íasan al-AshÝarÐ (d.935) and AbÙ ManÒÙr al- MÁturÐdÐ (d.944); they represent the orthodox Islamic 
Creed (Yusuf 2007).  
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post 9/11. Moreover, Euro-Islam provides a counter-argument to the Eurabia thesis which sees 
Europe gradually becoming an extension of the Muslim Maghreb (Bat Ye’or 2005; Caldwell 
2009). Tibi (2008) reassures the critics who have this particular pessimistic outlook on Islam in 
Europe by highlighting: 
 What is important is the question of what kind of Islam they adhere to. If European 
 Islam were to be accepted by Muslims living in Europe, then their presence in Europe 
 would not pose a problem, because a Euro-Islam would be in line with the idea of 
 Europe.  
        (Tibi 2008: 202)  
  
The above thesis presented by Tibi on Euro-Islam has a number of shortcomings. For example, it 
seems to suggest that Muslim communities in Europe have two narrowly defined options: either 
a secularized Muslim identity based on Euro-Islam or an insular ‘communitarian ghetto’ (ibid.). 
In fact, Muslims living in the West have a range of other possibilities based on multiculturalism 
(Modood 1992, 2005, 2007), hybridity (Hall 1992; Bhabha 1994), community cohesion (Thomas 
2003; Cantle 2005) and globalization (Roy 2004).  
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3.4 Ibn Khaldun and ‘Asabiyya  
  Arnold J. Toynbee (1975) saw the Muqaddimah of Ibn Khaldun (d.1406) as ‘undoubtedly the 
greatest work of its kind that has ever yet been created by any mind in any time or place’. 
Toynbee, the British historian and author of the twelve-volume Study of History, was influenced 
by Ibn Khaldun and his cyclical understanding of historical events (Irwin 1997). Irwin (1997) 
argues that, prior to the translation of the Muqaddimah into English18, 
 One should bear in mind that Toynbee’s transmission of the latter’s theories was of 
 some importance, for, until the appearance of Franz Rosenthal’s translation19, 
 Toynbee did more than anyone else to popularize Ibn Khaldun’s theories to the 
 English-speaking world. 
         (Irwin 1997:466)  
 Irwin (1997) also demonstrates how, through Toynbee, a number of notable historians 
specialising in Middle Eastern studies were influenced by Ibn Khaldun. Amongst the key 
historians were Albert Hourani and the great historian Marshal Hodgson. Toynbee was one of 
many scholars and academics who held Ibn Khaldun in high esteem. For the historian Philip K. 
Hitti (1978), ‘Ibn Khaldun was the greatest historian and philosopher ever produced by Islam 
and one of the greatest of all time’ (Lacoste 1984). For others he was ‘one of the fathers of 
modern cultural history and social science’ (cited in Ahmed 2005:592). In fact, for over a 
hundred years Ibn Khaldun has played an important role in shaping the Western imagination. 
This is partly due to the French colonial interest in North Africa (Lacoste 1984), but also due to 
                                                          
18
 Arnold J. Toynbee (1975) relied upon the French translation of Muqaddimah by de-Slane (1982-8) 
19 Franz Rosenthal’s translation of Muqaddimah has been welcomed by most scholars. However, a number of leading Arabists have criticised Rosenthal’s translation for failing to convey the true spirit and form of Ibn Khaldun’s account. Makdisi (1961) argues that an ‘Arabist familiar with Ibn Khaldun cannot fail to sense this alienation in spirit between text and translation’ (Makdisi 1961:59).     
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Ibn Khaldun’s historical, sociological and philosophical insights. Thus, it is not surprising to note 
that the works of Ibn Khaldun have been translated into a range of European languages20.  
 Ibn Khaldun’s major work consists of the Muqaddimah (prolegomena or introduction), a 
preface to his KitÁb al-ÝIbar or Universal History. Rosenthal (2005) writes in his introduction to 
the translation of the Muqaddimah, that this seminal text can be:  
 Regarded as the earliest attempt made by any historian to discover a pattern in the 
 changes that occur in man’s political and social organization. Rational in its approach, 
 analytical in its method, encyclopaedic in  detail, it represents an almost  complete 
 departure from traditional  historiography, discarding  conventional concepts and  
 clichés and seeking,  beyond the mere chronicle of  events, an   
 explanation - and hence a  philosophy of history. 
        (Ibn Khaldun 2005:xxxix)  
   
Ibn Khaldun was born into an aristocratic family in Seville during the Muslim rule of Andalusia. 
He came from the prestigious Khaldun family, who trace their lineage back to Hadramout in 
Yemen (Rosenthal 1958). Most historians draw attention to the scientific, intellectual and 
political fame enjoyed by the Khaldun family. The fate of the Khaldun family was to change in 
1230 when the city of Seville was defeated by the Christian army as part of the reconquista.  The 
family then took political refuge in Tunisia under the Hafsid Dynasty where Ibn Khaldun was 
born in 1331 in the city of Tunis.   
                                                          
20
  Schmidt (1930) provides a comprehensive list of all the translated manuscripts on Ibn Khaldun in a range of 
European countries, including Italy, Russia and Germany. Rosenthal (1958) also provides a useful outline in the 
introduction to his translation of the Muqaddimah.  
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The political connections of Ibn Khaldun’s family would play an important role in the 
development of his future career as an advisor to a number of leading Muslim rulers in North 
Africa (Enan 1993). This was a tumultuous period in North Africa with political rivalries 
between competing Muslim Empires. They each sought to control the important gold trade routes 
to the west of Sudan (Lacoste 1984). The Almohad Empire, which came to an end sixty years 
before the birth of Ibn Khaldun, left political offshoots in the Maghreb which were to play an 
important role in his political career. Three competing Muslim dynasties in the Maghreb 
struggled for the political control of the Almohad legacy, which included most of North Africa 
and southern Spain. The Hafsid Dynasty would rule from Ifriqiyah, which is situated in present-
day western Libya and Tunisia, while the Marinid Dynasty ruled from Morocco; finally, the 
Zayyad dynasty ruled central Maghreb from the central North African city of Tlemcen 
(Fromhertz 2011).  The political volatility in which these dynasties were caught up played an 
important role in shaping Ibn Khaldun’s Weltanschauung.  
 Ibn Khaldun was well-versed in a range of Islamic disciplines, including the 
memorization from an early age of the QurÞÁn. He was also an eclectic reader of a range of 
disciplines, including the natural sciences, geography, history and philosophy. Unlike his 
predecessors, such as Ibn Rushd (d.1198) and Ibn Sina (d.1037), he was not only interested in 
high logic and philosophical theory, but was also motivated by the desire to understand and 
explain human interaction. 
 In fact, Ibn Khaldun maintained that humans are essentially a product of their social 
environment; their future is determined by the wider social   bonds which they create and nurture 
with fellow humans. These, he argued, were vital in order for individuals to succeed in the dunyÁ 
(world) and also the Ákhira (hereafter). Ibn Khaldun’s understanding of group processes is 
82 
 
influenced by the classical Muslim perspective of ‘man’ as understood by Ibn Sina and others. 
This is demonstrated in the following observation by al-ShahrÁzÙrÐ in his al-Shajara al-IlÁhiyya  
 
 The individual human being cannot accomplish all the things that are necessary for 
 his livelihood, unless he has co-operation from someone else…Assuming that he  could 
 (somehow manage) to live (on his own), it would be (only) with great difficulty  and 
 trouble. He would not be able to obtain the various kinds of intellectual perfection 
 (that are the goal of humanity). Thus, of necessity there must exist a group the 
 members  of which co-operate to acquire many different crafts and (technical) 
 skills. In this  way, each individual accomplishes something from which his fellow 
 men can profit. (The sages) said ‚man is political by nature‛ in the sense that  he 
 needs this kind of social organization in order to live, to provide for his own 
 livelihood, to improve his  situation in this world, and to perfect his soul for the 
 next world…The proper order of such social organization is political and based  upon 
 cooperation.  
       (Quoted Ibn Khaldun 1967 xxiv-lxxv). 
  
Perhaps one of the remarkable features of Ibn Khaldun is his sociological observation of political 
events that played an important role in shaping his writings. Schmidt (1930), drawing upon the 
works of one of the founders of European sociology, Ludwig Gumplowicz (d.1909), cites 
evidence of sociological theory and empirical observations in Ibn Khaldun’s writings. This, 
Schmidt (1930) argues, relates to his classification of human societies based upon culture, 
institution, habitat and, most importantly, group solidarity as a way of understanding the impacts 
of social factors in shaping human behaviour. Rabi (1967) supports the above observation by 
Gumplowicz (Schmidt 1930) regarding Ibn Khaldun’s methodology, stating:   
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  By applying empirical procedure to social phenomena, a new element was 
 introduced into this field of study. His inclination to devote his works to facts  and 
 realities of life was clear in the task he assigned to himself, i.e. to reveal  the nature 
 of human association as it is and not as it ought to be whether  according to 
 proposed rules of ethics, religion or wisdom.   
         (Rabi 1967: 28).  
 The methodological approach underpinning the study of ‘asabiyya is essentially based on 
a ‘scientific methodology’ which emphasises the need to gather ‘facts’ rather than follow hearsay 
in order to understand social reality. This is clear from a detailed reading of the Muqaddimah. 
For example, Ibn Khaldun dismisses the works of a number of leading Muslim historians 
because they place ‘blind trust in tradition’ which undermines scrutiny and academic rigour with 
‘little effort made to get at the truth’(Ibn Khaldun 2005: 5-9). In this respect, Ibn Khaldun is a 
committed social scientist interested in understanding his socio-political environment. This is 
also confirmed by Gellner (1981:86), who suggests that ‘one of the interesting traits of Ibn 
Khaldun…is the extent to which he is a sociologist rather than a moralist’. This is clear from the 
advice he offered his political masters: ‘technical advice on points of detail, or on the wisdom of 
knowing things…he indulged in no preaching’. 
‘Asabiyya and the Rule of Four 
 The central idea of Khaldunian weltanschauung is ‘asabiyya. Some writers find the 
concept difficult to translate and have failed to capture the essence of what Ibn Khaldun was 
trying to convey. Rosenthal (1958), in his English translation of Muqaddimah, used ‘group 
feeling’ within and between people to convey the meaning of ‘‘asabiyya. A range of other 
commentators  used other synonyms to capture the essence of ‘‘asabiyya, such as ‘sense of 
solidarity’, ‘group feeling’, ‘group loyalty’, ‘esprit de corps’ (Rabi 1967: 49), ‘group 
consciousness’ (Daood 1967:xIi) and ‘group cohesion, and common will’ (cited in Laborde 
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1984:101).  ‘Asabiyya can be seen as set of attitudes and emotions governed by complex social 
processes which have psychological ramifications.  
 ‘Asabiyya is an old idea which is derived from the Arabic root word –s-b, meaning to 
‘bind’ (Lacoste1984:103). The word in fact appears in the ÎadÐth literature in the following:  
‘Does ‘‘asabiyya mean loving one’s people?’ No, replied the Prophet ‘‘asabiyya means helping 
one’s people in just action’ (ibid).   
 For Ibn Khaldun (2005), homo sapiens was essentially a product of his social 
environment. Human beings were created to live together in communities as part of a wider 
social network. He argues that they are unable to maintain a fulfilled life on their own. Given the 
fact that individuals are rational people, it is not surprising to note that individuals live together 
in groups to achieve their basic needs and also their higher socio-political objectives through 
‘asabiyya.  
 In order for ‘asabiyya to flourish, four distinct kinds of relationship are central, namely 
blood ties, alliance, clientship and religion. Each of these relationships plays a crucial role in 
protecting individuals within the group (Rabi 1967). As Ibn Khaldun notes: 
  Their defence and protection are successful only if they are close knit   
  groups of common descent. This strengthens their stamina and makes   
  them feared, since everybody’s affection for his family and his group is   
  more important than anything else.  
       (Ibn Khaldun 2005:97-98) 
As stated above, ‘asabiyya provides a sense of protection and support against external threats. 
Ibn Khaldun further notes that a successful form of ‘asabiyya generates fear and at the same time 
commands respect from other people. In order to elaborate this point, he introduces the idea of 
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‘house’. For Ibn Khaldun (2005:104), fear and respect can be generated either through religion 
(as in the case of the Abbasid Empire) or through tribal contact (Ibn Khaldun 2005:102).  The 
fear and respect of groups   based upon the principle of ‘house’ is elaborated below: 
  A ‘house’ means that a man counts noble and famous men among his   
  forebears. The fact that he is their progeny and descendant gives him   
  great standing among his fellows, for his fellows respect the great    
  standing and nobility that his ancestors acquired through their qualities.   
        (Ibn Khaldun 2005:102)  
   Ibn Khaldun (2005:160) considered religion a crucial element of ‘asabiyya. For Ibn Khaldun, 
‘group feeling is necessary to the Muslim community. Its existence enables (the community) to 
fulfil what God expects of it’.  Religious solidarity along with numerical support of citizens is 
equally crucial in maintaining political support. This is clear from the following: 
 The expansion and power of a dynasty correspond to the numerical strength of those 
 who obtain superiority at the beginning of the rule. The length of the duration also 
 depends on it. The life of anything that comes into being depends upon the strength of 
 the temper. The temper of dynasties is based upon group feeling…Group feeling, in 
 turn, depends on numerical strength. 
        (Ibn Khaldun 2005: 130) 
 The above observation also demonstrates the importance of ‘asabiyya in the formation of 
the state. Strong ‘asabiyya rooted in ÝumrÁn badawÐ (nomadic life) would gradually lead to 
movements of people towards ÝumrÁn ÎaÃÁraÞÐ (sedentary life) or life in the towns (Lacoste 
1994). ‘Asabiyya within this context would suggest giving life to new forms of living. This cycle 
of stronger tribes moving from the desert to the cities and replacing existing weaker groups was 
seen to repeat itself every four generations. The first generation of Bedouin invaders moving 
from nomadic life to the cities is loyal to its group and sees success through solidarity and 
cohesiveness. It is ‘asabiyya that gives success, sustenance and political legitimacy, and the 
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rulers ensure that these qualities that led to their success are at the centre of their priorities. The 
second generation still has association and loyalty to the group and puts in place the relevant 
support systems to nurture the rule of the founding fathers. Discord and dissent start to emerge 
with the third generation. This is when rulers begin to enjoy the luxuries of the dynastic rule and 
lose contact with the group by employing external experts.  This reliance on external support 
instead of utilising group solidarity, group cohesion and tradition leads to the further weakening 
of ‘asabiyya, and the fourth generation falls victim to new stronger forces of ‘asabiyya emerging 
from the desert to take over. The process then repeats itself.  
For Ibn Khaldun (2005), just as ‘the world of the elements and all it contains comes into being 
and decays’ (pg.105),  so group cohesion, tradition and culture through the law of nature go 
through similar modification. Society, by its nature, goes through transition and change which, 
according to Ibn Khaldun, is usually underpinned by the rule of four: 
 The rule of four (generations) with respect to prestige usually holds true. It  happens 
 that a ‘house’ is wiped out, disappears and collapses in fewer than four, or it may 
 continue unto the fifth and sixth generations, though in a state of decline and decay. 
 The four generations can be defined as the builder, the one who has personal contact 
 with the builder, the one who relies on tradition and the destroyer.   
        (Ibn Khaldun 2005: 106) 
Ernest Gellner, Akbar Ahmed: Anthropology of ‘asabiyya  
A number of academics have used the theoretical concept of ‘asabiyya to understand 
contemporary Muslim society. Gellner (1981), in his study of North African societies, applied 
the concept of ‘asabiyya along with the works of Durkheim to guide his anthropological study. 
Gellner (1981) was attempting to understand the social changes that were occurring in most 
North African societies as a result of modernity.    Gellner (1981) was interested in exploring the 
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changes from ‘mechanical solidarity’21, described by Ibn Khaldun and based on close-knit 
‘asabiyya as exemplified in pre-industrialised tribal societies, to the ‘organic solidarity’ of 
Durkheim (1997) based on complex society in an industrial context. Gellner (1981) argued that, 
despite this social transformation, group solidarity can still be maintained.  This transition from 
‘mechanical’ to ‘organic solidarity’ is further articulated in the following:  
 Contrary to the logic of Ibn Khaldun’s premises, industrial society - a mass of 
 mobile, atomised, highly specialised individuals - has exemplified its own kind  of 
 social cohesion and identification, working on a new principle which has not 
 infrequently been capable of arousing the fervour of broad masses and of  leading 
 individuals to make extreme, self-denying sacrifices. The name of that  principle is 
 nationalism.  
         (Gellner 1981:92) 
   
 More recently, Ahmed (2005, 2003) has used the Khaldunian sociology of ‘asabiyya to 
understand the post 9/11 world. For Ahmed (2003, 2005), Ibn Khaldun provides detailed answers 
to some of the pertinent issues relating to the ‘Muslim question’, such as ‘ethnicity, group 
loyalty…revenge, suicide and the tribal code’ (Ahmed 2005:591). For Ahmed (2003, 2005), the 
traditional ‘asabiyya within the Muslim world successfully transmitted cultural values which the 
next generation (Ahmed 2005:594) is gradually eroding. This is largely due to the rise of 
globalisation and modernity within the Muslim world.   For Ahmed (ibid.): 
 
 
                                                          
21
 Durkheim (1984) argues that a type of society based upon the division of labour produces certain types of 
solidarity. He highlighted two major types of group solidarities - Mechanical solidarity and Organic solidarity.  The 
former is nurtured through family and kinship ties and is found in traditional and religious societies, whilst the latter 
is based on complex, individualised and increasingly secularised forms found in industrial and modern societies.  
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 Tribal and rural groups can no longer provide ‘asabiyya; urban areas in any case  are 
 inimical to it. The result is loss of vigour and cohesion. Muslims everywhere  are 
 voicing their alarm at the breakdown of society. They know that  something is  going 
 fundamentally wrong but they are not sure why. With the  inherited colonial 
 structures of administration, politics and education  disintegrating and new ones  yet to 
 supplant or consolidate them, and with old  identities being challenged, Muslim  society 
 is in a state of flux. ‘Asabiyya is at its weakest in these societies.  
          (ibid.) 
Ahmed (2005) sees a number of factors contributing towards the collapse of ‘asabiyya in some 
Muslim countries. Many of the factors that Ahmed (2005) identifies are associated with the rise 
of industrialisation, which led societies, according to Durkheim (1984), to move from traditional 
communities to complex societies. Some of the factors that Ahmed (2005) identifies can be seen 
as follows: 
 ...‘asabiyya is collapsing [in Muslim societies] for the following reasons: mass 
 urbanization, dramatic demographical change, a population explosion, large-scale 
 migrations to the West, the gap between rich and poor (which is growing ominously), 
 the widespread corruption and mismanagement of rulers, the rampant materialism 
 coupled with the low premium on education, the crisis of identity, and, perhaps most 
 significant, new and often alien ideas and images, at once seductive and repellent, and 
 instantly communicated from the West, ideas and images that challenge traditional 
 values and customs.  
         (Ahmed 2005:595). 
 Ahmed (2003, 2005) sees the breakdown of traditional ‘asabiyya giving rise to new paradoxical 
forms of hyper-’asabiyya. Hyper-’asabiyya is based upon ‘exaggerated and even obsessive 
loyalty to one’s group and is usually expressed through hostility and often violence towards the 
other’ (Ahmed 2005:592). Ahmed (2005) concludes that the post-9/11 world is essentially 
marking the beginning of a ‘post-honour’ world. Thus, for Ahmed, Hyper-’asabiyya is the ‘cause 
and the symptom of the  post-honour world we live in’ whereby, in ‘dishonouring others’, people 
think ‘they are maintaining honour.’ (ibid)   
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‘Asabiyya and Segregation?  
 The task for sociologists interested in understanding ‘asabiyya and the question of the 
integration of Muslim communities in Europe will be to examine the relationship between 
‘asabiyya and segregation. Ahmed’s (2005) distinction between ‘asabiyya and hyper-’asabiyya 
demonstrates the positive and negative approaches to understanding group solidarity. The Hadith 
of the Prophet Muhammad (Lacoste 1984:103) suggests that ‘asabiyya is greater than blind 
loyalty to one’s group; rather it is a mechanism through which people help others at a time of 
need. More recently, contemporary scholarly discourse on Muslims in the West seems to argue 
that Muslim ‘asabiyya can be understood as transcending self-segregation or as nurturing a sense 
of hostility between ‘us’ and ‘them’. 
 March (2009, 2009a), drawing upon the works of contemporary traditional scholars such 
as Mawlawi and others (Sheikh Yusuf al-Qardawi, Sheikh Abd Allah Bin Bayya), argues how 
one of the conditions for living in the West is to partake in daÝwah, although daÝwah here is not 
understood in its conventional sense of proselytizing. Rather, it incorporates a complex set of 
terms, drawing from the QurÞÁnic narrative, including ((1) good-willed exhortation [al-mawÝiẓa 
al-Îasana]; (2) argumentation [jadal]; (3) non-coercion [lā ikrāh]; and (4) wisdom [ḥikma] 
(March 2009a:76). For Mawlawi, these conditions cannot be fulfilled without social interaction 
and the forming of bonds, trust and affectionate feelings towards non-Muslims. Thus Muslim 
‘asabiyya within a European context does not necessarily translate into self-segregation, hostility 
or indifference towards non-Muslims. Indeed, as Mawlawi has pointed out, the idea of Îubb al 
fiÔr (or innate love) towards non-Muslims should be nurtured and sustained. This is contrasted 
with love towards one’s fellow Muslims which he argues is based on Îubb al-ÝAqÐda. Thus, as 
March (2009a: 78) argues, bonds between communities should be based on ‘common interest, 
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shared experience and secular virtue’, and love for one’s fellow Muslim brother does not mean 
the hatred of fellow non-Muslims.  
 The celebrated Mauritanian scholar Sheikh Abdullah Bin Bayya also draws similar 
conclusions to Mawlawi and others that loyalty towards one’s faith does not rule out loyalty and 
obligations of citizenship to the nation state: 
 The highest and most exalted of these loyalties is that based on creed, which includes 
 faith in basic pillars of religion, the shared practice of rituals and adherence to moral 
 virtue. This relationship of loyalty is not incompatible with loyalty to a homeland, 
 which binds people together into a contract of citizenship and defends its territory  against 
 aggression. 
  
      (Cited in March 2009a:80)  
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3.5: Conclusion 
The above section highlighted the rich scholarly discourses on integration. This chapter 
demonstrated the diverse attempts made by Muslim academics in the west to articulate a 
progressive future for Muslims in the West. The perspectives highlighted above frame the 
conversation around Muslim integration and political participation through two discursive lenses. 
Ramadan (2009) tends to adopt a theological approach whilst Tibi (2001, 2008) uses secular 
liberal ideas. What both of the above detailed accounts, together with the rise of liberal and 
progressive ideas22  (Kurzman 1998; Safi 2003) of Islam taking root in the Western world, 
demonstrated is the complex and diverse ways in which integration and political participation are 
framed. Werbner’s (2000) summary of the range of Muslim scholarly discussions on integration, 
citizenship and political participation in Europe notes that ‘we find in these international debates 
among Muslim scholars an attempt to engage with and accommodate to Western democratic 
values within the framework of Islamic law…Their views highlight a shared judicial approach to 
reinterpret the law in order to adapt it to realities of everyday life’ (Wernber 2001: 314).  Ibn 
Khaldun’s work, whilst rooted in traditional Muslim scholarship, was used to explore the 
importance of ‘asabiyya in religion and Muslim group dynamics in particular. A detailed 
examination of ‘asabiyya in light of the research findings will be explored further in chapter 10.  
                                                          
22
 Liberal Islam puts emphasis on modernity and Western discursive epistemology. Kurzman (1998)  identifies three 
Muslim liberal trajectories. First, the liberal shariah approach sees shariah as essentially liberal with gender equality 
and democracy as essential features of Islam. The second, the silent shariah, argues that shariah is silent on key 
questions of modernity, which provides space for Muslims to construct a liberal future. Finally, the Interpretative 
shariah sees the role of shariah as a human endeavour which is interpreted via human action.  For Safi (2003), progressive Islam  sees greater textual emphasis on the ideas of ‘justice, pluralism and gender’ and sees the role of Muslims as promoting ideals of ‘ihÎÁn’ (beauty) and Ýadl’ (justice). Their claim is that there could be no justice in Islam ‘without gender justice’. Progressive Islam differs from liberal Islam because its proponents see their role as ‘intellectuals being involved in  ‘multiple critiques’, namely a critique of the Western epistemology and also a 
particular Muslim reading of textual sources. 
92 
 
Part 2: Methodology: Analysing Discourse  
 
4.0 METHODOLOGY  
 
4.1 Introduction 
 This chapter will be divided into three main sections; each section will explore the 
procedure and examine the technique and methods used to collect and analyse the primary data. 
The first section will provide a reflective account on issues concerning positionality and 
reflexivity. It will explore the potential impacts of the researchers’ own weltanschauung on data 
collection and interpretation.  The second section will explore the general themes associated with 
the Muslim discourse and the ‘subaltern voice’. The second section will highlight: (i) the ethical 
framework; (ii) the research method; and (iii) the data analysis associated with this study. The 
central theme of this chapter will be to firmly establish the validity and the integrity of this 
research. 
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4.2   Positionality and Reflexivity  
 Positionality, or the location of the self,   is central to assessing the question of validity in 
research. Thus it is not surprising to see that a number of scholars including the BERA guidance 
have stressed the importance of considering one’s ‘own positionality’ (Jackson 1993, cited in 
Hopkins 2007) and the ‘politics of positions’   (Rose 2007, cited in Hopkins 2007)   during the 
research process. Milner (2007) has also cautioned that there can be ‘seen, unseen and 
unforeseen’ (pg.387) dangers when researchers ‘do not pay attention to their own and others’ 
racialized and cultural systems of coming to know… the world’ (ibid).  
 In researching this project the issue of positionality and reflexivity has been a central 
component. I am conscious of the fact that I am a Muslim of Bangladeshi origin, born in the UK, 
with over 10 years of community development work experience. I have been a school governor 
for 10 years and have also served as a member of Oldham’s Standing Advisory Council for 
Religious Education (SACRE) since 2005. Since 2010 I have also been the Chair of the Oldham 
Inter-faith Forum. Researching the Muslim communities in light of this experience should bring 
about certain advantages through ‘alliance formation’ (Harvey 1996:360) and developing rapport 
and shared experiences (Hopkins 2007).  My research positionality also carried certain privileges 
with over 8 years’ experience as a local government policy analyst; I was able to use this 
experience to gain access to the research field. There are also possible shortfalls that this 
experience brings which required conscious and detailed negotiation, such as the question of 
prejudging some of the responses to school policies, the commitment to a particular line of 
thought, or attempting to prove one’s own ideas and beliefs.  I was able to negotiate some of 
these questions through reflecting upon my role as a researcher within the research process and 
dynamics, together with a critical inspection of the self within the power dynamics of data 
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collection, making myself more accountable and the research findings more valid. One of the key 
ways through which this was achieved is through the following. Firstly, for the process of data 
collection I avoided all the secondary schools or parents that I had contact with - either through 
my voluntary work or my professional role. This allowed me to approach the ‘field’ not as a 
community activist but rather as a researcher interested in understanding the social world. This 
also meant that none of the respondents were prejudiced in providing an answer which deemed 
to be politically correct.  Secondly, my approach to understanding the social world was grounded 
upon a phenomenological perspective (Denscombe 2003) that is to say that I was interested in 
understanding the social world through the eyes of the other.  In order to do this I had to 
‘bracket’ out or suspend judgment (Moustakas 1994) on any of the issues or points discussed by 
the respondents or during the process of data analysis and interpretation. This is particularly 
important because the role of the phenomenological researcher is interested in how Muslims 
interpret key political events and how they make sense of their experiences.   
 Connected to the issue of positionality is the crucial question of the intellectual project 
driving this study. Similar to the work of feminist, post-colonial and critical race theorists, this 
research project is rooted in the political nature of research. It intentionally locates the ‘subject’ 
not at the periphery of research but rather as central to the research design by recognising the 
importance of the subject’s ‘voice’. In order to achieve this it was particularly important that 
responds had the ability to articulate their voice regarding the public framing of Muslim visa via 
the question of integration. The phenomenological approach further helped ensure this though 
the process of bracketing and the quest to understand the social world through lenses of the 
subaltern. 
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 As a Muslim conducting academic research on the Muslim community in an intense 
political environment, I discovered that this research had raised a number of personal dilemmas. 
I was conscious of the fact that the object of my research had personal implications and this 
required detailed and often sensitive negotiating of the emic (insider) and etic (outsider) 
perspectives of research.  
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4.3 The Muslim Discourse and the Subaltern Voice  
The pivotal element for understanding the Muslim discourse is to focus on language as a 
means of exploring the hitherto mentioned aims (see introduction page 1). Potter & Wetherell 
(2010:1) have recognised the importance of using sociology and social psychology to study 
‘talk’, especially given the fact that it ‘orders our perception and makes things happen, and thus 
shows how language can be used to construct and create social interaction and diverse social 
worlds’. Moreover, the importance of studying speech is further reinforced by Heritage (1984), 
who argues that ‘the social world is pervasively conversational, one in which an overwhelming 
proportion of the world’s business is conducted through the medium of spoken interaction’ (cited 
in Silverman 2000:821). 
 This thesis draws upon primary source data in order to uncover a Muslim etic perspective 
on integration by providing a space for Muslims to articulate what integration means to them and 
to ‘talk’ about the political framing of integration. As already stated in the introduction (see page 
1, footnote 3), the Muslim voice is an important research topic, not only to guide the principles 
of equality and democracy, but also to inform academic debates. A number of writers have also 
supported this observation. Ahmed (2009), for example, in her report on the ‘Voices of Young 
British Muslims’, noted how ‘much is written about young Muslims but we rarely seem to 
actually hear their voices’. Fekete (2009:63), drawing upon wider academic research, has also 
stressed how ‘seldom is the ‚other‛ given a hearing, except to confirm our prejudices’.  
Furthermore, Critical Race Theorists have also observed how dominant groups in society 
construct their own discourse, which at times can be diametrically opposed to that of 
marginalised groups. Delgado (1995), one of the leading exponents of the Critical Race Theory, 
identifies: 
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 Members of what could be loosely described as out-groups, groups whose  marginality 
 defines the boundaries of the mainstream, whose voice and  perspective whose 
 consciousness - has been suppressed, devalued and  abnormalised. The attraction of 
 these stories should come as no surprise. For stories create their own bonds, 
 represent cohesion, shared understanding and meanings. The cohesiveness that  stories 
 bring is part of the strength of the group. An out-group creates its own  stories, which 
 circulate within the group  as a kind of counter- reality.      
         (Delgado 1995:64)  
 For Delgado (1995), counter-discourse can be used as a way of challenging normative 
constructs of race, racism and power relations. Moreover, stories or counter-stories are powerful 
means of resisting and challenging the hegemonic discourse of the state. Delgado (1995) shows 
how ‘most of the storytelling focus[es]  on its community - building functions: stories build 
consensus, a common culture or shared understandings, and a deeper, more vital ethics’ 
(Delgado 1995:65).  
 For the purpose of this research I will be exploring parental and pupil discourses on 
integration and schooling. The significance of examining the discourses of both of these groups 
is supported by Parker-Jenkins (2002, 2005), who has acknowledged the importance of parental 
rights and also the rights of children in educational endeavours, whilst recognising the fact that 
the rights of children may conflict with the rights of parents. This does not mean that the voices 
of the wider Muslim community, such as those of faith leaders, teachers and community 
activists, are excluded. Indeed, many of the respondents in the parental sample groups were also 
committed activists and religious leaders.  
 A research project which recognises the Muslim subaltern voice has a number of 
questions associated with it, such as (i) what constitutes a Muslim subaltern voice or (ii) why 
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review books written by non-Muslims within the sociological components of the thesis and not 
include them in the theological debates?  In response to (i), subaltern studies recognise the 
importance of  providing a space for the ‘voices’ of minority groups and the powerless,  who are 
often pushed to the margins of society (Apple & Buras 2006; Young 2006). The Muslim 
community in the UK is principally a marginalised and powerless group. This observation, is 
confirmed by a range of studies, based on a number of socio-economic and discriminatory 
indicators (Hussain 2008). The Muslim community, following the events of 9/11 and 7/7, is also 
projected through a range of negative and problematic categories in the media (Poole 2002) and 
also within public discourse (Kundnani 2007; McGhee 2008). The importance of the meaningful 
engagement of the Muslim community with questions relating to schooling is pertinent, 
especially given the fact that over 50% of all Muslims in the UK are under the age of 25, and a 
significant number of these are below the age of 16 (Ahmed 2009).  
In response to (ii), the publication of Said’s (1978) classic work on Orientalism has 
generated a lengthy debate on Europe’s ability to fully understand the ‘other’. The decision to 
exclude non-Muslim theological writings on Islam and integration from chapter 3 of this thesis 
was taken in order to demonstrate the vibrant nature of Muslim academic and theological debate 
on this topic rather than to make a Saidian epistemological point regarding the West’s essential 
bias against Islam and Muslims. Indeed, a cursory review of non-Muslim studies of Islam 
(Schimmel 1992; Esposito 1994; Hodgson 1994 Murata & Chittick 2008; Mattar 2008) and 
Muslim communities (Gellner 1981; Eade 1989, 1992, 1994), demonstrates the West’s genuine 
desire to understand the ‘other’.    
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4.3 Analysing Discourse: Methods, Principles and Analysis 
Ethical Framework 
The ethics of research are seen by Bulmer (2006:45) as requiring a ‘matter of principled 
sensitivity to the rights of others’. The importance of making ethical considerations in research 
design and practice has been of paramount importance, for example considering the historical 
connection between research and eugenics in Nazi Germany (Farrell 2005). This has led Boeije 
(2010:44) to argue that contemporary research in ‘general is a human practice, one in which 
social values and ethical principles apply and moral dilemmas occur’. 
 In order to guide this research project, ethical guidance provided by a number of 
professional bodies, such as the British Educational Research Association (BERA), the European 
Social Research Council (ESRC) Research Framework and the British Sociological Association 
(BSA) was adopted.  The ethical questions used to frame this research consist of the following. 
First, are there  any potential or actual risks of harm involved for the research participants? 
Second, how was the privacy of the respondents maintained throughout the research process? 
Third, did the respondents provide full consent? If so, how was the confidentially of the 
respondents safeguarded?  Finally, were the respondents or the agencies involved deceived in 
any way? These ethical principles will be further explored within this chapter.  
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Discourse Analysis 
    Discourse analysis (or discourse studies) is a generic term encompassing a number of 
approaches within sociology and social psychology to analyzing text and talk. These include the 
following: (i) ethnomethodology, which allows the analysis of talk in interaction in everyday life 
through conversational analysis; (ii) content analysis, which is a generic approach covering the 
analysis of documents and newspapers using Critical Discourse Analysis to explore issues of 
power, domination and social inequality and their relationship with racism and sexism, and also 
includes social psychological approaches to discourse which involve the analysis of 
conversations and interviews which have been transcribed (for further discussion see below); and 
(iii) narrative analysis, which allows researchers to assess how people use stories or counter-
stories to interpret their world.  
 It is important to recognise, in light of the above three dominant approaches to discourse 
studies, that analysis of discourse ‘is not a method but a discipline’ (van-Dijk 2007: xxvii) 
similar to other disciplines (such as sociology). Discourse analysis will draw upon a range of 
methods depending upon the objective of the study.   Thus, it is not surprising to note that two of 
the major journals for discourse analysis - Discourse Studies and Discourse and Society -  view 
discourse studies through the prism of analysing text and talk.  
 According to van-Dijk (2007) the development of discourse studies was largely shaped 
by epistemological shifts within a range of disciplines, including anthropology, sociology, 
linguistics and socio-psychology during the early 1960s. During the 1970s, discourse studies 
started to develop a common theme which provided a framework for the analysis of discourse. 
According to van-Dijk (2007) these themes can be characterised as follows. First, academic 
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research started to recognise the importance of examining naturally-occurring speech. This was 
influenced by the changes in linguistics, from the examination of sentence structure and grammar 
to the importance of analysing language ‘beyond the sentence’.  Second, social sciences started 
to recognise the importance of macro processes of language as opposed to the previous interest 
in grammar, syntax and morphology. A number of significant changes in sociology, cultural 
studies and ethnomethodology, with its emphasis on studying language in everyday life, 
facilitated this process. Third, academic debates started to feature the social and cultural context 
of language as an important area of enquiry. This was aided by sociolinguistics, with its 
emphasis on examining the relationship between language, gender, race and social class.  
Finally, semiotics and its emphasis  on the study of signs, symbols and meanings provided a 
space for the analysis of non-verbal aspects of language. This meant that non-verbal 
communications were given the same precedent as verbal communication.  
 
Discourse Analysis and Social Constructionism  
 
 The above section provided a brief overview of discourse studies by demonstrating how 
the subject became a product of cross-disciplinary and trans-disciplinary developments.  It 
established how discourse analysis was viewed as a discipline, rather than a method with a range 
of methodological approaches. More crucially, despite its wide-ranging approaches to discourse 
studies, it explored some of the common features in discourse studies by focusing on the analysis 
of the use of language in everyday life. 
 
 
102 
 
Defining Discourse Analysis  
 The research method adopted in this project is based on the works of Potter & Wetherell 
(2010). Potter & Wetherell’s approach, as highlighted in Discourse and Social Psychology,  has 
become a foundational text for  both specialist scholars (van-Dijk 2007) and also researcher 
practitioners (Charlebois 2010). According to Mills (1997), this perspective is based on a content 
analysis of discourse studies and developed because of the emphasis on the analysis of 
transcribed data. Potter & Wetherell’s (2010) approach to content analysis is based on a generic 
study of discourse: 
 We will use ‘discourse’ in its most open sense, following Gilbert and Mulkay  (1998) 
 to cover all forms of spoken interaction, formal and informal and written  text  of all 
 kinds. So when we talk of ‘discourse analysis’, we mean analysis of  any of  these 
 forms of discourse. 
        (Potter & Wetherell 2010:7)  
 
 The precise definition of discourse analysis is deeply problematic; this is largely due to 
the evolution of the discipline from different and often contrasting approaches. Moreover, it has 
led many scholars, as highlighted in the four-volume text of discourse studies edited by van-Dijk 
(2007), to use discourse analysis as a generic approach for most research associated with 
language in its cognitive or social context. Despite these uncertainties over the exact definition, I 
have adopted the content approach to discourse studies (Mills 1997). This is because the   
emphasis n this study was placed on analysis of data, which were transcribed and then analysed.  
 Discourse studies within the context of this research see discourse as a social construct, 
which can be analysed as a source of data to reveal interesting insights into aspects of a person’s 
life (Gilbert & Mulkay 1984). More importantly,   discourse analysis within the Gilbert & 
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Mulkay (1984) tradition can be utilized by researchers interested in the ‘systematic description of 
discourse employed by particular groups of social actors in specific settings’ (Gilbert & Mulkay 
1984:16).  This point has been further reinforced by a number of research studies adopting 
discourse analysis within the context of education and schooling (O’Donoghue & Punch 2003; 
McClure 2003). 
 Discourse analysis within the Potter & Wetherell (2010) tradition is interested in 
assessing how individuals attempt to socially construct their world. One of the main reasons for 
this  is based on the recognition  that discourse analysis ‘focuses attention on the process 
whereby the social world is constructed and maintained’ (Hardy 2002: 2).  This point is 
confirmed by Wood & Kroger (2000:2), who see discourse as a form of social practice, or a 
process which is used to ‘do things’. This is further articulated as follows: 
Generally speaking, the topic for discourse analysis is more properly framed not as 
language or talk, but in terms of phenomena that are constructed discursively (e.g. 
racism, abuse etc.), that is in terms of what people are doing with words. 
        (Wood & Kroger 2000: 9) 
Social Constructionism  
 A central theme that arises in the above discussion is the way in which discourse analysis 
is positioned within the idea of social constructionism.  A social constructionist view of the 
social world is based on the research principle of anti-realism, in that  ‘it denies that there is 
external reality awaiting a definitive portrayal by the researcher and it therefore disavows the 
notion that any research can arrive at a privileged account of the aspect of the social world being 
investigated (Bryman 2008: 500). Unlike other scientific approaches to research, such as the 
positivist tradition with its emphasis on empirical truths and deductive reasoning, discourse 
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analysis is based upon the social-constructionist paradigm. This idea views people constructing 
their world through social experience. Given our understanding of social science, this is not a 
novel idea. After all, Piaget (1955) demonstrated how children in schools are actively involved in 
creating their social world through experience.  
 Social constructionism, as an idea within social psychology, is derived from the work of 
Gergen (1985), who defined social constructionism as a position which is ‘principally concerned 
with elucidating the process by which people describe, explain or otherwise account for the 
world in which they live’ (Gergen 1985:3). A central premise within Gergen’s (1985) thought is 
that human beings do not reflect a given ‘reality’; rather, they are actively engaged in 
constructing and re-constructing their social world through discourse. Gergen’s (1985) view of 
social reality has major implications for this thesis, as it rejects the essentialised construct of the 
Muslim community as reflecting a fixed reality. Instead it accepts the principle of social 
constructionism, which views Muslim communities as actively constructing their social world. 
Shweder and Miller (1985) have also applied Gergen’s (1985) idea of social constructionism 
through an ethnographic study of the UK Hindu community. The study acknowledged how the 
Hindu community used the discursive positioning of Karma and the ‘just world’ hypothesis to 
make sense of their reality through constructing a world based on reincarnation - whereby a 
person’s current ‘form’ is largely based on the actions of his/her previous life. A central thesis 
within Shweder and Miller’s work (1985) is the idea that humans are not simple beings reflecting 
a given fixed reality; rather, they are active agents of social construction.  
 Potter & Wetherell (2010) have explored the implications of the social constructionist 
approach to discourse analysis by comparing two personality constructs: the traditional and 
social constructionist positions. A traditional construct of the self, they argue, ‘assumes that the 
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self has one true nature or set of characteristics waiting to be discovered and once discovered a 
correct description of these characteristics will follow’ (Potter & Wetherell 2010: 95). Potter & 
Wetherell (2010) provide a range of approaches within psychology and sociology to highlight 
the traditional construct of the self as having fixed measurable traits (as exemplified in the works 
of Eysenck 1964), or the understanding of the self as structured by their roles in society (as seen 
in the works of Mead 1934). The social constructionist position rejects these positions and 
instead focuses on the self as a social construct.   Potter & Wetherell (2010:102) argue that the 
‘question becomes not what is true nature of self but how the self is talked about - how is it 
theorized in discourse? This is a move which is welcomed by the discourse analyst’. The social 
constructionist view of personality has a radical conceptualisation of the self in that it sees ‘not 
one self - waiting to be discovered or uncovered - but a multiple of selves found in the different 
kinds of linguistical practices’ (ibid.).    
 
Discourse as function, variation and construction  
 Discourse analysis as already highlighted above is more interested in the study of 
‘linguistic content’ than of the ‘linguistic form’; the latter is preoccupied with grammar, rule, and 
syntax whilst the former sees language as a ‘social practice’ (Potter & Wetherell 2010:48). In 
other words, the objective of analysis is based on sociological questions rather than linguistic 
ones. This is clear from the fact that discourse analysis pays particular attention to three 
important components of language use, namely discourse as function, variation and construction.   
Potter & Wetherell (2010) note how: 
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 People perform actions of different kinds through talk…they accomplish the  nature 
 of these actions partly through constructing their discourse out of a  range of 
 styles, linguistic resources and rhetorical devices. 
        (Potter & Wetherell 1999:48) 
 
 The above observation acknowledges the importance of discourse as a function that is 
used to achieve set objectives. The functional element of discourse is crucial as it unveils the 
complexities behind human actions and motivations. Given that the functional element of 
discourse is rooted in changing social contexts, it comes as no surprise that the assessment of 
language reveals variations in speech content. Potter & Wetherell (2010) note how: 
 A person’s account will vary according to its function. That is to say, the  purpose of the 
 talk. For example,  if we take two descriptions of a particular  individual, we will 
 expect them to  vary in accordance with the feelings of the  person doing the 
 describing…What is happening in these cases is that  people are using language to 
 construct versions of the social world. The  principal tenet of discourse analysis is that 
 function involves construction of  versions, and is demonstrated by language variation. 
        (Potter & Wetherell 2010:33) 
 
Sampling, Access and Consent  
 Discourse analysis is interested in the context of language use as opposed to the quantity 
of the people speaking. Given the labour-intensive nature of analysing discourse, it is relatively 
common to come across classical studies using a single text (Potter & Wetherell 2010:161).  
Whilst this is true in theory, in practice the average sample size for a research project with 
similar objectives to those of this thesis includes 30 respondents. This is demonstrated in 
Charlebois’ (2010) study, examining the ‘discursive constructs of femininity amongst Japanese 
women’, or Gilbert & Mulkay’s (1984), much cited sociological study, which had a total sample 
size of 34 respondents. The sample size of this project reflects both Charlebois’ (2010) and 
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Gilbert and Mulkay’s (1984) relatively large sample sizes for discourse analysis. It is important 
to note that a large sample size in discourse studies does not signify any deficiencies within 
discourse methodology. It rather acknowledges that a large sample size will require more work 
and time (ibid.).  
 The sampling process included in this study reflects the methodological principles 
associated with qualitative research in general and discourse analysis in particular. Almost all 
research methods have strengths and weaknesses (Denscombe 2003), and discourse analysis is 
no different. Some of the many advantages associated with discourse analysis are highlighted as 
follows. Firstly, the analysis of data is grounded in social context. The discourses associated with 
Muslim communities and integration is grounded, not in ‘arm chair’ theorisation, rather within 
the social contexts of schooling and community.  Secondly, discourse analysis is more interested 
in depth of the information provided by the respondents rather than the breadth of information. 
According to Denscombe (2003) ‘thick description’ of information is best placed to explain 
complex social situations.  This particular approach is best suited for this study, especially given 
the political sensitivities associated with governance and Muslim communities (Thomas 2009). 
Finally, given that discourse analysis is interested in function, variation and construction this 
means that it is in a better position to deal with ambiguity and contradictions.  
 Some of limitations associated with discourse analysis are seen by the following. Firstly, 
given the emphasis on thick description of data means that the analysis might be less 
representative, this limitation, was partially overcome by including an eclectic mix of sample 
groups, locations and settings. The Muslim communities in UK are a super diverse (Vertovec 
2007) community, ranging from the historical Muslim communities, including communities from 
Yemen and the Indian sub-continent and the recently arrived communities from East Africa. In 
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order to capture the diverse mix of communities, the sampling process included communities 
from the historical Muslim community and the emerging Muslim communities. In order to 
ensure the sampling process reflected this diverse mix of Muslims, the geographical reach had to 
be widened to include Manchester and East London. The geographical spread is also important, 
especially given that the ‘problematic’ presence of segregated communities is often associated 
with north-mill towns. By including the respondents from other towns and cities adds to the 
geographical diversity. Secondly, it is argued that discourse analysis often assumes that the 
findings are often associated with the researcher rather than the discovery of ‘fact’. This criticism 
was mitigated through the conscious awareness of ‘self’ in the process of data gathering and data 
analysis (see section on positionality and reflexivity). Furthermore, given that this research is 
grounded within the subaltern studies perspective, means that the objective of this research is to 
give the voice to Muslim communities, thus the importance lies not in the researcher’s voice but 
rather the voice of the powerless. Finally, there is the concern that discourse analysis de-
contextualises the meaning of the findings, in other words, the process of coding and 
categorizing the data is disconnected from the location i.e. the research setting. This is a general 
criticism associated with qualitative research methods (Denscombe 2003), as a result, attempts 
were made to factor the importance of data and location. For example Table 2 and Table 4 
provides outline of the dominant categories and the themes associated with each location. Table 
5 provides an outline of how the emerging themes and categories were factored in whilst writing 
the findings section.  
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Pupil Cohort 
Three geographical areas were identified for this study – Blackburn, Burnley and Oldham.  
These local authorities were chosen owing to the media attention on ethnic integration, schooling 
and Muslim communities (a detailed discussion of this is highlighted in Chapter 2). According to 
the 2001 Census, a majority of the Muslims within these areas are of Indian sub-continental 
heritage, even though most of the respondents were born within the UK. In order to obtain a 
much broader perspective of Muslim voices, interviews in Manchester were conducted due to the 
ethnically diverse nature of the Muslim communities there. The Manchester focus groups 
allowed me to draw on a range of diverse Muslim perspectives, of Yemeni, Somali and Muslim 
convert heritages. East London was also identified as being likely to provide a wider 
geographical account of the Muslim discourse. It is important to note that the broader factors of 
diverse Muslim voices, geographical area and gender have all been included to provide a 
comprehensive account of Muslim discourse.   
 Ofsted reports were used to identify schools with mono-cultural and mixed pupil cohorts. 
The information gleaned was then combined with interviews with parents, teachers and pupils to 
ascertain the full status of each of the schools. Once this status was confirmed, a standard letter 
was sent to each school explaining the nature of the research together with a request for a 
meeting with a senior member of staff. Furthermore, as and when required, local networks were 
also used to arrange meetings with either the head teacher or members of staff responsible for 
school outreach. These preliminary meetings with individuals from each of the schools allowed 
me to explore with them the nature of the research, explain its purpose and discuss the ethical 
framework of the study. Each respective school then identified two focus groups comprising 
pupils from years 9 and 10. All the pupils participating in the study gave consent to the head 
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teacher or the relevant teacher who organised the focus groups. Before conducting each 
interview, I explained the overall objective of the study to each focus group member and 
discussed the ethical framework of the study. Following this process, each of the pupils taking 
part was asked for his/her consent to participate in the research. All the pupils identified by the 
school (with the exception of two) participated in the research. Of these two, neither could 
commit to the 45 minutes required for participation in the focus group interviews. Overall, the 
students were willing to be involved in the project; they liked the prospect of missing out on core 
teaching time! The fluency of each of the groups differed. In some cases it was difficult to 
engage the pupils with the research topic. Out of a total of 21 focus groups, 3 were compromised 
as a result of this. The remaining 18 focus groups produced high-quality data. The students 
proved to be articulate, dynamic, lucid and willing to engage generally and to discuss schooling, 
integration and Islam. Given the fact that all the schools had control over the allocation of pupils 
for the focus groups, I had no control over which pupils were chosen. Some of these groups were 
mixed-gender whilst others were single-sex groups. A comprehensive outline of each focus 
group is provided in table 2.       
 The majority of the focus groups were conducted on school premises, usually without an 
accompanying member of staff but with one exception - the Muslim Girls’ School.  This allowed 
the pupils to speak openly, without staff intervention or influence.  A number of individual 
interviews (see table 2) were also organised. These were essentially follow-up interviews with 
different pupils to examine some of the key issues in more depth.  A total of 6 of these individual 
interviews were conducted within a youth club setting, temporarily acquired through close 
contacts within three voluntary organisations (from Manchester, Oldham, and Burnley). In order 
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for these interviews to be conducted, full (written) consents were received from the respective 
parents.   
  In order to engage with diverse Muslim communities, the Somali, Yemeni, and white 
and African-Caribbean convert groups were included (see Table 3). This was achieved by 
working closely with youth groups from both Eccles and Moss Side in Greater Manchester.  
Table 2 provides an outline of the pupil sample. It identifies the location of each of the focus 
groups and the number of these groups conducted within school or youth club settings. The 
pupils’ names together with the names of the schools have been anonymised. Steps were also 
taken to keep their anonymity and privacy secure.   
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Table 2: Pupil Sample 
 
Focus Group Location  Type of 
School 
Setting  Number of 
Focus 
Groups   
Gender  
(Number) 
Size of 
Focus Group 
(Total 
Number per 
Group) 
Ethnic 
Breakdow
n  
Union College Oldham  Mixed  College 2 Mixed 6 (12) 12 Pakistani 
Rolls School  Oldham Mixed School 3 Girls (1) 
Boys (1) 
Mixed(1) 
6 (18) 9 Bangladeshi  
9 Pakistani  
Westgate School Oldham Mon-
cultural 
State 
Youth Club 1 Girls  5 (5) 5 Bangladeshi 
Hollings School  Oldham Mixed School 2 Boys (1) 
Girls (1) 
4 (8) 8 Bangladesh 
Islamiyya 
Muslim School  
Blackburn Faith 
school 
School 2 Girls  5 (10) 10 Indian 
East London 
School 
London Mixed School 3 Girls (1) 
Boys (1) 
Mixed (1) 
5 (15) 10 
Bangladeshi  
5 Pakistani 
ACS School Manchester Mixed School 2 Boys (1) 
Girls (1) 
5 (10) 
 
4 Arab 
6 Pakistani 
Manchester 
College 
Manchester Mixed Youth Club 2 Boys  5 (10) 10 Somali 
Charlestown 
School Eccles  
Manchester Mono-
cultural 
State 
Youth Club 1 Boys 8 (8) 1 Pakistani 
5 Yemeni 
2African-
Caribean 
 
Individual 
follow-up 
interviews 
Oldham, 
Burnley,  
Mono-
cultural 
State 
Mosques 6 Boys 6 3 Pakistani 
3 Bangladeshi  
   Total 18  102 102 
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Table 3 Ethnic Breakdown of Pupil Sample 
Ethnicity  Number of 
Respondents  
Pakistani 36 
Bangladeshi  35 
Indian 10 
Somali  10 
Yemeni 5 
African Caribbean 2 
Arab 4 
Total  102 
 
Parent Cohort 
A total of nineteen individual interviews and four focus groups were conducted with Muslim 
parents.  Each of these parents either had a pupil in secondary school or a child in year 6 waiting 
to attend a secondary school. As with the pupil sample, all parents’ names and personal details 
have been anonymised; steps were also taken to ensure that their anonymity and privacy will 
remain secure. 
  Table 4 below provides a breakdown of the geographical area, gender and ethnic 
background of the parental sample group. Parents’ interviews were obtained via a ‚snowballing 
sample‛, snowballing sampling as a non-probability sampling technique allowed me to locate 
and recruit parents for interviews  This method was particularly helpful, especially in locating 
‘hidden population’ of  parents who sent their children to Muslim faith schools. 
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Table 4: Breakdown of Parental Sample  
Number of 
Respondents  
(Location) 
Ethnicity 
(number) 
Gender Focus 
Groups 
Individuals  
6 (Manchester) Bangladeshi (3) 
Pakistani (3) 
Male (1)  
4 (East London) Bangladeshi Male  (4) 
5 (Manchester) 
Moss Side 
Somali (2), 
African 
Caribbean- 
convert (3)  
Male  (1)  
4 (Oldham) Bangladeshi  Male  (1)  
3 (Manchester) 
Hale, Didsbury 
White Convert 
(2),  
Pakistani (1) 
Male (2) 
Female (1) 
  (3) 
1 (Rochdale) Pakistani  Male  (1) 
8 (Oldham) Pakistani (4) 
 
Bangladeshi (4) 
Male (3), 
Female (1) 
Male (3) 
Female (1) 
 (8) 
3 (Burnley) Pashto (1) 
Bangladeshi (2) 
Male (1) 
Female (2) 
  (3) 
4 (Burnley) Bangladeshi (4) Male (2) 
Female (2)  
 (1)  
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4.4 Interviews, Transcription and Analysis of Data 
Interviews  
Frey & Oishi (1995:1) see interviews as ‘a purposeful conversation in which one person asks 
prepared questions (interviewer) and another answers them (respondent)’. Researchers working 
within the qualitative tradition have long used ‘purposeful conversations’ to aid understanding or 
reveal complexities of the social world. The effectiveness of using focus group interviews for the 
analysis of discourse has been confirmed by Goodman & Burke (2010). They note how focus 
groups are ideal for producing meaningful interaction between research participants.  
 In conventional qualitative research interviews, greater emphasis is placed on ‘obtaining 
and measuring consistency’ in the data extracted from interviews (Potter & Wetherell 2010:163). 
This is done because it is assumed that consistency is an accurate reflection of the beliefs and 
ideas of the respondents.  Discourse analysis takes into account the idea of constancy and goes a 
step further to focus on ‘how talk is constructed and what it achieves, rather than whether it is an 
accurate description of the participants’ internal state’ (Potter & Wetherell 2010:164). 
 The crucial feature of conducting interviews using discourse methodology is to try to 
generate an ‘interventionist and confrontative arena’ (ibid.) through the process of interviewing. 
Potter & Wetherell (2010) are not advocating a form of disputation during the process of 
interview, but rather stating the claim that interviews should be able to explore function, 
variation and construct of speech. One of the many ways this thesis has done this is to encourage 
pupils and parents to talk about a variety of forms of integration within mixed-school and 
monocultural school settings. 
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 For the purpose of this research, semi-structured interviews (Willig 2001) were used to 
conduct focus group and individual interviews. Potter & Hepburn (2007) define semi-structured 
interviews in discourse analysis as follows: 
 An interview of this kind will typically be guided by a schedule of topics or 
 questions, although their order in the interview may vary and interviewers are  likely 
 to depart from the schedule and use a variety of follow-up questions (or  comments, 
 responses, or some other contributions). 
 
        (Potter & Hepburn 2007:283) 
 
 This method of using semi-structured interviews with a range of open-ended questions 
was a useful approach to generate interaction and also to provide space for discussion to take 
place. This particular method of engaging with respondents to encourage speech has been an 
effective model to provoke debate and dialogue (Griffin 2007).   To help structure and guide the 
interview, Potter & Hepburn’s (2007) framework for conducting interviews was adopted. First, 
particular care was taken not to ‘flood the interview with social science agendas and categories’ 
(Potter & Hepburn 2007:12).  To do this, especially for the pupil sample, would have rendered 
the interviews useless. Second, the complex and varying footing positions of interviewer and 
interviewee were avoided as (ibid.) footing positions occur when the interviewer reports another 
person’s speech.  An example of a footing position would be to use Ramadan’s (2009) position 
on integration to shape and influence the interview discussions. Thirdly, during the focus 
groups/interviews, due care was exercised not to orientate the interviews towards a set objective 
through question and probe.      
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Transcription  
 For an effective discourse analysis to occur, a clear and comprehensive transcript of 
interview data acts as the cornerstone of successful research practice.   In order to analyse 
interview data, discourse analysts have developed a system for transcribing ‘talk’. Gail 
Jefferson’s (d.2008) transcription and notation model (see Table 5) is used within certain circles.  
The Jeffersonian (2005) model is based on a detailed and painstaking approach which puts 
emphasis on text, hesitations, overlaps, intonations, pause and length of speech measured in 
seconds. A detailed Jeffersonian transcript notation is provided below (Heritage 1984).  The 
Jeffersonian model for discourse analysis has a number of advantages; for example Potter & 
Hepburn (2007), argue: 
    The full Jeffersonian representation of talk makes most apparent the jointly 
 constructed, socially engaged nature of what is going on, including the close 
 dependence of what the interviewee says on the interviewer’s question (and vice versa) in 
 all its specifics. 
        (Potter & Hepburn 2007: 289) 
 
 
 The detailed emphasis on transcription as noted by Jefferson can also be very laborious 
and time-consuming. For example, Potter & Wetherell (2010) have calculated the ratio of tape 
time to transcription time using the Jeffersonian model.  They conclude that this  model is based 
upon the ratio of one to ten - in other words ten minutes of interview time would take an hour to 
transcribe.  
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 For the purpose of this research the Jeffersonian model was avoided for three reasons. 
First, given the size of the sample it would have been immensely time-consuming to adopt the 
model (ibid). Second, the Jeffersonian model, with its emphasis on fine details, would not have 
improved the overall quality of the data (Parker 2005).  
Table 5:  Jefferson Transcript Notation (Heritage 1984) 
Symbol Name Use 
[text] Brackets Indicates the start and end points of overlapping speech. 
= Equal Sign Indicates the break and subsequent continuation of a single utterance. 
(# of seconds) Timed Pause 
A number in parenthesis indicates the time, in seconds, of a pause in 
speech. 
(.) Micropause A brief pause, usually less than .2 seconds. 
. or  Period or Down Arrow Indicates falling pitch or intonation. 
? or  Question Mark or Up Arrow Indicates rising pitch or intonation. 
, Comma Indicates a temporary rise or fall in intonation. 
- Hyphen Indicates an abrupt halt or interruption in utterance. 
>text< 
Greater than/Less than 
symbols 
Indicates that the enclosed speech was delivered more rapidly than 
usual for the speaker. 
<text> 
Less than/Greater than 
symbols 
Indicates that the enclosed speech was delivered more slowly than 
usual for the speaker. 
 Degree symbol Indicates whisper, reduced volume, or quiet speech. 
ALL CAPS Capitalized text Indicates shouted or increased volume in speech. 
underline Underlined speech Indicates the speaker is emphasizing or stressing the speech. 
::: Colon or Colons Indicates prolongation of sound. 
(hhh)   Audible exhalation. 
or (.hhh) High Dot Audible inhalation. 
(text) Parenthesis Speech which is unclear or in doubt in the transcript. 
((italic text)) Double Parenthesis Annotation of non-verbal activity. 
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In fact, the Jeffersonian model would have been an obstruction to the overall flow and coherence 
of the transcript, especially when dealing with intonations, pauses and overlaps within the text. 
Finally, a number of canonical discourse studies (Gilbert and Mulkay 1984; Griffin 2007) have 
demonstrated alternative ways of transcribing data from a non-Jeffersonian tradition.  
 For the purpose of this study a generic approach to transcription, as suggested by Potter 
& Wetherell (2010) and based on a modification of the Jeffersonian model, was used to capture 
the detailed conversation without the aid of detailed Jeffersonian notation. During the process of 
transcription, particular attention was paid to capturing the entire conversation using the 
orthographic model.  
 Following the interview process each of the interviews was transcribed based upon the 
orthographical model highlighted above. Following the process of data transcription, each of the 
interviews were coded, this allowed the emerging categories from all of the interviews to be 
highlighted. A detailed analysis of each of categories together with the emerging themes, arising 
from the pupil and parental sample group, is highlighted in table 4. Table 5 provides a summary 
of the dominant themes arising from the discourse analysis.  
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Table 6a: Analysis of Categories and Themes  
Category 1: Mixed Schools 
Pupil Sample  Parental Sample Emerging Themes 
   
Union College, Rolls, 
Westgate, Hollings, East 
London, Manchester College, 
ACS, Charlestown, follow-up 
interviews (1,2,3,4) 
Manchester, Oldham, 
Rochdale, Burnley 
Social contact as ‘norm’ 
 Manchester, Oldham, 
Rochdale, Burnley, Hale 
Mixed schools in middle class areas 
Union College, Rolls, 
Westgate, Hollings, East 
London, Manchester College, 
ACS, Charlestown, follow-up 
interviews (1,2,3,4) 
 Integration seen as  ‘mixing’ 
Union College,Westgate, 
Hollings, East London, 
Manchester College, ACS, 
Charlestown, follow-up 
interviews (1,2,3,4) 
 Mixed school ideal- help learn other people’s culture/ religion. Mixed school = ‘knowing each other’.  
Union College, Rolls, 
Westgate, Hollings, East 
London, Manchester College, 
ACS, Charlestown, follow-up 
interviews (1,2,3,4) 
  Imperative- help prepare for ‘future’, ‘real world’, ‘work’, ‘college/university’ , ‘multi-cultural society’. Occurred 
despite of sticking together- racial 
religious group solidarity. 
Union College, Rolls, Hollings, 
East London, Manchester 
College, ACS, Charlestown, 
follow-up interviews (1,2,3,4) 
Manchester, Oldham, 
Rochdale, Burnley 
‘Mixed school’ positive ‘mono-cultural negative’.  
Union College, Rolls, 
Westgate, Hollings, East 
London, ACS, Charlestown, 
follow-up interviews 
(1,2,3,4,5,6) 
Oldham, Rochdale, Burnley, 
Hale, Didsbury 
Provide integration (maintain own 
identity- hybrid)  not assimilation  
Union College, Rolls, 
Westgate, Hollings, East 
London, Manchester College, 
ACS, Charlestown, follow-up 
interviews (1,2,4) 
Manchester, Oldham, 
Rochdale, Burnley 
De-radicalisation tension- accounts of 
racism and help reduce racism. Push factors leading to ‘sticking together’.  
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Table 6b: Analysis of Categories and Themes  
Category 2: Sticking Together 
Pupil Sample Parental Sample  Emerging Themes 
   
Union College, Rolls, 
Westgate, Hollings, East 
London, Manchester College, 
ACS, Charlestown, follow-up 
interviews (1,2,3,4,5,6) 
Oldham, Rochdale, Burnley, 
Hale, Didsbury 
Symbolic violence = ‘protection’, ‘safety’ 
Union College, Rolls, 
Westgate, Hollings, East 
London, Manchester College, 
ACS, Charlestown, follow-up 
interviews (2,3,4) 
Oldham, Rochdale, Burnley, 
Hale, Didsbury  
‘to seek out’ 
Muslims  
Union College, Westgate, 
Hollings, East London, 
Manchester College, ACS, 
Charlestown, follow-up 
interviews (1,2,3,4) 
Oldham, Rochdale, Burnley, 
Hale, Didsbury 
Social grammar ‘jokes, language, experience’  
Union College, Rolls, Hollings, 
East London, Manchester 
College, ACS, Charlestown, 
follow-up interviews (1,2,3,4) 
Oldham, Rochdale, Burnley, 
Hale, Didsbury 
Perceived hostility- reinforces solidarity – racism, Islamaphobia 
Union College, Rolls, Hollings, 
East London, Manchester 
College, ACS, Charlestown, 
follow-up interviews (1,2,3,4) 
 Ummah- not imagined rather contested. 
Examples shape discourse (hajj, war 
Iraq, Gaza/ shia vs. sunni, deobandi, beralawi, ‘only heard of term etc.) 
Ummah crucial  
Union College, Rolls, 
Westgate, Hollings, East 
London, ACS, Charlestown, 
follow-up interviews 
(1,2,3,4,5,6) 
 Attempts by school encourage mixing- perceived ‘sticking together’.  
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Table 6c: Analysis of Categories and Themes  
Category 3: Mono-cultural Schools 
Pupil Sample  Parental Sample  Emerging Themes 
   
Union College, Rolls, 
Westgate, Hollings, East 
London, Manchester College, 
ACS, Charlestown, follow-up 
interviews (1,2,3,4) 
Oldham, Rochdale, Burnley, 
Hale, Didsbury 
Mono-cultural school as 
social deficit. Does not 
provide relevant capital for 
positive future 
Union College, Rolls, 
Westgate, Hollings, East 
London, Manchester College, 
ACS, Charlestown, follow-up 
interviews (1,2,3,4) 
Oldham, Rochdale, Burnley, 
Hale, Didsbury 
Mono-cultural/ mixed 
schools product of 
environment. 
Union College,Westgate, 
Hollings, East London, 
Manchester College, ACS, 
Charlestown, follow-up 
interviews (1,2,3,4,5,6) 
Oldham, Rochdale, Burnley, 
Hale, Didsbury 
Free from racism and anti-
Muslim prejudice 
 Oldham, Rochdale, Burnley, 
Hale, Didsbury 
  Working class neighbours- 
Conscious neglect of school    
Islamiya Muslim school  Oldham, Rochdale, Burnley, 
Hale, Didsbury 
Dialectical space for delayed 
integration 
Islamiya Muslim school Oldham, Rochdale, Burnley, 
Hale, Didsbury 
Positive space for nurturing 
Muslim solidarity and 
Muslim identity.  
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
123 
 
Table 6d: Analysis of Categories and Themes  
Category 4: Integration as political construct 
Pupil Sample Parental Sample Emerging Themes 
   
  Oldham, Rochdale, Burnley, 
Hale, Didsbury 
‘Why Muslims’ - integration 
as a tool from anti-Muslim 
prejudice.  
Union College, Rolls, 
Westgate, Hollings, East 
London, Manchester College, 
ACS, Charlestown, follow-up 
interviews (2,3,4) 
 ‘Why not other communities’  
Union College, Westgate, 
Hollings, East London, 
Manchester College, ACS, 
Charlestown, follow-up 
interviews (1,2,3,4) 
Oldham, Rochdale, Burnley, 
Hale, Didsbury 
Role of media – 
Islamaphobia and racism.  
 Oldham, Rochdale, Burnley, 
Hale, Didsbury 
Integration political 
construct. Political tool rather 
than a cultural process.  
Union College, Rolls, Hollings, 
East London, Manchester 
College, ACS, Charlestown, 
follow-up interviews 
(1,2,3,4,5, 6) 
 Wider narrative of 
integration constructed in 
opposition to being Muslim. 
Narrative changes. 
Union College, Rolls, 
Westgate, Hollings, East 
London, ACS, Charlestown, 
follow-up interviews (1,2,3) 
Islamiya School.  
Oldham, Rochdale, Burnley, 
Hale, Didsbury 
Debate on Muslims 
integration does not reflect 
Muslim reality. People do 
mix!  
 Islamiya School follow-up 
interviews (1,2,3) 
Oldham, Rochdale, Burnley, 
Hale, Didsbury 
Muslim school- ‘we do mix’ ‘we do socialise’. Help 
integration adab – good 
citizens.  
Union College, Rolls, 
Westgate, Hollings, East 
London, Manchester College, 
ACS, Charlestown, follow-up 
interviews (1,2,3,4) 
 Muslims more integrated 
than other communities.  
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Table 6e: Analysis of Categories and Themes  
 
Table 5: Summary of Dominant Themes: Pupil and Parental Discourse 
 
Pupil Parental 
 
Mono-cultural 
Schools 
Mixed Schools Mono-cultural schools Mixed schools 
 
Social deficit 
 
 
Ideal type – good 
form of social capital  
 
Social deficit and 
conscious neglect of 
schools 
 
 
Middle class ideal 
Anti-Muslim 
prejudice 
 
Cultural pluralism and ‘getting to know each other’ 
 
Dialectical space and 
delayed integration 
Class, social capital 
and social mobility 
Dialectical space- 
integration through 
faith 
Social political climate and ‘sticking together’ 
 
 Group solidarity  
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Analysis of Data  
 
A number of successful approaches have been developed, implemented and reviewed as far as 
the analysis of discourse is concerned (Gilbert & Mulkay 1984; Fairclough 1992; Van–Dijk 
1993; Wood & Kroger 2000; Potter & Wetherell 2010).  
 In order to analyse the data from these transcripts, techniques utilised by Wood and 
Kroger (2000) and Potter & Wetherell (2010) were adopted. For Potter & Wetherell (2007), 
these techniques are based upon a detailed critical assessment and understanding   of the 
transcript.  This involves a thorough understanding of the nuances, subtleties, contradictions and 
complexities associated with the data. This can only happen when the researcher reads and re-
reads the transcripts a number of times to develop a comprehensive understanding of the text. 
This approach to data analysis is also provided by Potter and Wetherell (2010) using a bicycle 
analogy to convey the rationale behind discourse analysis: 
 Analysis of discourse is like riding a bicycle…there is no mechanical  procedure for 
 producing findings from an archive of transcript…Just as with  bike riding, it is not 
 easy to convey the analytical process in abstract. Words  fail us at this point, it is not 
 the case  of stating, first you do this then you do  that. The skills required are 
 developed as one tries to make sense of  transcript and identify the organizational 
 features of documents….analysis  involves a lot of careful reading and re-reading. 
 Often it is after long hours  struggling with the data…that a systematic pattern emerges.   
       (Potter & Wetherell 2010:168) 
  Potter & Wetherell (2010) identify two processes used to commence discourse analysis. 
First, the researcher looks for the systematic pattern that may emerge from the variability and 
consistency of data. He/she looks for patterns in the data through assessing the variability of 
data; that is to say, the researcher looks at the ‘differences in either the content or the forms of 
the accounts’ (ibid.). Then he/she moves on to the ‘identification of features shared by accounts’ 
(ibid.) The second process involves constructing a detailed hypothesis by assessing the 
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variability and consistency of the text.  Gilbert and Mulkay’s (1984) approach to analysis of data, 
based on the interpretive repertoire, was also used to intensify the analysis.  For Potter & 
Wetherell (2010:138), an interpretive repertoire is a ‘lexicon or register of terms and metaphors 
drawn upon to characterize and evaluate actions and events’.  Gilbert and Mulkay (1984) 
observed two types of repertoires in their study of scientists working in the UK and the US. They 
noted how the empirical and contingent repertoires best explained the discursive framing of the 
scientists’ academic research. The former looks at the logical, chronological presentation of the 
discourse as presented by the actor, whilst the latter examines the speculative and often 
personalised experiences presented within the text.  
 A number of practical tools were also adopted to aid the development of systemic 
patterns within the data, based upon the works of Wood & Kroger (2000) and Maclure (2003). 
First, whilst examining and re-examining the text, the idea of scaffolding helped build a picture 
or a profile through assessing the text. Scaffolding works by ‘simultaneous examination of 
utterances and their context, with recognition that utterances can be analysed for it and treated as 
context for others’ (Wood & Kroger 2000:96). Second, agency of actors and the role they play in 
constructing their words is also pertinent to assess. This allows researchers to understand how 
‘talk’ reveals actors’ autonomy or their dependence on external stimuli.  Thirdly, most research 
methodologies within the qualitative tradition focus on ‘what is said by respondents’. Negative 
case analysis allows the researcher to focus on what isn’t said, as this allows space to examine 
‘the data for exceptions’ (Wood & Kroger 2000). Finally, Maclure (2003:9) highlights the 
importance of examining the binary opposites of discursive realities This is the way in which 
actors construct social reality based upon ‘us and them’. Such binary oppositions are ‘is one of 
the key ways in which meaning and knowledge are produced’ (Maclure 2003:10). 
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Part 3: Research Finding: 
Chapter 5:  Debating ‘Muslim’ Mono-cultural Schools 
 
5. Introduction   
 Following the summer riots of 2001, most government reports (Ritchie 2001; Ouseley 2001; 
Cantle 2001) expressed concerns over ethnic segregation in some of the northern mill town 
schools in the UK. In addition to these reports a number of demographers also cautioned against 
the prevalent nature of ethnic segregation within British schools (Johnson et al. 2006; Burgess 
and Wilson 2004). Chapter 2 evaluated how subsequent government policies framed 
monocultural schools through the prism of terrorism, fundamentalism and segregation (Taylor 
2009; Davies 2008).  A key conclusion drawn from this discussion was how integrated or mixed 
schools were considered essential for the functioning of a vibrant democracy, Muslim mono-
cultural schools, on the other hand, were seen as potential sources of racial division and social 
disorder.  
 The first part of this chapter explores how Muslim pupils make sense of their experiences 
of mono-cultural state schools, whilst the second part considers the framing of the discourse on 
Muslim faith schools. This chapter will also examine the complex attitudes with regards to 
school segregation and integration. It will further demonstrate how pupil discourse is grounded 
in a contradictory and complex relationship between cohesion and integration, rather than 
behaviours that can be grouped together based upon set typologies (Sewell 1997; Shain 2003; 
Erik 2010).   
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5.1  Mono-cultural Schools as a deficit model  
 Pupil meta-discourse generally accepted mixed schools as the dominant feature of the urban 
landscape. Thus, it was not surprising to note that, for the vast majority of respondents living in 
cities (such as London and Manchester), mixed schools were considered the general norm. It is 
important to note that they did not interpret mixed schools in terms of a dominant ethnic group; 
instead, schools were seen to be made up of diverse ethnic groups reflecting each respective 
borough.  
 Schools in the northern mill towns which experienced the riots were identified by a 
number of focus group members as hyper-segregated schools, as most Muslims living outside 
these towns found it difficult to comprehend schools comprising one dominant ethnic group. 
This is clear from the following expression by a Somali Muslim from neighbouring Manchester 
after learning about the mono-cultural schools in Oldham. He finds it difficult to comprehend 
how, in a diverse society, people can still attend schools that are made up of one ethnic group.  
F10: 189: R3:  I can’t understand how you can have schools in Oldham   
 190:  with mainly Pakistani people, how can that happen? I  
 191:  don’t understand, I find that quite strange!    
 192: R4: WHAT? How can that be?      
 193: R3: IT’S TRUE, I TELL YOU IT’S TRUE!    
 194:  I can’t believe that, how can that happen? In the school   
 193:  that we went to there were all mixed people. I take it,  
 194:  there were few white kids, but it was mixed, we had    
 195:  Black, Pakistani and Bangladeshi kids. I find that  strange    
 196:  that’s all I’m saying.  
 
The reason why the above focus group member viewed the mono-cultural school 
experience as ‘strange’ was because he regarded the idea of mixed schools as the norm for most 
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Muslims in Britain.  The focus group members expressing reservations about monocultural 
schools acknowledged the importance of education in creating and nurturing a crucial space for 
young people to ‘mix’ and to integrate23. This form of integration provided social value for the 
individual and also society as a whole. This discursive framing of school experience can be seen 
to support Dewey’s (1916) perspective of education as a social function, which is based upon the 
idea that schooling should nurture a contingent experience between social and racial groups. It 
further supports Levinson’s (2008) account of how schooling can be used for ‘realising the 
multicultural ideal’.  
 In light of the pupil discourse on the ‘social function’ of education, mono-cultural schools 
were seen as a deficit model. It was argued that, by attending mono-cultural schools, young 
people were ‘losing out on their educational and social experience’. The deficit model was 
articulated by using two distinctive repertoires of linguistic and social deficit.  
 The linguistic deficit was based upon the recognition that Muslim pupils attending mono-
cultural schools develop a spoken repertoire which makes it ‘difficult’ to communicate or 
socialise with ‘white’ children. The following example cited by a young Pakistani male attending 
a mixed school in Oldham highlights how a close friend, overseeing him talking to a white 
friend, found it difficult to comprehend how he ‘could chat to white people’. 
 
 
 
                                                          
23 A detailed discussion of this idea is presented in the second part of this chapter.  
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F4: 233: R3:  I got mates that go to Breslin School, there’s only 3 white guys      
234  in entire school… One day my mate               
235:  saw me ‘chattin’ to some white guys, they said ‘maan how          
236:   can you talk to him … This is the problem too much              
237:  segregation.       
 There are three main themes associated with the above observation. Firstly, Muslim 
pupils, in some urban cities, tend to communicate using a particular repertoire which juxtaposes 
language borrowed from the ‘hip-hop’ subculture of the United States with a ‘switching’ code 
which moves with fluidity between English and Urdu or English and Bengali. Secondly, it was 
argued that ‘chattin’ with white people was considered ‘uncool’ or socially unacceptable. This 
was largely due to the sub cultural ideas associated with what was considered ‘cool’ and types of 
actions that were frowned upon. Finally, it was argued that this particular type of attitude is 
nurtured through attending mono-cultural schools, as children generally feel comfortable  
socialising with peers with whom they share the same social space.   
 The three themes highlighted above are further supported by wider research. For 
example, Shain (2003), in her research on Asian girls in Greater Manchester, notes how some 
girls would use their mother tongue in school as a conscious attempt to exclude fellow white 
students. She also highlighted how the selective use (or switching) of language is used as a 
mechanism through which the balance of power is maintained (Shain 2003:65). Furthermore, she 
demonstrated how ‘some girls would also use peer pressure as a way of maintaining friendship 
with their own kind’ (Shain 2003:68).    
  The social deficit model with regards to mono-cultural schools was based upon the 
general agreement that Britain was a diverse multicultural society. Mixed schools within this 
perspective were seen as a microcosm of contemporary diverse society which was seen to 
provide students with relevant social skills for multicultural life. Attending mixed schools was 
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seen to provide relevant knowledge, expertise and training to deal with multiculturalism.  This 
was clearly articulated by the following: 
 
F5: 19: R1: I think you can learn more when you got a diverse                  
20:  people and not just your own kind. This is because                    
21:   if you get used to multiculturalism in school it will be              
22:   easier for you when you get a job in the future. 
 
 It is interesting to note how the above respondent touched upon how attending a mixed 
school will provide skills that will be of use for future employment opportunities. This highly 
important theme is apparent throughout the pupil discussion on mono-cultural schooling. The 
pupils feel that education is  not just about getting the correct grades; rather, schooling can 
provide wider social experience that is crucial for future socio-economic  prospects. This 
particular construct of education further supports the idea that education should be a ‘fostering, 
nurturing and cultivating process’ (Dewey 1916:9).  The importance of attending a mixed school 
because it provides a space to nurture bonding and bridging forms of social capital24 is further 
highlighted in the following observation: 
F3: 25: R2: I think it’s a good thing because when you go to college   
 26: you are going to meet different types of people. So if you’re in   
 27: a school with one race, you’re not going to understanding    
                                                          
24
 For Putnam (2000:19), social capital refers to ‘connections among individuals - social networks and the norms of 
reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them’. He makes a distinction between bridging and bonding capital. Bonding capital consists of socialisation with people that are ‘like you’ with the same family, religion and culture. 
Bridging capital occurs through interaction with people of different racial and cultural background.  Putnam (2000) argues that the decline in social capital since the 1960’s has undermined a range of traditional, social and civic practices.  Ficher (2001:2) is highly critical of Putnam’s thesis by a) ‘casting doubt on some of the empirical claims.’  
b) Failure by Putnam to consider new forms of social capital. This has led Fisher (2001:9) to argue that social capital 
has changed and not declined since the 1960s. c) Ficher (2001:10) sees wider social factors contributing to the 
decline in social participation, such as work commitment and political scandals, rather than social capital.   
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 28:  people of different cultural background. So I think it’s better if   
 29:  you go to a mixed school.   
 The notion that attending a mixed school not only provides advantages for the students 
but also wider society is an important point to note. Attending a mixed school within this context 
is seen as a civic duty or participating in active citizenship; it was a way in which students felt 
they could contribute to a society that is multicultural. This is clear from the following: 
F4: R2: 30: I think there are a lot of advantages, basically coming to a mixed  
 31 school - it’s good for society.  I think it’s a multicultural society and 
 32:  I think we mix a lot, don’t we?      
 33:     [YEAH:::] 
 
 Whilst the above point is drawn from pupil experience in a mixed school, the following 
observation by a student attending a monocultural school echoes these sentiments. It 
demonstrates how pupils attending a monocultural school will find it much harder to adjust to 
different cultural environments in the future.  
F10: R1: 32: By coming to this school we have definitely lost out by not   
 33: mixing with people of different backgrounds. At the end of     
 34: the day when we finish school we are going to find it  
 35: much harder to interact.  We are going to have to mix   
 36: with people of different backgrounds… We don’t know   
 37: what they are like, it would be difficult.  
 The above respondent continued to provide examples of types of interaction that she 
might find difficult during higher education or future employment contexts. It is important to 
note that the examples that were shared did not include aspects of general communication but 
rather covered aspects of deeper social experiences revolving around humour and telling of 
jokes.     
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F10: R1: 40: Yeah, we don’t know how they would respond to certain  
 41; statements or jokes, we don’t know if they would get our jokes.   
 42: Like we might say a joke and we would laugh and we would get   
 43: it, but I don’t know how they may react. This might lead to us not   
 44: opening up because we don’t know how they may respond or   
 45: react or if they might find something offensive.    
 
  A number of schools in which the interviews were conducted were often portrayed in a 
negative light by the media because of their mono-cultural features. Further research on this 
topic is required, as little empirical evidence exists on the way in which the public image of a 
school impacts upon its pupils. The following observation provides an insight into the way in 
which ‘mono-cultural’ schools depicted as ‘problematic’ spaces have an impact on the pupil 
morale. It demonstrates how the deficit model of a mono-cultural schools involves a process of 
alienation.   
F10: R2: 48: Everyone knows that we go to Westgate School because  
 49: every  time we go on trips only thing that people can see   
 50: is Black face. You know they all STARE AT US because  
 51:  we’re all Asians. The other day we went to the    
 52: Manchester BBC building and we got  the LOOKS.     
R1: 53 Yeah they all look down on us because we are from a   
 54: school with people of the same colour.  I’m sure you   
 55: won’t get that if there were all white people turning up!       
R2: 56: They look down at us, they make us look low. I would say    
 57: to myself. What is so different about me? They won’t say   
 58: it in your face, but you can tell in gestures and the    
 59: whispers those that  don’t like you, you can tell.  
  
 The deficit model of mono-cultural schools is also supported by wider research; for 
example, Ahmed (2009), in her study of Muslim youths, highlighted how pupils expressed 
concerns about mono-cultural schools in many of the urban areas. Her research echoes Cantle’s 
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(2001) thesis of ‘parallel’ schooling experience in many cities. Thomas’ (2010) study also cited 
many of the concerns young people expressed about segregation and the importance of creating 
spaces for young people to interact based upon the principles of social contact. 
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5.3 Contesting ‘self-segregation’ thesis 
(I)State Schools 
 The popular notion that people attend mono-cultural schools due to ‘self-segregation’ 
was strongly challenged and contested within the pupil discourse, thus confirming existing 
sociological studies on segregation (Philips et al. 2008; Finney & Simpson 2009). The 
understanding of segregated schools instead focused on a sympathetic and circumstantial reading 
associated with social and residential factors. It was argued that residential segregation is the 
principal factor in ethnic segregation in schools; in other words, children went to local schools 
that happened to be mono-cultural – there was no parental desire for self-segregation.  The idea 
that mono-cultural schools function because Muslim parents want to isolate themselves from the 
‘white’ communities (Tibi 2002; Nazir-Ali 2008; Taylor 2009; Ali 2010) was completely 
rejected. In fact, young people felt that many parents wanted to send their children to mixed 
schools but were unable to do so for a number of reasons. Some of the factors that were cited 
included poverty, large families (making it difficult to pay for bus fares etc.) and a general sense 
of security at being in one’s own residential area. Some parents (with financial means) were able 
to send their children to mixed schools in other neighbourhoods; it was argued that this was 
largely motivated by the chance to achieve good educational opportunities (e.g. higher grades)  
and a general sense that it would provide better prospects for their children25. This is clear from 
the following observation by a Bangladeshi female attending a mixed school in Oldham.  
F5: 43: R1: You don’t go to a school because there are black people              
44:  or white people. You go to a school because you might want to    
45:   avoid bullying or get better grades.    
                                                          
25 The theme of parental choice and school is debated at great length in the next chapter. 
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 There was a general consensus that residential area was a key factor that shaped the type 
of school that young people attended. The greater the racial mix of the residential area, the more 
diverse the type of school one attended.  There was also an acceptance that attending a mono-
cultural school may also bring certain advantages. Perhaps one of the main virtues of attending 
mono-cultural schools is that pupils will be educated in an environment which is devoid of 
racism. Moreover, attending schools with ‘your own’ kind was seen to provide a space which 
nurtured confidence and developed a common bond between people of the same ethnic group.  
This is clear from the following discussion: 
F4: 75: R2: I’d say that all Asian schools are local and the people that                 
76:  whispers those that  the schools are local Muslim people that would     
77  know   each other.           
78: R1: You won’t have any problems attending schools with your own          
79:   kind compared to mixed schools. You see when you have all                            
80:   Muslim you won’t have any problems with racism, its:                  
81  when you have to go out and socialise with other people you             
82  going to get trouble.   
  
5.4 Contesting ‘self-segregation’ thesis  
(II) Muslim Faith Schools  
    Muslim faith schools have often been projected as problematic, self-segregated spaces 
which nurture a culture of difference. In fact, this controversial framing can be traced back prior 
to the security concerns post-9/11 and 7/7. For example, Grillo (1998) has long associated the 
idea of Muslim schools with the conscious attempt to create and maintain separate lives. 
  The Muslim respondents highlighted how, by attending a Muslim faith school, they were 
able to question and discuss contemporary ideas associated with integration, segregation and 
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identity. Moreover, it was clear that issues associated with citizenship, integration and 
community cohesion were extensively discussed during and outside the teaching period. This 
confirms the way in which discourse within a school context plays an important role in 
constructing young people’s social world (Potter & Wetherell 2010).  
 The subsequent observation noted below establishes one of the ways in which integration 
is discussed by students attending Muslim faith schools. It provides a critique of the popular 
understanding of Muslim faith schools as spaces of ‘fixity’ or unchanging boundaries of identity 
construct. Instead, the following discussion confirms wider research on Muslim faith schools as 
spaces where a British Muslim identity is constructed (Meer 2010) based upon mutual 
compatibility of faith and national identity (Mogahed & Nyri 2007). The focus group 
respondents verify how ideas of faith and nationality informed their own self-construct. In light 
of this, it was not surprising to find the focus group members displaying a very strong sense of 
British Muslim identity.  
F2: 137: R2: If someone asks us how to define yourself, we say that                      
138:  we are British Muslims.                                    
139: ALL: Yeah we are all British Muslims                                           
140: R3: That is the way it has been installed in us and that’s the                      
141:  way we define ourselves. Just because we attend a                                  
142:  Muslim faith school this does not make us less British. In                  
143:   the same way that Muslims attending state schools                            
144:  makes them less Muslim.        
  
 British Muslim identity was a major theme that was consistent throughout the Muslim 
faith school focus group. For the Muslim girls, religion was determined by one’s spirituality and 
the way in which one conducts one’s affairs within society.  Britishness is largely determined by 
the place of one’s birth, the geographical location where one lives and the probity of the 
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individual. It was argued that these cultural values of Britishness were nurtured through 
secondary agents of socialization.  
 To live out a British Muslim identity was also seen as a liberating experience. Many saw 
the impacts of cultural surroundings playing a crucial role in them becoming ‘true Muslims’. 
Being a ‘true Muslim’ involves having a pristine identity which recognises the importance of 
location (Al-Alwani 2003; Abdullah 2004) in shaping ethnicity.  It was argued that ‘Pakistani’ or 
‘Indian Islam’ is largely mediated through the ethnic markers of the respective countries; thus, 
inter-marriage between various castes or ethnic groups were largely prohibited or socially 
frowned upon.  A British Muslim identity, the girls argued, has the ability to transcend these 
cultural markers and  allow Muslims to practise their faith. As one of the focus group members 
noted: 
F2: 138: R4: I think it’s generally how you live your life, you can either                
139:  live it as a <true Muslim> or you can just call yourself a                       
140  Muslim.  
 British Islam has the potential for nurturing a ‘true Muslim’ identity: an identity which is 
interested in the way faith is practised in its ‘truest form’ and not one that is diluted by kinship-
based politics. These cultural practices were seen as antithetical to the generic principles of 
Islam. ‘True Islam’, it was argued, comes as a result of expansion of religious knowledge which 
transcends the Indian subcontinental frame of reference. An example of this is based upon the 
idea of valuing freedom of religious practice or the importance of greater individual autonomy in 
defining the British Muslim experience.   This is further articulated below: 
F2: 166:  R3: I think as younger generation we are freer and we let      
167:  others  be free. You see the older generation have     
168:  strict ideas, such as Pakistani can’t marry an Indian. It    
169:  was looked down upon, but now I think things will change    
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170:   with the new generation, we are more accommodating    
171:   and accepting. I think our parents also realise this, as                
172:   British Muslims we do    things differently.  
 Greater religious autonomy was seen as an important feature of the British Muslim 
identity; this was manifested by the way in which marriage was debated. Marriage was framed 
within a broader Islamic framework; the fact that Islam puts no prohibition on people taking 
marriage partners of different nationalities or ethnicities was seen as an empowering force. The 
above example [F2]  acknowledges the shift in the conceptualisation of marriage between the 
first and second generation of Muslim communities.   
 The above discussion shows how the Muslim girls viewed themselves as autonomous 
agents of change, with an active independent voice or, in the words of the above respondent, ‘as 
British Muslims we do things differently’.  This idea is further supported by the following: 
F2: 111: R4: You don’t have to follow the world; you just need to be yourself        
112:  and not how the world wants you to be. 
 
  The Muslim girls felt that their faith school experience ‘installed’ a positive self-image, 
which in turn nurtured a British Muslim identity. They argued that this was vital, especially 
because it was seen to provide an ideal springboard to wider society. The discourse on 
integration revealed an open attitude to wider society, whereby secular space was not seen to be 
in conflict with the teachings of Islam; rather, it was a space where Muslims can negotiate and 
also make positive contributions. The overall narrative showed how attending a Muslim faith 
school was a means to an end, a transitional sojourn; once completed it would provide relevant 
and necessary skills for the future. Furthermore, it was felt that faith school education instilled 
discipline, good manners and strong ethics, all vital components for good citizens. This is 
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articulated in the subsequent observation, which rejects the popular notion that attending Muslim 
faith school can be a barrier to future integration, whilst confirming the ideas of ‘delayed 
integration’ as discussed in the works of Meer (2007) and McLaughlin (1992). 
F2: 101: R2: I don’t think it’s going to be an issue going to college, university   
102:  or even work. I think coming to this school has given us a lot         
103:  emotionally, morally and ethically. It has taught us not only to be   
104:  good Muslims but also to be good <human beings and good     
105:  citizens>. Also, it has taught us the importance of interacting   
106:  with other people but also how to interact with wider society. I         
107:  think it has been beneficial coming to a faith school as this one,        
108:  as it really prepares you for the big wide world.  
 
 Integration was framed as a positive act and  a naturally occurring process; however, 
reservations were voiced at attempts to politicise the idea of integration as a way of undermining 
religious identity. There was a general criticism that, whilst social and cultural change was a 
normative experience within the Muslim community, particularly amongst young people, it was 
felt that there was little or no recognition of this within public discourse. One of the reasons for 
this was the fact that some political actors wanted to use the idea of integration for political gain 
by wanting Muslims to lose their religious identity and embrace a secular world-view; under 
such circumstances it was argued that this form of integration should be resisted. This is clear 
from the following: 
F2: 111: R3: MUSLIMS DO INTEGRATE, but what do they want us to do,         
112:  do they want us to do un-Islamic activities? We can’t do that,    
113:  as she says, we have to develop a barrier of resistance.            
114:   There are things that we can or want to do and there are          
115:  things which we don’t want to do. You can’t force people; we   
116:    don’t go around telling other people what to do and not to do.   
117:   We just let people be, even though we may disagree with it.   
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  The above observation demonstrates how Muslim girls are involved in discursive 
negotiation between preserving core religious identity and interacting with wider secular space. 
The above also confirms Modood’s (2007, 2010) works on the centrality and importance of 
religion in people’s lives. It further reinforces the point that ‘all minorities recognise that some 
give and take is needed if they are to live successfully in a multicultural society’ (Halstead 
2008:323).  
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5.5 Conclusion  
Mono-cultural schools are often portrayed within public policy (Philips 2005; Cantle 2008) and 
popular discourse (Carey 2008; Nazir-Ali 2008) as problematic spaces, which could not only 
lead to social disorder (Ouseley 2001; Ritchie 2001; Cantle 2001), but also in extreme cases, lead 
to violent extremism (Davies 2008). Mono-cultural schools were not only characterised by 
independent / grant maintained Muslim faith schools, but also certain state schools with over 
ninety-percent  Muslim cohort.    
 This chapter elucidated how mono-cultural school were framed within Muslim discourse 
by Muslim pupils. The overall summary of this chapter sees pupil discourses questioning the 
popular ‘integrated and segregated’ school dichotomy. This chapter looked at how Muslim 
pupils view ‘mono-cultural’ school experience through three interconnected schemata.  First, a 
generic account of mono-cultural schooling revealed a deficit model of education. It was 
generally argued that attending mono-cultural state schools had a negative impact on the 
educational and future career experiences of Muslim pupils. It showed how mono-cultural [state] 
schools failed to provide students with relevant social capital to develop and sustain professional 
career prospects. Muslim pupils also highlighted concerns over segregation and recognised the 
importance of shared spaces for interaction and social contact. Second, whilst acknowledging the 
problems associated with mono-cultural schools, pupil discourses challenged the idea of self-
segregation. Instead, a more nuanced account of mono-cultural schooling was presented based 
upon various socio-economic readings. Ethnically segregated schools and neighbourhoods were 
seen to be determined by social class. Pupils attended mono-cultural school due to parental 
financial circumstances and not because of the desire amongst parents to live a parallel existence. 
Third, Muslim faith schools were debated through a complex account of schooling.  Muslim faith 
143 
 
schools were not considered as problematic spaces for integration, secularism and citizenship, 
instead they were portrayed as changing cultural spaces which nurtured a British Muslim identity 
based upon mutual compatibility of faith and national identity (Meer 207). Muslim pupils 
rejected the idea that some mono-cultural schools could lead to social disorder. Instead they 
recognised that certain mono-cultural schools could facilitate the process of integration by 
providing a dialectical space to debate religion, identity and citizenship.  Furthermore, they 
recognised how in a hostile environment created by the War on Terror (Kundanani 2007), mono-
cultural ethnic schools could act as a protective buffer against anti-Muslim racism.  
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Chapter 6: Deconstructing Binary Opposites of Ethnically Mixed Schools  
 
6.0 Introduction 
 Chapter 2 explored how one of the aims of creating mixed schools in areas with high 
concentrations of Muslim pupils was to tackle urban disorder, global terrorism and Muslim 
fundamentalism (Davies 2008; DCSF 2008).  
 This chapter examines how Muslim pupils make sense of their experiences in mixed 
schools. The first part considers how mixed schools are characterised by positive experiences 
which nurture cultural and social capital. It shows how pupils view integration as a form of 
commodity which can be used as an exchange value during the transition from childhood to 
adulthood.  The second part highlights a contradictory and antithetical reading of mixed schools 
as nurturing a sense of segregation by ‘pushing’ pupils to ‘stick together’.   
 Pupil discourses highlighted within this chapter expand upon the general theme 
developed in chapter 2 of deconstructing the binary opposites of mixed schools as positive 
spaces of hope and ‘mono-cultural’ schools as recipes for social disorder.   
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6.1 Mixed School Imperative: ‘You know it’s all about mixing’ 
 Social contact theory is seen by many as ‘a cornerstone of community cohesion practice’ 
(Cantle 2008:116). Contact theory is highly influential within local government thinking; as 
already noted, it is based upon the idea that repeated cross-cultural and intergroup contact is a 
determining factor in understanding the levels of prejudice against different ethnic groups.  
Whilst there is ample evidence to support the social contact theory (Wagner et al 2006; 
Hewstone 2007 et al.; Cantle 2008;Thomas 2010), it is broadly agreed amongst contact theorists 
that declining levels of prejudice towards different ethnic groups is predicated on a range of 
issues such as duration of contact, voluntary or non-voluntary nature of contact, nature of group 
perception and size of the ethnic population (Allport 1979; Hewstone & Brown 1986).  The 
notion of size of population determining the levels of prejudice has been of particular interest 
amongst researchers; for example Halstead (1988) shows how a limit of 33% was used by the 
government to bus Muslim pupils to mainly white schools during the 1960s.  More recently, 
Forman (2003), using evidence from a nationwide sample of Black students in the United States, 
found that high levels of prejudice were experienced in schools if the Black population went 
above 35% (cited in Hewstone 2007:103).  
 The social contact thesis was used by Muslim students in this research as a meta-narrative 
to construct their understanding of mixed-school experiences. For many, the function of 
integration was the act of ‘mixing’ between people of different ethnic backgrounds. The students 
saw ‘mixing’ as, above all, a reciprocal process. This idea of integration is also conceptualized 
by a number of Muslim writers; for example, Sardar (2009:19) views integration as a ‘mutual 
process of being accepted and accepting’. He and other Muslim writers (Modood 2007) have 
recognised that the imperative to mix  was a civic duty for all and not  a burden for one particular 
146 
 
community or group. Nevertheless, there was a general acknowledgement that it was in the best 
interest of minority groups or, in this particular case, Muslims, to integrate. 
  Mixed schools were seen as providing both individual and collective advantages.  It was 
argued that those who attended a mono-cultural school were depriving themselves of these 
advantages. The discourse of mixed-school imperative focused on three fundamental themes. 
Firstly, mixed schools allowed people to get to know one another. Secondly, mixed schools were 
seen as a microcosm of wider multicultural society; for most pupils, schooling was a key 
medium through which integration was achieved and actualised. Finally, the discourse of mixing 
helped shape pupils’ understanding of a diverse multicultural society.   
   Cultural difference and religious identity were considered to be very important for all 
pupils, and mixed schools provided a space for these cultural identities to be debated and 
negotiated.  It is within the context of schooling in general and the classroom environment in 
particular that a safe space for ‘mixing’ between people of different cultural backgrounds was 
provided. Furthermore, these spaces were organic and neutral, and evolved due to students’ keen 
interest in recognising one another’s  cultural differences (Taylor 1994). These settings were not 
‘organised’ or managed by the school; instead, they were evolving contexts in which students 
took a keen interest in ‘getting to know one another’. This is demonstrated by the following 
discussion: 
T1:  61. SM: What do you mean by ‘mixing’?     
 62: R5: You know just socialising and integrating   
 63: SM: In what context?      
 65: R5: In school and in class, like in this college and this       
 66:  class there are a lot of mixing we all like to mix and   
 67:    interact. We do this not because teachers tell us, but   
 68:   because we are interested in   finding out about different cultures.  
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  Integration was predicated upon ‘mixing’ or socialising with people. Mixing, as noted by 
T1, was seen to occur naturally without teacher involvement or intervention. Mixing  occurred 
voluntarily and spontaneously; more importantly, it was driven by pupils’ willingness to know.  
The idea of ‘mixing’ was also considered an empowering experience as it provided a platform 
for cultural exchange and debate. This is clear from the following interaction between students in 
a mixed comprehensive school in Manchester.  
F6: 4:  R1: I think it’s a great idea; you get to know and understand   
 5:  and find out about different people and their backgrounds.   
 6: R2:  I think   I agree with that, you get to know and find out   
 7:  about people of different cultural backgrounds and   
 8: R1:  [ It helps you to understand different people ]  
 9: R3:          Also it helps   
 10:  you to find out what they believe and what they don’t   
 11:  believe. They can find out about us  about Muslims and    
 12:  what we believe.       
 13: S: Can you give me an example of something that you have   
 14:  learnt?         
 15: R1:   I found out about Lent, my friend is a Christian and by  
 16:  coming   to this school and hanging about with my friend    
 17: it helped me to know other people. 
 
 The above observation of schools as public spaces confirms and extends Modood’s 
(2010) idea of ‘politics of difference’. As Modood (2010) notes, religious identity, like other 
forms of identity, ‘should not be privatised and tolerated but should be part of the public space’ 
(Modood 2010:42). The above example together with data produced below demonstrates how 
Muslim pupils view public space as neutral places where aspects of identity and religion can be 
debated freely.  
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 Whilst the above construct of mixing [F6] provides an opportunity to participate in the 
‘politics of difference’, the observation cited below shows how this process allows students to 
know about one another’s cultural differences.    
T8:  74:  R2:   If you   walk around the school playground                      
75: <yeah> you will find that people of all cultures mix           
76:  together. As Muslims we accept that all people are different     
77: from different religious and races abilities and disabilities.      
78: People speak different languages and eat different foods. So as                   
79::  Muslims we have to recognise these differences. In fact, I think      
80: there is a verse in the Quran about this. We bring these                       
81: differences to school, we talk about it in the playground and                
82: lunchtime. You know sometimes we agree and other time we       
83: don’t.                                                      
 
 The above observation (F6 and T8) provides an interesting account of pupils participating 
in the ‘politics of difference’.  What is interesting to note is that this happens in the school 
setting; more importantly, it recognises that students embody a discourse of cultural difference.   
Whilst it was common for pupils to provide religious examples of debates between students, 
such as the role of Jesus, the following accounts demonstrate how wider issues, including dietary 
needs and even aspects of sexuality, were discussed and debated: 
F9:  67: R2: We learn about many issues by talking to people of    
 68: different cultural backgrounds. Religion is one issue. But there  
 69:  are many other examples, obviously when you go to the canteen   
 70:  that sparks many conversations about food, you know some   
 71: people are veggies and other Hindu people won’t touch meat.    
 72: There are also some teachers who are you know…gay. And   
 73:  some kids are also like that. Some people take the piss, but    
 74:  we chat sometimes people accept that they are like that and   
  75:  that’s what they do, so safe. You know society is like that,    
 76:  people have to recognise that the society is different.  
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 The process of mixing occurred because pupils had a genuine desire to find out about the 
cultural difference of their cohorts. Mixing was seen as an active process shaped by a 
multicultural template of integration, which provided an opportunity for pupils to participate in 
multiculturalism. This is highlighted by the following comments by the two respondents’ whoi 
were passionate arguments: 
F1: 58. R5: It’s part of multicultural Britain <isn’t it> how are you       
59:  going  to be <multicultural> if you do not mix.   
and;   
F4: 31: R2: I think there are a lot of advantages (.) basically       
33:  to a  mixed  school it’s best for society (.) it’s a              
34  multicultural  society and I think we mix a lot, don’t we?                                                    
35:  [YEH:::::]                                                                      
 Mixing was achieved within a discursive framework; it was only through the act of 
speech and exchange of cultural references that the objectives of mixing were achieved. It is 
through the act of discourse that young people constructed their experiences, challenged their 
own prejudices and, above all, constructed their own versions of social reality. The importance 
of speech in the act of integration is best exemplified by the following: 
F1: 92: R2: You have to talk to people to get to know them,                     
93: otherwise you end up making things up; you have to                    
94: integrate before you can get to know each other.   
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 Mixed schools provided a space for students of different cultural and religious 
backgrounds ‘to know each other’26.  The following responses taken from two separate focus 
groups best exemplify this point. The first example is taken from a focus group in Oldham and 
the second is from South Manchester; both of them provide an insight into how mixed schools 
are framed. Moreover, they show how schools are perceived as active spaces, which allow pupils 
to understand cultural difference.   
F3  121: R7: You see if you go to a mixed school you get    
  122:  to see other people and you get to know other people.  
F6  4: R1: I think it’s a great idea, you get to know and    
  5:   understand about different people and their cultural   
  6:  backgrounds. The real world is made up of people of   
  7:  different backgrounds and  this helps you to prepare for                                 
  8:  that          
  9: R2: I agree with that  you get to know and find out about   
  10:  people of different backgrounds.  
 
 An additional feature of mixed-school discourse was based upon the idea that meaningful 
and detailed interaction between Muslims and non-Muslims could lead towards greater trust and 
stronger bonds. It was argued that social contact could help reduce racial prejudice between the 
Muslim community and the wider public. This is clear from the following observation on the role 
of mixed schools.  
 
                                                          
26 The idea of ‘getting to know each other’ is taken from the following Quranic verse: ‘O mankind! We created you 
from a single (pair) of a male and a female, and made you into nations and tribes, that ye may know each other (not 
that ye may despise each other). Verily the most honoured of you in the sight of God is (he who is) the most righteous of you. And God has full knowledge and is well acquainted’ (Quran: 49:13). Given the fact that students 
did not make any reference to the   Quran demonstrates the ways in which they may have subconsciously picked this  
up from the mosque or the wider community.   
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F5:  22: R2: It helps break down prejudice [from both sides]. 
 
  Given the history of racial conflict and tension in some of the areas where the focus 
groups took place, it was strongly argued that one of the many ways of combating antagonism 
and animosity is through greater social contact. This is clear from the following: 
F1: 52: R4: There are different people fighting, which can be a        
53: negative factor, I think when different people get to know each       
54: other, they will stop fighting and get on with each other.     
 
  The above Quranic principle   of ‘getting to know each other’ to reduce  
racial conflict can provide wider  discursive support for Cantle’s (2008) idea of social  
contact reducing racial prejudice. Furthermore, it supports the following  
observation: 
  Islam has a highly developed sense of social or ethical citizenship in which, in 
line with contemporary Western communitarian thinking, duties as well as rights 
are emphasized.  
      (Modood 2007:143)   
 
6.2 Doing Integration: Integration as performance  
 
 This section demonstrates a strong narrative of Muslims mixing with people of different 
cultural backgrounds. The act of integration for many Muslims was seen to be important, as was 
the need to be seen to be integrating. This idea of integration as performance was central to the 
discursive function; this is clear from the following observations.  
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The focus group interviews cited below confirm that young Muslims ‘do’ mix with non-
Muslims; this can be observed in schools and also within wider society. An additional feature as 
highlighted below is the constant comparison with ‘other communities’ to demonstrate the extent 
and speed of Muslim integration.  
F1: 122: R6: Muslims do integrate...[for example] in school  and also,          
123: in  town, you see shop with different Asian people working or    
124:  generally mixing.                  
130: R2: You also see in your own community, there are people of         
131:  different backgrounds and you just get on with your       
132:  neighbour its one of those things.  
F1: 161: R5:  it’s like Amir Khan, he uses the flag and says he’s British  
 162:   Muslim and he is fighting for Britain. We are integrating   
 163:  more so than other communities. You see Muslim    
 164:  community is a new community and within short amount     
 165:  of time I think we have  come a long way compared to   
 166:  say the Jewish or other  communities.   
 
   The example cited below touches upon the crucial idea of integration as performance by 
drawing upon changing cultural patterns of eating from fast-food outlets. The observation also 
confirms that the idea of integration is a conscious act that can be used to silence some of the 
critics of Islam.  
F6:  7: R3: In Oldham there is so many chicken and chips place, you turn   
8: every corner and you see Chunky chicken etc. What I find      
9: interesting is when KFC started to go Halal     all      
10:  Muslim flocked there - why? When you have all these places            
11: Muslims still go to KFC. It’s because  Muslims want to be             
12:  seen to be integrating. I think                          
13: people do this to show Muslim haters… look we do integrate!  
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6.3 ‘This is a mixed school’ 
This section examines how students understand their own [mixed] schools by comparing them 
with neighbouring mono-cultural schools in the borough. One of the many ways pupils do this is 
through a racialized binary discourse: schools with a significant White or Asian cohort are 
viewed as ‘all White’ or ‘all Asian schools’.   Schools with a mainly diverse cohort without one 
dominant ethnic group are characterised as mixed schools.   
 The racial dynamics of schools within the borough are central to young pupils; from an 
early age they develop a detailed knowledge of all the borough’s segregated or mixed schools.  
They were able to provide concrete examples of most schools in their borough which were 
racially segregated. It appeared that there was a consensus on segregated and mixed schools; 
moreover, there was an acknowledgement by Muslim students that mixed schools provided a 
more complete and well-rounded education than the segregated ones. The schools were suitable 
not because of the educational achievement they offered but because of the quality of experience 
they provided. This is clear from the following two examples; the first is taken from a focus 
group in Oldham, whilst the second is taken from a school in East London: 
F5: 14: S: How would you describe this school?                                                   
 15:  R1:  I think it’s a ‘mixed’ school   
F8: 1: S: How would you describe this school?  I think this will be a mixed  
 2: R1: school (.) very very mixed                                                                    
 3:  R2:  Yeah:::  a mixed school        
 4: R1:  You have many people from different cultural backgrounds (.) 
 5:   Black, Asians, English and Europeans and yeah::: mixed race. 
 6:  It’s a good idea for people of different religion and culture to  
 7:   learn together. I think it makes people better.   
 8: S: What do you mean ‘makes people better’?    
 9: R1: You know, better person, more tolerant person.                                                                               
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  All the focus group respondents were able to provide concrete examples of segregated 
schools. It is worth pointing out that the schools they described as segregated were not schools 
that were widely debated in the public domain. It seems that the pupils were reversing the 
popular discourse of mono-cultural ‘Muslim’ schools with mono-cultural [White] schools. This 
is clear from the following example: 
F3: 12: S: Can you give me any examples of schools which are  
 13: R1: segregated?  Mountthill, Railsworth                                                                               
 14:     R2:    [Railsworth]                                                     
 15: S:  They are segregated by?                                                                                          
 16 R2:          [ <Whites>] 
 The above example demonstrates how schools are defined in racial terms. In the above 
example, Muslim pupils chose to describe monocultural White schools as segregated; this is 
contrary to the way segregated schools are framed by the national media. The schools that tend 
to receive much of the attention in Oldham  are those in which Muslims account for over 90% of 
the students, such as Greevsville, Prozehill and Masenmor. The above observation provides a 
good example of the way in which the popular public discourse of segregation is reversed.    
 As noted in the above observation [F3], schools that generated a significant amount of 
public and policy attention because of their mono-cultural composition did not feature in the 
immediate discourse. Rather, mono-cultural White schools   located in predominantly White 
neighbourhoods, such as Mounthill and Railsworth, were cited. This further shows how the pupil 
discourse rejects the public debate on segregation as simply focusing on state mono-cultural 
‘Muslim’ schools.  
 
 
155 
 
 The Muslim pupils adopted a binary framing of mixed or segregated schools. It is worth 
noticing that the choice of expression used  to describe the educational experience did not reflect 
the language of ‘cohesion’, in other words, no references were made to schools which were 
‘integrated’ or ‘cohesive’ as reflected within the public discourse of Oldham. Instead they had 
their own language to describe the nature of the schools.    
  Mixed compulsory educational institutions were described in either visual and numerical 
terms, and most focus group respondents had a clear picture of the diverse range encompassing 
their own school and the surrounding schools. Mixed schools were viewed as an ideal  
educational setting by most Muslim pupils; this was because  they were able to provide students 
with the relevant and necessary skills required for a rounded education. This point is further 
articulated by a year-10 girl from Oldham: 
F4: 110: R1:It’s better if you come to a mixed school (.) because (.)           
111: there are many benefits. There are narrow-minded people       
112: <I’m not saying this because they are white> I’m saying this because               
113: Asians can be narrow-minded. You can think people are so strange                   
114:  because they are from different cultural backgrounds. If they                                                 
115:  didn’t attend a mixed school they would not have had that                    
116:  opportunity to find out that they are OK.                            
117: There are good and bad people in all cultures.  
 The above point highlights the way in which mixed schools are discussed. It shows how 
mixed schools are seen as providing a discursive space in which prejudices and stereotypes can 
be challenged.   
 
 
 
156 
 
  6.4 ‘Sticking together’: Constructing ‘ummahtic’ space in school 
The preceding section highlighted a variety of ways in which Muslim pupils welcomed the 
opportunity to ‘mix’. It was argued that the idea of mixing provided valuable ways in which 
social and cultural capital is framed; it also facilitated different ways in which Muslims view 
citizenship and participation in a multicultural society.  
 Evidence provided in this section demonstrates how the idea of mixing does not 
constitute a normative experience for Muslim pupils. This section highlights the importance of 
Muslim group solidarity (Ibn Khaldun 1958) for young people in the context of the school 
experience. Pupil discourse in this section demonstrates how experiences and perceptions of 
racism, combined with the deeply politicised context of Islam within contemporary society, can 
contribute to a sense of solidarity, ethnic clustering and overall sense of ambivalence within 
mixed schools.  Pupil narratives presented in this section reinforce wider empirical evidence that 
supports the idea that racism and the global war on terror are shaping Muslim school experiences 
(Crozier & Davies 2008).   
  Muslim students in mixed schools talked of developing a range of complex and creative 
ways to respond to dominant hegemonic Whiteness (Gilborn 2008) by defining and redefining 
rules of engagement. Hegemonic Whiteness sees schools as possible hostile spaces for Muslim 
students, spaces which were defined, firstly, by the numerical dominance of White students in a 
given school. Secondly, there is an understanding that a school where White pupils are in the 
majority could lead to the privileging of White students over non-Whites. Thirdly, these notions 
of hostility are often predicated upon personal experiences of racism and anti-Muslim prejudice, 
based upon the personal (for example, hostility towards the hijab) together with the institutional 
(such as policies, school ethos) responses to cultural difference. Finally, the role played by 
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international events, such as the war on terror, must be considered (Imtiaz 2010; Brittain 2008; 
Allen 2010).  
One of the main strategies discussed by Muslim pupils to challenge hegemonic 
Whiteness in schools was the idea of ‘sticking-together’: ‘sticking-together’ functions when a 
group of students of similar religion consciously cluster together within, as a way of generating 
support and strength, in the face of a perceived or actual hostile school environment.  An 
important theme emerging from the discourse of ‘sticking-together’ is that it transcends markers 
of ethnic difference and unites young people on the basis of a religious identity. For example, 
statements such as ‘we all Muslims need to stick together’ or ‘we have to look out for each other’ 
provide young people with a way of achieving ‘safety in numbers’.  
Perhaps the most important features of ‘‘sticking-together’’ is that it ‘just happens’; it is 
akin to a subconsciously conditioned response to perceived hostile environments.  Ethnic 
clustering is not rule-governed; rather, it is an organic process in which people of a particular 
faith or ethnic background wilfully navigate towards one another, based upon shared cultural 
traits. There is no malicious intent behind the idea of ‘‘sticking-together’’; in fact, as indicated in 
the previous chapter, pupils often socialise and ‘mix’ with people of different ethnic and 
religious backgrounds. This point is made with great passion by one focus group member in a 
mainly mixed school in Oldham. 
 F3: 138: R1: It’s not like oh she’s Bengali and I’m going to hang  
 139:  around with them, it just happens, that we are both   
 140:  Bengalis. If  there was a new kid in class and they were  
 141:  English, white or whatever, it won’t be that I don’t   
 142:  want to hang about with them.  
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As most young people ‘socialise’ with others based upon shared cultural experience, it 
came as no surprise to find that this was a key foundation on which ‘‘sticking-together’’ was 
actualised.  The key factors that shaped the idea of ‘commonality’ or shared identity were largely 
defined in cultural and religious terms. Within a mixed school context, ethnic and religious 
cultures were seen to play an active role in pupils’ understanding of social reality. Thus, diet, 
religion, language, music and family all played an important role in developing a sense of shared 
identity. A complex and elaborate explanation was offered to explain the governing principles of 
‘sticking-together’. For example, the following observation from a mixed school in Manchester 
highlighted how social forms of discourses, which manifest themselves in the form of humour, 
constitute an important ‘connective’ in ‘sticking-together’. Jokes have often been seen as short 
stories with an intent to make a person laugh or to demonstrate a sense of irony. Jokes within the 
focus group interviews were seen to have a discursive feature which requires a cultural decoding 
framework. This is because most often the jokes are told in a bi-lingual medium; thus, to really 
appreciate the humour, access to both languages and cultural schemata is crucial. This is further 
articulated as follows: 
F4: 20: R2: I mean:::: I mean::: (.) it’s different few people are   
 21:  mixing now but, I think it’s different if you hang about with  
22:  your own  kind.         
23: R1:  [IT’S DIFFERENT]             
24: R2:  [IT’S DIFFERENT]        
25: R1: Our jokes and their jokes are different.                         
26: R2: Yeah:: its different that’s why it allows you all to get along    
27:  and connect in a better way.      
  
The above observation touched upon an important feature of the discursive 
characterisation of  ‘sticking-together’. This point was further elaborated by a female focus 
group in a mixed school in Greater Manchester; the summary of their discussion is provided 
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below. The debate explains how cultural events, such as the religious festivals of Eid and 
Ramadan, play an important role in forming social bonds. Pupils generally discuss key highlights 
of their evening or weekends with their friends at school.  The fact that most Muslim students 
share a similar cultural experience of community is seen to further cultivate a common or shared 
experience. Focus group members often mentioned how the following questions after a festival 
season might underpin the topic of conversation: ‘What did you do on Eid? What clothes did you 
buy and where did you buy them from? Isn’t it hard fasting in school? These questions 
demonstrate some of the discussion points that governed the marking of memorable religious 
festivals, together with the creation of cultural ties within specific groups. These intimate and 
highly meaningful discussion points also play an important role in  nurturing the idea of 
‘‘sticking-together’’. 
F7: 63: R4: Like when it’s Ramadan all the white people will go                 
64:  to the  canteen during lunch and all the Muslims            
65:  will go out, so that’s a common thing that helps                              
66:  them to come together.  
 
 The discursive links between home and school combined with the way leisure 
time is spent act as important anchor points for conversation. The different world-views of 
Muslim and non-Muslim students within the context of leisure time play a crucial point in 
defining young people’s shared experiences. The following observation provides an indication of 
the differing ways in which personalised time is perceived. The example demonstrates how the 
personal time of White students is perceived as culturally different from most Muslim pupils.  
This cultural construct of leisure time also facilitates the ways in which Muslim pupils see the 
notion of ‘shared values’ as  competing and differing value structures (Halstead 2008).  
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F4: 131: R2: It just happens, if we start chatting, we chat            
132:  about the same things in common. Some of the                    
133:  things we chat about is what links us all together                        
134:   really. Stuff that goes on at home or what we do                         
135:   outside school. The white  kids like talking about                  
137:            drinking and partying and   getting pissed.   
 
 Whilst the above comments demonstrate how social and cultural traits can nurture a 
sense of loyalty based on religious group solidarity, the following observation taken from the 
same focus group further highlights the importance of shared experience through the discursive 
framing of ‘commonality’. The idea of ‘commonality’ is based upon the premise that in order to 
be accepted by the ‘White’ community you have to be ‘like them’.  In other words, Muslims 
have to lose their cultural traits prior to being accepted by their fellow pupils.   
F4: 215: R2: You will never get full integration, never never, there is   
 216:  always going to be a barrier of your skin colour. To them   
 217:  you will always be a PAKI. Nah you can be Bangladeshi,   
 218:  Pakistani or even an Indian, to them though you are a   
 219:  PAKI.  
Given the point that people with ‘brown skin’ are lumped together as one, as seen in the 
above observation, it is not surprising to note that ‘sticking-together’ can also include people of 
similar ethnic backgrounds, such as Indians (Hindus or Sikhs). Although, most of the time, 
‘sticking-together’ was referred to as a religious phenomenon, it is interesting to note how 
‘sticking-together’ can sometimes include non-Muslims. This is exemplified by the following: 
F4: 221: R2: There are lot of Hindus that stick with us, for example  
 222:  there  is Chundi, he always sticks with us. So it’s not   
 223:  always a religious thing. This may be because the white   
 224:  kids don’t know the difference between Muslims and   
 225:   Hindus;  they just  look at the skin colour and    
 226:   think we’re all Pakis.    
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Those who are not part of this ‘social bond’ or who choose not to stick with Muslims are 
often viewed with hostility and a sense of betrayal.  Remarks such as ‚they are sold out‛ or ‚he 
used to be safe, now he isn’t‛ were often used to describe Muslims who, despite the animosity, 
continued to associate with White youngsters. This is explained by the following statement 
which touches upon a crucial point that has already been mentioned above: namely, non-White 
people who socialise with White pupils are associated with losing their cultural identity. This is 
confirmed by the following observation which uses the example of music to demonstrate this 
point further: 
F4: 224: R2: NAH::: there’s only Nimo, he used to be safe yeah, but  
 225:  now he hangs around ‘with them’. He’s sold out…he   
 226:   listens to rock music, you can tell he doesn’t like it,   
 227:  he doesn’t even fit in there; he does it to try and fit in...    
 228:  His mates have had a [bad] influence on him.  
 
Given that the students use their personalised time to ‘stick-together’, the above point 
demonstrates the organic and spontaneous nature of group solidarity. ‘Sticking-together’ reaches 
its peak during certain times of the school day; these times are usually personalised times, such 
as during break and lunchtimes. This is made clear by the following point: 
F6 61: R4: I think during break or lunch people tend to stick together,   
 62:  but in class, I think people generally tend to mix together.  
 
If the schools are located in a predominantly White neighbourhood then ‘sticking-
together’ may be exemplified by the perceived essential practice among up to a dozen pupils, 
travelling to and from the school. When ‘sticking-together’ occurs within schools during break 
and lunchtimes, the numbers can be much smaller - perhaps half a dozen. One of the many 
reasons for this is based on the way in which Muslim pupils perceive certain geographical spaces 
162 
 
as hostile; these may be neighbourhoods with large concentrations of White people or schools 
located in mainly White residential areas. The fact that ‘‘sticking-together’’ confers confidence 
and group security is further demonstrated by the following statement by a year-10 boy.  The 
statement further highlights the circumstances in which he will challenge racism, which are 
usually determined by the people around him. 
F3: 93: R3: If I am on my own then I won’t challenge it     
 94:  [racism], but if  I’m in a group then I definitely will. This is    
 95:  because I  know I have my ‘back covered’.  
 
 
The above point is further reinforced by a  year-10 boy from a different school, who goes 
on to highlight how ‘‘sticking-together’’ is  commonly accepted by teachers and also by  White 
fellow pupils; he concludes by mentioning how ‘‘sticking-together’’ is used as a reciprocal 
support mechanism.  
F4: 120: R3: Everyone knows < EVERYONE KNOWS> we all     
 121:  stick together.        
 122:  R1: They know that if they are going to gang up on  
 123  one,   then all your boyz have you backed     
 124: R3: You won’t have a problem       
 125: R1 That’s how it works, we have to look after each     
 126:  other’s back.   
There are particular spaces within the school that were ‘marked’ by ethnic clustering; 
students demonstrated how specific spaces within mixed schools were racialised. There were 
certain areas within the canteen or the playground where Muslim pupils would play, and there 
are other places where White kids will ‘hang about’. These spaces were seen not as territories or 
fixed spaces that erupted in tension or violence but as spaces that organically developed over the 
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duration of schooling, and which tended to be determined by sports activities or other related 
pastimes and hobbies.  
Teachers have attempted to break down ‘ethnic clustering’  through mixed seating, group 
work and various sports activities,  only to find that, in the absence of such factors, ‘‘sticking-
together’’ continues as a normalising presence. As noted above, ‘‘sticking-together’’ can 
function based upon territorialised spaces within school.  Moreover, this seems to be a dominant 
idea which most, if not all, people recognise exists’ thus, it comes as no surprise to find that 
teachers actively  intervene during core lessons  to break down the idea of ‘‘sticking-together’’. 
There were two main approaches by teachers that were highlighted within the focus groups: 
firstly, teachers would implement a standard policy within class, mixing  pupils up; this would be 
done either by a policy of ‘boy girl, boy girl’,  or through alphabetical ordering of names on the 
register. The second approach would involve a teacher identifying instances of ethnic clustering 
and directly intervening. Teacher interventions challenging the idea of ‘sticking-together’ were 
routinely administered against Muslim pupils (and not White students). In these circumstances it 
is important to note that pupils did not challenge the teacher’s involvement in trying to mix the 
pupils. This is demonstrated by two examples cited below. The first example is taken from a 
sports lesson and the second during a school field trip. These examples are taken from two 
different schools. 
F4: 147: R2: It’s like in PE when the teacher (.) because we have two   
 148:  trampolines and all the Asian girls will go on one and all   
 149:  the white girls will go on the other. When this happens  
 150:  and it  usually does happen the teacher will say ‚come  
 151:  on girls. ‚Why don’t you mix together?‛   
F3: 244: R3: We went on a trip once and we just happen to go with our   
 245:  mates and the white lads would also go wither their   
 256:  mates. But the teacher came to us and told us to ‚go and  
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 257:  mix with them‛.  Why didn’t he go up to the white   
 257:  lads and tell them to come and mix with us? 
 
The above examples demonstrate how ‘sticking-together’ acts as a normalising presence 
in a school context. This is confirmed through a collective discourse on schooling and is also 
based on the examples cited above by the students. This is exemplified by the need for teachers 
to actively challenge the idea of ethnic or religious clustering of pupils. Moreover, it is generally 
accepted that, in the absence of external forces such as intervention through classroom structures 
and streaming students based upon ability groups, ‘sticking-together’ continues as a normalising 
presence.  
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6.5 Racism and Schooling- ‘At the end of the day you’re still a Paki’ 
The discourse of ‘‘sticking-together’’ is based upon experiences of racism and anti-
Muslim prejudice within the school environment. International events and the rhetoric of the 
‘war on terror’ have also nurtured a sense of hostility displayed by non-Muslim pupils and 
teaching staff towards Muslim pupils.  These experiences have played a vital role in reinforcing 
Muslim group solidarity based primarily on religion.  In order to support these observations, 
concrete examples from pupils’ experience and general hostility towards Muslims in the UK 
were cited. The following examples taken from a mixed school in Oldham provide supporting 
evidence of anti-Muslim prejudice within an educational context.   
F4: 181: R2: Recently with all that’s been happening in Afghanistan, and    
 182:  stuff with CCF [Combined Cadet Forces based in school].   
 183:  people go there and they get told stories about all these   
 184:  [Muslim] Taliban’s killing ‘all our’ British soldiers, that’s   
 185:  having an impact. People turn against us.     
 186: S: I take it you’re not members of the CCF?    
 187: R2: Me and <him> joined it       
 188: R1:    [We joined]     
 189: R2: There were racism (.) <TOO MUCH> racism that’s why     
 190:  we left.  
The above example is particularly revealing as it demonstrates concrete examples of the 
ways in which ‘the war of terror’ has created hostility and feelings of isolation within schools. 
This feeling of isolation created by wider political events following 9/11 and 7/7 was also 
confirmed by the Crozier & Davies (2008) study of Muslim students. Furthermore, the example 
used by the above focus group [F4] elucidates the crucial question of acceptance of Muslims 
within wider society in general and the schooling context in particular, and was further endorsed 
by the following: 
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F4: 154: R2: At the end of the day it’s your ethnic group which matters        
 155:  end of the day the English people will not accept you as   
 156:  British at the end of the day that guy will say (.) <THAT  
 157:  GUY’s A PAKI> so we might just stick with that.  
 
Strong examples of racism and anti-Muslim prejudice were not confined to just one local 
authority; accounts of racism perpetrated by members of staff were also a strong feature in focus 
group in Eccles, Manchester. An observation by a Yemeni Muslim boy demonstrates this point 
further: 
F8: 126: R4: One day a teacher got hold of my tie and called   
 127:  me a <scruffy Arab>        
 128: S: How did that make you feel?      
 129: R4: I don’t mind if they call me, but the teachers they should   
 130:  know better. 
Whilst the above citation of hostile treatment by members of staff against Muslim pupils 
is apparent, other experiences also confirmed differential treatment  of Muslim and non-Muslim 
pupils by teachers. This is confirmed by the collective discourse of racism and anti-Muslim 
prejudice by Muslim pupils within schools: 
F8: 131: R3: One day <yeh> there was a white kid that called  
 132:  me a <dick head> and I called him fat (.), the teacher  
 133:  yeah heard this, and can you believe it, he gave me half  
 134:  hour det. [detention]   <GIVE ME HALFHOUR DET>  
 135: R2:     [That’s racist]   
 
F4: 58: R2: YOU KNOW that the teachers don’t do anything, they say   
 59:  that you are pulling the <RACE CARD> that’s what they  
 60:  say, I think that’s completely wrong. The other day we  
 61:  had our Frisbee taken away, it was these (.) white   
 62:  girls that said ‘oh sir’ that’s our Frisbee to a teacher and   
 63:  he took it from us, without asking us, and gave it to them.  
 64:  Do you not think there is a hint of racism?      
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The above observations of racism are also supported by academic studies. For example, 
Crozier & Davies’ (2008) study on Muslim educational experiences of schooling highlighted 
how the question of safety was paramount for Muslim parents and pupils. Their study also made 
‘clear that racist abuse is a lived experience for some on a daily basis, but for all as a feature of 
their schooling’ (Crozier & Davies 2008: 295). 
6.6 ‘Safety in numbers’  
 Pupil testimonies of schooling confirmed how   Muslim pupils do not consider 
themselves as individuals but as a collective group. This collective body or ‘ummah’27  was seen 
to provide support and protection for fellow Muslims as and when required.  
Discursive framing of anti-Muslim prejudice seems to be predicated upon the size of the 
Muslim population within the school. A school with a small population of Muslim children 
provided detailed accounts of racism, anti-Muslim prejudice and bullying. This point is further 
articulated by the following observation.  
F8:  15: R2: They won’t call me a Paki in our school         
16: S: Why?                                                                                      
17: R2: Because like there are many Muslims and             
18: few whites. They only call you names and treat     
19: you bad if there are a small number of Muslims in                   
20:  the school. 
 
                                                          
27 A detailed account of the way in which Muslim pupils frame the notion of ‘ummah’ is provided in the following 
section.  
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The crucial point of safety in numbers and how this acts as a support mechanism for 
students inside the school premises is further articulated by another respondent from the above 
focus group. The example taken from Eccles elucidates how group solidarity is viewed as a way 
of supporting fellow Muslims; it demonstrates how vulnerability and susceptibility to racism and 
anti-Muslim prejudice is associated with being alone or without fellow Muslims.    
F8: 34: R1: In Charlestown I feel safe you know (.) if you went   
 35:  to the new Academy and you’re the only Muslim yeh (.)  
 36:  you’ll  get called a <PAKI> everyday. You see in   
 37:   our  school we all stick together, so they don’t     
 38:   have the guts to call  us names.  
 
Personal and group safety were cited as key reasons for attending schools with significant 
numbers of Muslim pupils; it was felt that this provided a mechanism to challenge racism or anti-
Muslim prejudice. Archer’s (2003:13) study also confirmed this point; she noted how Muslim 
boys in particular would use ‘aggressive macho talk’ to reassert power and autonomy by 
mobilizing a repertoire of hegemonic masculinity, similar to that highlighted in the following 
interview by Yemeni Muslim pupils: 
F8: 37: R2: It’s about your religion, it’s good to go to a school where there              
38:  more of your people.                                 
39: R3: Ya man, you feel safe                                                     
40: R2: If you are with your own group of people you feel safe,                           
41:  but (.) if you are on your own you get picked on and they                    
42:  would call you names, but if you’re in a group and you                           
43:  are more in …                                                                                         
44: R4: numbers, you know you’ll finish them off. <Yeh will finish                
45:  them off>.  
 
The language of ‘aggressive macho talk’ can also draw upon external support from the 
local community. The example highlighted below, taken from a grammar school in Greater 
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Manchester, demonstrates how a school with a small population of Muslim pupils can draw upon 
the wider Muslim community for a sense of security.   
 
F4: 37: R2: One of the things that has helped us is that the school is    
38:  in Fartown [mainly affluent Muslim ward], even though the              
39:   school is full of white kids. That’s why they don’t mess                     
40:  with us.  Any other area we would have been                          
41:  slaughtered  . Innit?                                         
42: S: SERIOUSLY?                     
42: R1: Yeah                                    
43: R2: YEAH:::    
    
 The above section articulated the way in which Muslim pupils construct their social 
world as autonomous agents responding to external hostile stimuli.  It was particularly revealing 
how Muslim boys seek out other ‘brothers’ for support and help in the event of future anticipated 
racial incidents, rather than approaching the head teacher or other teachers at the school. This 
was also confirmed by Archer (2003) in her study of Muslim boys and education. She highlights 
how: 
Muslim identity was talked about as a unifying force, one that superseded other, 
possibly conflicting, national identifications and loyalties, such as potential 
Bangladeshi-Pakistani differences. Another boy, Raihan, also suggested the ideal 
of Muslim brotherhood and  umma created strength through a global network of 
identifications, saying  ‘you got Muslim brothers all over the world so wherever you go a Muslim brother will help you’.  
        (Archer 2003 
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6.7 Islam and the War on Terror 
Muslim discourses within schools also drew upon wider experiences of socio-political 
events. These events help shape the way in which pupils view themselves but also the way in 
which others view them (Shain 2003).  Focus group accounts demonstrate a strong sense of 
politicisation of Muslim communities in general and Muslim young people in particular. It is 
clear that Muslim youths take an active role in following both domestic and international affairs 
affecting the Muslim community. It is also apparent that ‘grievance politics’ following the Bush 
Years (Imtiaz 2010) played a crucial role in developing a sense of collective Muslim identity 
which helps shape and nurture a sense of Muslim ummah.   
The politicisation of young Muslims is demonstrated by the keen interest they show in 
the headline news reports regarding Muslims in Europe or throughout the ‘Muslim’ world. The 
meta-discourse of Muslim pupils usually takes an oppositional reading (Hall 1973) of dominant 
public discourse on Muslims and Islam. It is important to note that this particular way of reading 
media events was a universal trait within all the focus groups. In order to form their 
understanding of ‘Muslim events’, they often consulted a wide range of media sources ranging 
from traditional and new media outlets. It is also clear that major political events within the 
Muslim world formed part of collective conversation in everyday life (Imtiaz 2010; Philips & 
Iqbal 2009). 
The repertoire of conspiracy theories allowed some Muslims to explain and understand 
the events of 7/7. It was clear that some of the respondents who adhered to such a perspective 
were citing documentaries on YouTube and other websites to justify their views.  Conspiracy 
theories played a crucial role in framing discourses on key landmark events, such as the 9/11 and 
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7/7 bombings. Most of the explanations were also grounded in  new media sources. In fact, these 
videos and other internet articles were used as supporting evidence which formed counter-
arguments against the dominant public reading of 9/11 and 7/7. References to the Illuminati or 
the Freemasonic conspiracy were cited as ‘suspect groups’ that may be responsible for either 
carrying out  or organising the events. The importance of conspiracy theory in shaping popular 
understanding of September 11 and 7/7 is clear from the following focus group conversation 
taken from a Sixth Form College:   
F1: 288: R6: Even 9/11 and 7/7 events are both big conspiracies, how    
289:  can Muslims carry out something big like that it’s impossible                 
290: R4: Everyone’s seen the videos on YouTube; in fact I can show         
291:  you the video that proves that 9/11 is a conspiracy.               
292: R2: You see OBL [Osama bin Laden] likes to show off and admit       
293:  things, so why did he not accept it, he could have easy said        
294:  he was responsible?                   
295: S: OK, who was responsible?                           
296: ALL:  [GEORGE BUSH]        
297: R1: Its simple, he wanted to get access to the oil, there are so         
298:  many arguments and questions that have been unanswered,         
299:  one thing is for certain that the events of 9/11 and 7/7 was not        
300:  carried out by Muslims, it’s the Freemasons or the Illuminati   
301:  that had a hand in it. You only need to see the videos.  
 
 The above account provides interesting example of how international events create social 
bonding at a local level. The above discourses also demonstrate how young people provide a 
counter-reading to the dominant normative narrative on the ‘war on terror’. The above narratives 
demonstrate how Muslims see themselves as a collective ummah; this theme of collective group 
spirit, together with external events shaping internal discourse is continued with the French 
debate on the veil cited below.  The girls’ focus groups showed an active interest in the debate on  
Islamic dress and the secular public space. The politicisation of the hijab in some European 
countries helped inform and define the general discourse on integration, Muslim identity and 
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anti-Muslim prejudice. Muslim women felt a strong affinity and solidarity with Muslim women 
in France; this is further exemplified by the fact that issues of loyalty, acceptance and inclusion 
were all mediated through the prism of the hijab controversy.  The issue of the hijab was one of 
the key dominant issues discussed by the girls’ focus groups. There was no connection between 
the type of discourse and   students wearing the veil; most often, girls who did not wear the hijab 
projected strong feelings of solidarity with fellow ‘Muslim sisters’.  
F1: 97: S: Ok if we move on, who is familiar with the    
 98:  debate over Muslims and integration?    
 99: R2: I don’t think they mention it as blunt as that, I guess it is   
 100:  more subtle and you get hints now and again that Muslim    
 101:  should integrate and be more western.       
 102: S: Would you like to expand?      
 103: R2: Did you hear about the French president, he is trying to  
 104:  ban the veil? He was saying like (.) can’t remember how  
 105:  he said it but he was trying to say that wearing the hijab is  
 106:  not part of French culture and stuff like that, and if you  
 107:  are a Muslim in France, you can’t wear the hijab in   
 108:  school. I think it’s very wrong for him to do that and also  
 109:  to say that. It’s wrong.  
The intensity of the feeling behind the focus groups was further articulated by a Muslim 
girl in the following observation. It demonstrates how the hijab is worn by Muslim girls as a 
matter of choice; the statement also demonstrates how Muslims view the ‘double standards’ 
associated with choices made by Muslim women and choices exercised by non-Muslim women: 
F3: 85: R2: It’s like, it’s stupid!  When                     
86: non-Muslim wear very little clothes or often no clothes it’s      
87: fine. It is seen as women making a choice and that. But      
88: as soon as I want to wear a scarf it’s suddenly such an      
89: abomination, it’s strange and it makes me very angry.   
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 The above evidence demonstrates how international events play a crucial role in defining 
and framing integration; it also shows how Muslim pupils display particular interest in political 
events involving fellow Muslims throughout the world. An example, which helps elucidate this 
point further, involved the case of the Gaza bombing in 2008. Some of the interviews were 
conducted whilst the siege of Gaza was being played out in the media; thus,  it came as no 
surprise to find that young Muslims paid particular attention to the details of the bombings. It 
was particularly interesting that a group of year-7 (age 12) boys drew links between the siege of 
Gaza and the global war against Islam: 
F8: 53:R2: I think you have to stick together with your own, you   
 54:  know <MUSLIMS> because there is a war.    
 55: S: How many people think there is a war?    
 56: R3: Yeh you only have        
 57:  to look at Gaza (.) some people make a big deal about   
 58:  Muslims because of 9/11.  
As noted in the above example, young people were able to draw upon a range of tools to 
criticize the received knowledge of key political events through mainstream media.  The young 
people recognised how the media position themselves as diametrically opposed to the issues and 
concerns facing the Muslim community. The institutional racist  usage of front-page headlines as 
a way of conveying particular readings of events was seen as a means of promoting messages to 
reflect the problematic nature of Muslim communities was further exemplified by the following 
observation: 
F8: 65: R2: You know if something happens with Muslims like  
 66:  terrorist bomb or something like that its always in the front  
 67:  R6:  page but         
 68:   [I KNOW]        
 68: R2:  [It’s like...]        
 69: R6:            [YEAH I know]  
 70: R6: <You know if its a Muslim that gets killed (.) no one cares   
 70:  that much (.) but like if a English person gets killed they   
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 71:  make a big thing and they even make a big ceremony.    
 72:  But if a Muslim person that is killed by a terrorist bomb or   
 73:  killed they call him a terrorist.    
The above discussion demonstrates how young people feel they are portrayed in the news 
media; this view is also confirmed by a number of academic studies on the representation of 
Muslims in the media (Said 1997, Poole 2002). The connection between ‘Muslims as terrorists’ 
within the news media, and the similar depictions of Muslims in the wider media help shape 
young Muslim attitudes towards the mainstream media.  The following focus group discussion 
demonstrates how young people develop a critical reading of the ‘Muslim folk devil’ as 
portrayed in the media (Alexander 2000). The essentialised image of Muslims in the media, they 
argue, is not a true reflection of the lived experiences of the Muslim community. In other words, 
they felt there was a disconnection between the rhetoric of the media and the reality of the 
Muslim community.   
F2: 79: R4: Also in TV there is a lot of blaming the Muslims   
 80: R6: Like the analysis of the Quran that came on Channel 4,   
 81:  everyone watched it and they were all discussing and   
 82:  analysing it in school.       
 83: R2: Whenever there is a film about      
 84:  terrorism they always associate it with the Muslims (.)  
 85:  they  always put Muslims in a very negative and    
 86:  stereotypical view.  It’s not fair because they do not know 
 87:  what our religion is or what Muslims communities are like.  
 
Whilst it is clear that the above experiences inform the self-definition of Muslim 
communities, it is also important to note that the perceptions of Muslims emanating from the 
media can have a crucial impact on feelings of isolation and alienation. This is clear from the 
following observation, which captures the feelings generated by the negative media depiction of 
Muslims as terrorists.   
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F8: 82: S: How does [the negative media representation of Muslims   
 83:  you mentioned] make you feel?     
 84: R1: It makes me feel not important or accepted (.) it just   
 85:  makes  me feel that I’m alone in a world of darkness.  
 
 
      Most accounts of racism and anti-Muslim prejudice in mixed schools were 
experienced inside and outside the school premises. The following example taken from a school 
in Oldham demonstrates this point; it shows how the perception of Muslims as ‘terrorists’ in the 
general media informs jokes and general playground humour directed against Muslim pupils.  
F4: 191:R2:Stereotypical view of us plain and simple is that we’re   
 192:  terrorist.   We say something about a different     
 193:  subject in class and they’d say <’ARE YOU GONNA   
 194:  BLOW ME UP’>        
 195: R1: It will be like, you’ll be walking down the corridor in   
 196:   school  and a group of white students would  say ‘tick tick  
 197:   tick tick’ - like a bomb going off.  
 
The above section highlights a number of factors shaping the practice of ‘‘sticking-
together’’ within schools. Wider research on educational experience amongst Muslim pupils has 
also confirmed some of the above observations. For example, Crozier & Davies (2008) noted 
how teachers describe ‘sticking-together’ as ‘collective grouping’ or ‘pact behaviour’ and find it 
intimidating (Crozier & Davies 2008:295).  Moreover, they noted how ‘ethnic clustering’ is not a 
sign of ethnic segregation within schools, but rather examples of ‘enforced exclusion’, which is 
largely a product of racism.  Shain’s (2003) research on Muslim girls  also confirmed how 
experiences of racism can lead some girls ‘to the formation of an all-Asian female subculture 
from which white students and teachers and Asian students who appeared to ally with white 
students in the school were excluded’ (Shain 2003:59). 
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6.8 Conclusion  
 In the last decade, ethnically mixed-schools have been actively promoted within 
government policy (Ajebo 2007). In fact, the previous New-Labour government introduced the 
Education Inspection Act 2006, which placed a duty on all maintained schools to promote 
community cohesion as part of their Ofsted inspection process (DSCF 2006). The Ofsted 
Inspection framework 2012 continues to focus on community cohesion as part of a broader 
collective inspection of the Spiritual, Moral, Social and Cultural (SMSC) development of 
children (Ofsted 2012). In addition to Ofsted Inspection framework, the New-Labour 
government, together with the Coalition-led government, as documented in chapter 2, have 
encouraged the idea of mixed schools through the School Academies initiative. 
 This chapter developed the meta-narrative highlighted in chapter 2 of deconstructing the 
mixed school and mono-cultural school binary by exploring two over-arching discursive 
accounts of mixed schools. First, mixed schools were presented as positive spaces based upon 
the idea of geographical spaces of hope (Philips 2010), which provided an opportunity for 
Muslim pupils to interact and also to ‘do multiculturalism’. This experience or ‘performing 
integration’ were examined through the Quranic lenses of ‘getting to know each other’, which 
provided data in support of the community cohesion thesis (Cantle 2008) based upon the 
principles of social contact (Hewstone 2006a) and cultural pluralism. For Muslim pupils the 
function of a multi-cultural template of integration was based upon the act of ‘mixing’ between 
people of diverse ethnic and religious backgrounds. ‘Mixing’ voluntarily occurred within school 
environment driven by the desire to know and to understand. Moreover, the idea of ‘mixing’ was 
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considered as an empowering experience as it provided a platform for cultural exchange and 
debate in a de-facto multicultural society. Most importantly, Mixing was actualised within a 
discursive framework; it was only through the act of speech and exchange of cultural references 
that the objectives of mixing were achieved. It is through the function of discourse that Muslim 
pupils constructed their experiences, challenged their own prejudices and, above all, shaped their 
own versions of social reality. 
 Second, pupil discourse highlighted how the geographical spaces of hope (Philips 2010) 
can also produce ambivalent experiences (Bauman 1991), which can reinforce the  importance of 
group solidarity and belonging to a collective body of Muslims. The collective group was 
constructed through the religious categorisation of ’asabiyya, which was largely a response to 
experiences of racism and anti-Muslim prejudice, combined with the depiction of Muslims 
within the public domain as having a problematic presence.  Data in this section demonstrated 
how experiences of anti-Muslim prejudice within the context of global ‘war on terror’ (Imtiaz 
2010) played a significant role in shaping Muslim school experiences. These experiences, shaped 
through pupil and teacher interaction, played a crucial role in politicising young Muslims at the 
same time reinforcing group solidarity (Ibn Khaldun 1958) through the process of sticking 
together. Sticking-together’ occurs when Muslim students consciously cluster together, as a way 
of generating support and achieving safety in numbers, in the face of a perceived or actual hostile 
school environment.   Pupil testimonies of schooling confirmed how Muslim pupils do not 
consider themselves as individuals but as a collective group. This collective body or ‘ummah’ 
was seen to provide support and protection for fellow Muslims as and when required (Crozier 
and Davies 2008).  
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Chapter 7: Constructing identity in schools 
 
7.0 Introduction 
 The above two sections acknowledged the complex and ambivalent nature of debating 
experience of mono-cultural and mixed-schools. This section highlights the way in which 
Muslim pupils in the above schools construct their identity.  
 This section will demonstrate how the construct of self is not predicated upon the 
attendance of mixed or mono-cultural schools. For example, one would have thought, especially 
in light of the policy discourses on integration and schooling, that Muslim pupils attending a 
Muslim faith school would identify more with their religious identity compared to those 
attending a mixed school. In fact, students attending both of these types of school constantly 
negotiate a hybridised form of identity.  More importantly the interviews demonstrate how 
Muslim pupils see no contradiction between ‘Britishness’ and ‘Muslimness’ (Sobolewska 2010).  
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7.1 Debating and Negotiating Identity 
 A general consensus of those in the focus groups highlighted in the above chapters 
acknowledged that Muslims do actively take part in British life. They also accepted the fact that 
Muslims are, and have been, integrating into British society. One of the key features of Muslim 
integration focuses upon the notion of mixing; mixing, as already indicated, was seen to be based 
on the principles of social contact.   
 British Muslim identity was a major theme that was used to explain pupils’ sense of self. 
What emerged was a picture of young people negotiating, constructing their identity through the 
prisms of national and religious identity. This, they argued, was demonstrated through the 
cultural identity associated with ‘British Muslimness’. Muslim girls cited the wearing of the 
hijab through a distinctly cultural expression which juxtaposes the ‘modesty’ of the East with the 
fashion consciousness of the West (Bullock 2002).  
 The role of comedy was also seen as an important component of British Muslim identity 
which is manifested by cultural media through which humour is articulated. This once again 
combined a parody of the Asian Muslim culture set in British urban life. An example of this is 
the comedy and caricature of British Muslim culture, as demonstrated by the popular British 
Muslim comedian Humza, whose ‘Diary of a Bad Man’  is a popular hit amongst a cross-section 
of Muslim school pupils.  
There was also a general recognition that the migration of Muslims from traditional 
Muslim societies has changed the nature of Muslim society and culture (Cessari 2004). This 
migration, settlement and the emergence of a generation of young Muslims in Britain have given 
rise to potentially different sets of questions that Muslims living in Muslim societies were not 
180 
 
used to debating. The following observation clarifies this point in some detail. The discussion 
starts with question of barriers to Muslims integrating into UK society; respondent 1 argues that, 
despite the fact that Muslims are integrating into Western culture, they will not be able to ‘fully 
integrate’ because they will be unable to ‘go to the pub’. Respondent 2 challenges this position 
by arguing that it was a gross generalisation to assume that all non-Muslims were pub-goers.  
F1: 243: R1: Yes it does stop you from integrating; you won’t be able to go to   
244:  the pub?                         
245: R2: How can you say that? I know so many Muslim people that     
246:  drink, so you can’t say that and there are so many non-Muslims   
247:   those don’t drink or go to the pub. 
 
 The above discussion continues, revealing interesting ways in which the identity of 
Muslims is debated and, more importantly, negotiated. The following example reveals a very 
interesting question within the context of Muslims living in the West: to what extent is the 
membership of a particular faith predicated upon religious practice? The following observation 
demonstrates the idea of secularisation of religious communities; i. e. that membership of a 
religious community can exist without the external manifestation of religious practice.  
F1: 257: R5: YES but they are not Muslims [i.e. those that drink alcohol] 
 258: R2: YES THEY ARE, but they are not practising Muslims. So if you  
 259:  lie it’s a sin and that does not make you a non-Muslim, you are 
 260:  still a Muslim, although you are doing wrong you are still a  
 261:  Muslim. It’s  what you believe and what’s in your heart. It’s not 
 262:  what you practise but what’s in your heart. You don’t have  
 263:    to show everyone.   
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A similar discussion with a different focus group also draws similar conclusions. This 
time, the controversial practice of suicide bombing is discussed in light of contemporary political 
debate.  
F3: 250: R7: I don’t see it like that, I just see innocent people just dying. Its 
 251:  got nothing to do with the religion. Having said that some   
 252:  people are just prejudiced towards Muslims. It’s like you see the  
 253:  9/11 bombing and they will blame all the Muslims from that. I 
 254:  don’t think that is right.       
 256: R2: Yes, but have we given any reason for them NOT to believe all  
 257:  Muslims are terrorists?       
 258: R5: YES, You are not listening, they are <NOT MUSLIMS> how can  
 259:  people that are involved in those actions such as killing people  
 260:  be Muslims. They call themselves MUSLIMS.    
 261: R1: EXACTLY, they can’t be Muslims      
 262: R7: YES they are!        
 263: R2: You can’t say that, of course they are Muslim    
 264: R5: <COME ON MAN> seriously, you can’t say that they are  
 265:  Muslims        
 265:  R2: Islam teaches us peace, how can blowing up BUILDINGS BE  
 266:  PEACE.         
 267: R5: THAT’S WHAT ISLAM IS, all these terrorists call themselves  
 268:  Muslims, they are not really Muslims.      
   
7.2 Religious and National Identity  
 Most students did not see any conflict between religion and national identity; in 
fact, they felt confident in embracing both Britishness and Islam simultaneously. Students did 
not have any difficulties in embracing the religious or national positioning as a marker of 
identity. This is further clarified by the following statement taken from the girls’ focus group in 
Oldham: 
F3: 245: R1: I’ve never found it difficult being a Muslim and British, it never  
 246:  stopped me from doing anything. 
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 They felt that both religion and nationality complemented their sense of self and 
citizenship. This view is further supported by academic studies based on opinion polls (Mogahed 
2009) and detailed ethnographic accounts (Ahmed 2009). Some of the dominant ways through 
which the discourse of identity is discussed can be summarised as follows: 
F1: 180: R2: People can combine their identity, you can combine your        
181:  nationality which is being British, with your religion which is   
182:  your religion. I can’t  see any problems with that, you can be both    
183:  British and Muslim. In fact, what it means to be British and also       
184:  Muslim can also change. For example, I know people that are             
185:  practising now but were not doing so last year. And also, some         
186:  of my friends that do not wear the hijab were doing so 3 months ago.  
  
As highlighted in the above section, religious identity was not considered by Muslim 
pupils to be fixed; rather, it was always in a state of flux, adapting, formulating and 
reformulating based upon external factors. This is displayed in the construct of identity in F1 by 
R2 [see above], which shows the fluid nature of identity. This approach to identity confirms the 
arguments made by Hall (1992) and supported by Bauman (1999), who have reasoned that 
identities are not fixed but rather constantly in the process of becoming.  
 Pupil discourse did not reveal any sense of difficulty in embracing a hyphenated British 
Muslim identity; they did not see any questions circulating in public discourse as potential areas 
of contradiction between duties and responsibilities as a Muslim and a British citizen. By doing 
this the Muslim discourse was supporting Ramadan’s idea of Euro-Islam (2009). Students’ 
discourse did reveal that a strong grounding in the Islamic faith would make a person a better 
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citizen. The following extract taken from a Muslim girls’ school highlights how a strong 
religious education in the short term can help students to become better citizens in the future.   
F2: 101:  R2: I don’t think it’s going to be an issue to go to college,    
 102:  university or even work (.) I think coming to this school has given 
 103:  us a lot emotionally, morally and ethically. So I think it’s taught 
 104:  us to become good Muslims but also good <human beings and   
 105:  very good citizens> It has also taught us to interact with wider  
 106:  society and how to incorporate that within our religion. I   
 107:  think it has been beneficial coming to a Muslim faith school  
 108:  as this one, it really prepares you for the wider future. 
  
The above account supports the works of McLaughlin (1992), who argued that grounding 
in ones culture helps instil and nurture a sense of autonomy in children for the future. Meer 
(2009), in his study of Muslim schools in the UK, also supported McLaughlin’s thesis. What the 
above testimony demonstrates is how McLaughlin’s idea of ‘gaining autonomy via faith’ 
(Haydon 2009) can be extended to achieving integration via faith.   
 
 
7.3 British Pakistani Identity?  
     The most frequent way of demonstrating an expression of Pakistani identity was 
through a sense of loyalty to the birth place of one’s parents. This was paramount for those 
students who often visited their parental birth place. A number of students reflected upon their 
fond memories and also the positive treatment they received from extended family and the wider 
society during their stay in Pakistan. This was contrasted with the hostile negativity they may 
have encountered in the UK. This is demonstrated by the following: 
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F4: 147: R1: I see myself as a Pakistani.      
 148: S: Were you born in Pakistan?      
 149: R1: I was born here, but I have been back to Pakistan so many     
 150:  times, in fact I went back this year during the holiday.    
 151: R3: How can you be born here but see yourself as Pakistani?  
 152: R1: At the end of the day it’s your religion and your ethnic   
 155:  background  that matters.  
The nature of ‘Pakistaniness’, as noted by F4 above, was also seen by many students as a 
euphemism for religious identity. Many students struggled to separate Pakistani national identity 
from religion.  Both religious and nationalistic markers were seen to be interconnected and 
inseparable; when the above student (F4) is arguing that ‘at the end of the day it’s your religion 
and ethnic background that matters’, he is essentially making reference to his Pakistani identity. 
Thus, it was not surprising to find a number of students describing themselves as ‘British-
Pakistanis’. In a separate focus group as noted below, one of the respondents clarified the 
question of loyalty to dual nationality, by stating that he saw Britishness as his national identity 
and his Pakistaniness as his religious identity.   
 F5: 82: R6: I see myself as a British Pakistani      
 83:  [laughter]         
 84: R2: How can you belong or be British and Pakistani at the same 
 85:  time, I don’t know?        
 86: R6: You learn your religion and what have you from your home, you  
 87:  also learn your culture and religion from the mosque,   
 88:  by celebrating Ramadan and Eid and stuff.     
 89: R4: That’s all our Pakistani culture, all the religion and also the stuff    
 90:  we do at home is our Pakistani culture. It’s nothing complicated  
 91:  about that is there? 
 The above experience demonstrates how the Pakistani identity can be seen as a 
euphemism for the religious identity. In a similar vein, a student from an Iraqi heritage sees very 
little difference between Arab and Muslim culture.  
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F7: 130: R1: Yeah::: definitely Islam guides our life (.) that is why I follow the  
 131:  Arabic culture which is the Muslim culture. That is why I feel it is 
 132:  so important to follow our culture.  
 
 The notion of travel or staying in different countries for a long duration also played an 
important role in shaping one’s self-construct. This was raised by a number of students; for 
example, in the above passage (F4) one’s Pakistani identity was constructed after visiting the 
country of parental birth, but the following example taken from a mixed school in Manchester 
demonstrates how this label   is rejected for a British Muslim identity because, firstly, the 
respondent had not visited Pakistan or any other countries and secondly, Britishness and 
Muslimness were the only markers she was familiar with.  
F7: 114: R1: I was born here so I consider myself as British Muslim, I have   
 115:  not gone anywhere so I consider myself to be British.    
 
 In most cases the experience of travelling or staying in a different country either for a 
short or longer duration can provide young people with a sense of belonging and loyalty. If the 
pupils have constantly moved from one location to another, this can lead to a sense of alienation 
or difficulty in expressing one’s sense of self. This is further articulated as follows: 
F7: 120: R5: I am from three countries; I have stayed in these three countries 
 121:  for many years (.) Pakistan, England and Germany (.) so for me    
 122:  things are very complicated.  
 
  For students experiencing alienation, the process of imagination or sense of imagined 
community (Anderson 1991), or imagined ummah (Roy 2006), can play a crucial role in 
conceptualising one’s identity. This is demonstrated by the following example:  
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F7: 103: R2: Whilst I was born here and I have a British passport, this does   
 104:  not mean you can’t be part of your mother country. My parents 
 105:  are from Iraq, I have not lived in Iraq but I constantly try to  
 106:  imagine, ALL THE TIME  I try to imagine what it’s like to be   
 107:   Iraqi.  All my life we have not stayed in one place,   
 108:  my parents were from Iraq, then they came to Newcastle, where   
 109:  I was born, then we went to Dubai to live, and then we came to  
 110:  Manchester. So if someone asks me where I am from (.)   
 111:  it’s very difficult, I find that difficult to     
 112:  answer. How can I tell them where I am from?   
 
 For some students the country of their birth together with the birth place of their parents 
helped defined their identity. In the following examples, it is clear how ‘Asia’, ‘Africa’ and the 
‘Arab’ world played an important role in self-definition, but also the way in which fellow 
students are defined.  
F3: 166: R7: You see Asians feel that they own this place...                           
 223: R2: I am an East African Asian...  
F9: 9: R1 ...I don’t care - I’m a Yemeni  
 
  The above example taken from focus group discussions demonstrates how students often 
use ‘Asian’ or ‘Arab’ as adjectives to describe themselves and also define others.  
 Whilst some would consciously choose not to use any religious marker to describe 
themselves, it is useful to point out that students often use Muslim, Asian or African identities 
interchangeably. In fact, as we have seen above, for many pupils the Asian and Arab categories 
can often be taken to mean a broader cultural experience of which religion is a major component.  
For example, one of the students described how all ‘the Asians in [her] school all stuck together’; 
however, in the very next sentence she used the religious marker to describe the same group. 
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This demonstrates how parental birth place is often seen as a euphemism for framing a particular 
cultural practice.  
7.4 British Muslim Identity and Muslim Faith Schools 
 One group that perhaps demonstrated a clear sense of identity was the Muslim Girls’ 
School focus group. The Muslim girls did not solely use the ‘Muslim’ category as a way of 
talking about themselves or fellow students, but also used a hyphenated British-Muslim identity 
(Ramadan 2009). They demonstrated a strong and confident identity, which they felt at ease to 
discuss at length (McLaughlin 1992; Meer 2009). The meta-discourse of these students did not 
feature parental birth place as an important component in defining themselves. They were firm 
on their religious identity; at the same time, they were grounded in what being British meant to 
them. They argued very passionately about the religious imperative to integrate and the 
importance of socio-political space shaping one’s identity (Alwani 2003).  
 The Muslim faith school discourse reveals a pristine conception of ‘Muslimness’ which is 
free from any denominational links or ties. One of the focus group members described how they 
were interested in living their lives according to ‘true Islam’, which for them was grounded in 
the idea of tolerance.  In this context, ‘Muslimness’ is very much defined through an ecumenical 
visioning which transcends nationalistic or other clan-based linkages. It was not surprising to 
note that Muslim girls were very much in support of marriages across ethnic groups - providing 
they shared the same faith. This, they were quick to highlight, was a significant shift from their 
parents’ attitudes. Moreover, the girls felt that ‘assabiyya’ based upon tribal loyalties to a single 
ethnic group was essentially wrong and should be resisted.  
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  Responding to various religious denominations within the community of Blackburn, 
where the school is located, the focus group members displayed a very deep knowledge and 
understanding of the various denominations within the community and argued for a more 
pluralistic and encompassing vision of Islam. Moreover, the responses demonstrated how the 
pupils were not promoting a Deobandi vision of Islam, which most people would associate with 
the school; instead they projected an ecumenical spirit of Islam. This further demonstrates how 
Muslim pupils might attend a school of a particular denomination, but may have their own 
agency and own way of defining their Muslimness.  
F2:  141: R2: I do not believe in those <classifications> such as     
142:   Deobandi, Berelawi, because I think people have the right to   
143:   believe in what they have to, some of it might be or some might   
144:   say is wrong you can’t stop someone believing in something, if        
145:   that what they want to believe.   
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7.5 Conclusion  
 
Part 3 of this dissertation focused on the key findings of this research by considering pupil 
discourses on mono-cultural and mixed-school positioning through three interconnected 
chapters. In Chapter 5, pupil discourses on mono-cultural schools and schooling were explored.  
The dominant discursive repertoire that was used to talk about the ‘mono-cultural’ [state] 
schooling experience was through the deficit model of schooling. Chapter 6 saw the rupturing of 
the binary opposite of the integration debate – with social contact as good and ethnic clustering 
as bad.  Muslim pupil narratives considered how experiences of ‘mixed’ schools were seen as 
positive spaces of hope; these ‘spaces of hope’ allowed the functioning  of multiculturalism via 
(a) ‘getting to know each other’ and (b) the politics of difference (Modood 2010). This chapter 
also explained how these spaces of hope were not based upon a normative experience. It 
established how experiences of racism and anti-Muslim prejudice within school settings could 
lead to hyper-ethnic clustering or ‘sticking-together’.   
 This chapter explored how Muslim pupils frame their identity in light of their schooling 
experience; this section also highlighted how the type of school has no impact on how Muslim 
pupils see themselves. British Muslim identity was a dominant theme that was used to explain 
pupil’s sense of self. This further supported Ramadan’s idea of Muslim identity rooted in the 
west.  Furthermore, pupil data supported existing data on how Muslim pupils see no 
contradiction between ‘Britishness’ and ‘Muslimness’ (Mogahed 2009; Sobolewska 2010). Pupil 
narratives also confirmed the recognition made by Cessari (2004) that the migration of Muslims 
from traditional Muslim societies has changed the nature of Muslim society and culture.  
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 Religious identity was not considered by Muslim pupils to be fixed; rather, it was always 
in a state of flux, adapting, formulating and reformulating based upon external social events. 
This approach to identity confirms the observations made by Hall (1992) and supported by 
Bauman (1999), who have reasoned that identities are not fixed but rather constantly in the 
process of becoming.  Identity within this context is seen to be a part of a social construct with 
external political pressures influencing the ways in which Muslims view themselves. For 
example both the political and the popular discourses constantly frame Muslim communities as a 
religious group and not an ethnic group; this is clear from the governments Prevent policy whose 
stated objective is to work with Muslim communities in tackling violent extremism (see Chapter 
2). This account of identity formation further supports the Du-Boisian perspective (see chapter 1) 
of double consciousness or the idea of twoness in understanding the rise of Muslim 
consciousness (Meer 2010).  
Pupil testimonies from Muslim faith schools also supported the works of McLaughlin 
(1992), who argued that grounding in one’s culture helps instil and nurture a sense of autonomy 
in children for the future. Meer (2007), in his study of Muslim schools in the UK, also supported 
McLaughlin’s thesis. What the data from this chapter elucidates is how McLaughlin’s (1992) 
idea of ‘gaining autonomy via faith’ (Haydon 2009) can be applied to achieving integration via 
faith.  Furthermore, this confirms research on the objective of Muslim faith schools, as noted 
below: 
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…to Abdullah Trevathan, head teacher of north London’s Islamia School, a state-funded 
 school that offers religious instruction and the study of Arabic along with the 
 standard national curriculum, the answer is clear. Trevathan believes that schools such 
 as Islamia- one of the schools to receive state funding in Britain- can play a vital role 
 in hammering out a new Muslim identity, one that combines being a good Muslim 
 with being a good citizen in a pluralist society.     
         (Jay 2005:37) 
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Research Finding (II)  
Chapter 8: Parental Discourse, Integration and Schooling  
 
8.0 Introduction  
Muslim parental discourse on schooling is an under-researched area (Weekes-Bernard 2007). 
This chapter aims to bridge this lacuna by providing a detailed account of parental discourse; it 
intends to do this by exploring the relationship between integration, parental choice and the type 
of schooling.   
 This chapter will explore parental attitudes relating to the broader aspects of integration. 
It examines how integration is seen as a natural and a gradual process, resulting from the desire 
to succeed but also to be seen as succeeding. This recognition and affirmation of integration is an 
important mechanism through which status is gained within the community. Evidence presented 
in the first part of this chapter rejects the self-segregation thesis and the idea that Muslim 
communities develop conscious racial boundaries with a willingness to create their own ghettos 
(Philips 2005; Carey 2008; Nazir-Ali 2008; Ali 2010). Instead, it support the thesis presented by 
Simpson (2008) and others (Finney & Simpson 2009) that Muslim communities are best 
described as shifting geographies of ethnic settlement, symbolised by the movement out of 
traditional areas into more mixed and diverse neighbourhoods.  
 The second part of this chapter draws a parallel between residential integration and 
choice of schooling. It highlights how parents’ desire to move into affluent middle-class suburbs 
is predicated on the desire to see their children ‘doing well’.  Parental choice is best understood 
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as an intersectional discourse which juxtaposes three equally important ideas based on race, class 
and faith. It demonstrates how mixed schools within affluent ‘middle-class’ areas are the most 
popular school choice for Muslim parents; this is because they provide ‘the best educational 
advantage for their children’s future’.  
  This chapter further validates the popular notion shared by a number of academics 
(Alexander 2007; Weekes-Bernard 2007) who maintain that the idea of choice is best understood 
as political rhetoric, which does little to reflect reality. Parental discourse included within this 
section supports Alexander’s (2007) observation that ‘the problem with choice is twofold; first, it 
assumes the ability of all parents to make these choices on an equally informed basis; and, it 
assumes that the field in which they make these changes is an open and level one’ (Alexander 
2007:1).  
 Finally this chapter concludes by exploring parental views on mono-cultural state schools 
and Muslim faith schools. This section supports the pupil discourses on mono-cultural schools as 
a deficit model, at the same time confirming the importance of nurturing cultural identity as a 
way of encouraging integration (McLaughlin 1992; Meer 2009). 
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8.1 Embourgeoisement, Integration and Group Solidarity  
The meta-narrative that dominated all the parental focus groups viewed integration as a ‘lived 
experience’; it was an idea that Muslim communities fully understood and was considered to be 
‘in the blood of all migrant groups’. Integration was not seen as a problematic phenomenon; after 
all, it was argued that the ‘first generation of migrant communities had already factored this idea 
in mind, when they made the choice to migrate onto European soils’.   
 A crucial feature in the discussion focused on the notion of gradualism and inevitability, 
with integration seen as a feature within the DNA of all migrant communities. Thus, an etic 
Muslim perspective sees the process of integration as an active and on-going process. The 
question was not whether integration was happening; rather, concerns were highlighted as to the 
speed and the form of integration.  Furthermore, the phenomenon of integration was discussed 
within a cultural paradigm; integration was not understood as a form of assimilation which 
gradually leads to negation of cultural practice or cultural rights.  The following example 
provides the meta-narrative on integration; it demonstrates how residential integration is framed 
from the perspective of those who decide to move into non-traditional Muslim areas.    
AF1:   76: R1: I’ll give you an example: my parents and I have been living in         
77:  Glodwick since the 1970s. In 2005 I decided to move out into             
78:  Lees; it is a predominantly white area, so I have already made   the   
79:  leap and so others have also made that leap and made that       
80:  transition. 
 
 Whilst the above change, highlighted by the respondent, seems like a small step for the 
‘outside’ community, for the local Muslim community this is a hugely symbolic cultural shift 
given the close-knit nature of that community. The adjustment from ‘traditional’ to non-
traditional areas represents a major transition and it represents different ways of ‘doing things’. 
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This gradual population shift is also supported by wider census data in Oldham, Leicester and 
Bradford (Finney and Simpson 2009).  
 Parental discourse supported the idea of Muslim neighbourhoods as close-knit entities 
with strong levels of bonding capital, providing families and individuals with good support 
structures.  When someone decides to purchase a house outside the neighbourhood, it not only 
has implications for the individual family, but also has huge implications for the wider 
community. This is clearly articulated by the following example. It demonstrates how a 
transition to non-traditional residential areas is seen as ‘breaking’ or ‘separating ties’ with one’s 
group. 
AF1: 83:R1: I think instances like this go unnoticed by the wider society and       
84: people tend to focus on the big community and not the little          
85: pockets of people that are now moving. WE have made that           
86:  change within our own community, it is a cultural thing for us.         
87:  We’ve got our own cultural dynamics within our own communities     
88:  as well and so we’ve broken that and said to people that it is for the               
89:  better, so we have done the convincing.  
 
This particular style of narrative is described in terms of ‘sacrifices’ that are made by 
family members who have made the conscious choice to move into mainly white residential 
areas. Integration in this respect is viewed as a natural progression from the ‘early sacrifices that 
were made by the first generation of Muslims’, who took considerable steps in uprooting their 
own families from Pakistan and Bangladesh to the UK.  
In the above observation, Muslim parents highlighted an important disconnection between emic 
accounts of integration and a detailed etic perspective. Worley (2009), in her study, also noted  
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the detachment between the ‘policy world’ and the lived experience of the general public 
(Worley 2009:9).  This point is further reinforced by the above respondent in the following 
emotive language: 
AF1: 91:R1: I think people who think about integration don’t think of the         
92: dynamics within our own communities. They don’t realise the         
93:  sacrifices we make, in fact we make far bigger sacrifices than the                 
   94:  white communities. Because we are so attached to the     
95:  communities that we live in and we have to look at the cultures                      
96:  within cultures.  Sometimes that I think it is unfair because of the so-              
97:  called POLICY-MAKERS and the decision-makers do not realise                 
98:  these sacrifices that we are making. To them it’s the Muslims who are           
99:  not integrating.  
The genuine attempts to integrate into the host societies are considered to be in line with the 
‘migrant ethic’.  The ‘migrant ethic’ was articulated by Muslim parents as being largely 
associated with the notion of social progression and embourgeoisement (Goldthorpe et al. 1963). 
For Goldthorpe et al (1963), the embourgeoisement thesis posits manual workers and their 
families gradually moving into middle-class neighbourhoods and starting to adopt bourgeois 
values. A key feature of the parental discourse on residential integration, on the changes arising 
from the move from traditional monocultural neighbourhoods to prosperous mixed 
neighbourhoods, corresponded with a change in the value system. This is also in line with 
Goldthorpe et al’s (1963) classic sociological study in Luton, in which they note how this 
transition is characterised by a change of value system based on ‘communal sociability’ towards 
a more ‘privatised form of social existence’ (Goldthorpe et al. 1963: 76). Studies on middle-class 
constructs of Muslim identity are very limited; some studies have argued how  minority 
ethnic ‘participants constructed middle-classness’ in a range of ways but commonly regarded it 
as unattainable due to its association or conflation with whiteness (Archer 2010:134). Evidence 
provided within this section tends to argue  against Archer’s (2010) findings by associating 
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residential integration with a symbolic display of progression with upward social mobility and 
status.   
A change in residential transition is also connected with better locations or catchment areas for 
high-achieving schools. Thus, integration is associated with the notion of embourgeoisement and 
the aspirations of middle-class styles and standards, which are grounded in the premise that 
integration demonstrates a symbolic change in the prospects and life chances of the immediate 
family and also the future of their children.  .   
Integration within the context of social class is a privilege predicated upon social (Putnam 2000) 
and cultural capital (Bourdieu & Passerson 1999), which is largely associated with community 
members that have the financial capacity to move. Those who have had the ‘privilege’ of moving 
from traditional Muslim residential areas have been seen by others as having ‘made it’ or having 
become successful in life. This is very clear from the following account of the ‘migrant work 
ethic’: 
 AF16:  12: You see our fathers came here not to cut grass but to make a better future   
 13: for ourselves and our children.  This is a teaching that is in our blood that is  
 14: why it’s important to work hard so that you buy a big house near a good   
 15:  school. You see it is important to invest in yourself and   your    
 16:  families. Good house, neighbourhood and expensive cars are all important.  
 17:  You will be respected both by people in this country and also people in   
 18:  Bangladesh. What is the point in working so hard and living in the dumps it  
 19:  makes no sense. Our fathers and uncles worked hard it’s our time to ensure    
 20:  that we go on to make comfortable lives.  
 
 
Muslim embourgeoisement may lead to a shift in geographic location and will also, as noted 
above, inform the way in which integration is spoken about. It is important to consider that a 
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‘breaking’ or ‘separating’ of physical ties with one’s local community does not translate as the 
weakening of social ties or social solidarity with one’s community; rather, ‘asabiyya is simply 
replaced through different forms of social networks. One of the ways in which this was 
discussed, within the parental sample, is through the idea of recognition and acceptance by 
fellow community members. The parental sample group referred to the importance of not being 
labelled as having ‘sold out’; one way of avoiding this label was by having a visible presence in 
Muslim neighbourhoods, either by purchasing their Asian groceries or attending the Friday 
prayer.  This visual presence provided an important medium for gaining acceptance, achieving 
and maintaining status.  
Perhaps an important medium through which ‘asabiyya is maintained lies in the choices parents 
make in purchasing new houses. It was clear that ‘asabiyya or the group solidarity played a 
pivotal role for people when considering purchasing a house in a mixed residential 
neighbourhood. Some of the many reasons for this, including the fear of racism and harassment, 
are further articulated by the following: 
AF3:  15: When we decided to move it was obviously to do with thinking about  
 16: our children’s educational future.  But the area we decided to move into  
 17: was not an all-white neighbourhood, simply because we had     
 18: concerns about racism, acceptance and neighbours complaining       
 19: about curry smells and what have you. This area has a couple of    
 20: Muslim families, within walking distance and we like that it gives us   
 21: sense of security and feeling that there are people that we have things  
 22: in common.  
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8.2 Mixed Schools: Class Consciousness and Integration  
When considering the education of their children, Muslim parents recognised the importance of 
‘location’ in shaping the overall outcome of education. It came as no surprise to observe the 
close relationship between choice of school and type of neighbourhood parents wanted to live in.   
It was made clear in the previous section that aspiring Muslim parents recognised that moving 
into a prosperous neighbourhood would have a positive impact on their children’s future.  
Muslim discourses on choice of schooling are closely interconnected with conspicuous acts of 
consumption. This broadly reflects a Weberian view of social class; for Weber, class 
consciousness is associated with the realization of class as a status group (Collins 1986). The 
movement into a middle-class area demonstrated signs of upward mobility in the same way that 
sending a child to a school outside the majority ‘Asian’ community signifies an advance in 
status.   Weekes-Bernard’s (2007) study on school choice amongst BME parents also noted the 
importance of social class in shaping educational decision-making for primary and secondary 
schools. In fact, as Weekes-Bernard (2007), citing the works of Abbas (2004), argues in the 
following point, the avoidance of a school due to its mono-cultural BME composition can be 
seen as a form of ‘class consciousness’:  
 A small minority of aspirant Black and Asian parents actively avoided schools  that 
 were Black/Asian majority, engaging, where affordable, in high rates of  residential 
 and educational flight, despite their own awareness of risks  associated with educating 
 their children in predominantly white schools.   
        (Weekes-Bernard 2007:41) 
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The parental discourses on mono-cultural neighbourhoods, similar to the pupil discourse, were 
viewed through a deficit model. Drawing upon personal and extended family accounts, these 
mono-cultural communities were connected by a discourse of ‘broken’ societies (Blond 2010).  
These personalised discourses revealed an acknowledgement of individual community members 
who are struggling with issues of drugs and alcohol abuse. Familiar cases or incidents within the 
community were used to construct their narrative of a ‘broken society’.  The movement away 
from traditional areas was also influenced by the desire to move away from the ‘broken 
neighbourhoods’ to ‘better surroundings’.  Whilst this option to move was largely based upon 
cultural capital (Bordieu & Passeron 2000), there was nevertheless a desire by parents to move 
into better neighbourhoods, which would provide an improved social and educational prosperity 
for their children. 
This particular approach usually means that the family would purchase a house in a 
different location, away from the mono-cultural Muslim neighbourhood. This would mean the 
child going to a different school and growing up in a community that does not have problems 
associated with drugs or social delinquency.  The following observation drawing upon the 
respondents’ personal experiences reinforces the point very clearly: 
AF16:  86: I have been living in this area for over three years, it’s a nice area all our        
87: neighbours are white and we get on well. My kids were growing up and          
88: I did not want them to grow up in ‘crack city’. Things are bad; my     
89: children are of that age if I did not move out then they would have been          
90: influenced by that. Within my own extended family there are cases that   
91: I can talk    about, I know the impacts it has on immediate families and      
92: also extended families. You can’t tie your child at home they would         
93: want to go out and play with their friends and you can’t watch them all      
94: day. So now I am happy it’s a quiet area the kids are at home most of      
95: the time in their own rooms on their computer and they go to a good        
96: school. This is the main fact at least now by going to a good school         
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97: they can make something out of themselves. In many respects I am        
98: very fortunate I had the financial ability to move out. I know of other         
99: people that want to move out but their financial circumstances are          
100: different, in this current financial crisis things are going to get even        
101:  more difficult.  
 
Some of the experiences of living in deprived neighbourhoods with ‘mono-cultural’ 
schools were described as negative experiences. These neighbourhoods were viewed as poverty-
stricken and, most importantly, as areas affording few opportunities for their children’s social 
mobility. The mono-cultural state schools in these deprived neighbourhoods were seen to 
provide limited educational opportunities, with local youth clubs and mosques providing few or 
no constructive activities for out-of-school hours.  
Families living in predominantly Asian areas did not articulate a desire to live 
‘separately’ or maintain a parallel existence; rather, mono-cultural neighbourhoods were 
products of poverty and personal circumstances. The people who had left the area displayed a 
sense of achievement and accomplishment for their own respective families and for the wider 
community. This is clearly articulated by the following account of social mobility: 
AF15: 73: You see when I first moved out mainly in search of a good house and  
 75: also for a better future for my children… They now attend a very good  
 76: school. But I think the fact that we have moved has been a positive  
 77: sign for others, now everyone else would also move. You see   
 78: when  I meet the people where I used to live within our old area, they  
 79: look at me differently and see my in a different light. They give me  
 80: respect and you know it feels good.    
 
Platt (2005), in a longitudinal study on migration and social mobility, also found 
evidence in support of the above. He noted how some religious groups such as the Jews and the 
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Hindus are more likely to end up in higher social groups than their parents, compared to Sikhs 
and Muslims who have lower chances of so doing.  
8.3 Choice and Self and Segregation: Race, Class and Faith Intersectionality   
 Parental choice and schooling have been at the centre of educational policy in Britain 
since the 1944 Education Act. Those advocating parental choice in education normally use two 
key arguments in defence of greater choice. First, in terms of the human rights aspect, many cite 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) as a compelling argument. For example, 
Almond (1994) cites the following clause in the UDHR in support of parental choice: ‘Parents 
have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their children (26, 3)’ 
(Almond 1994:68).  The second argument is the free market approach to schooling; it is argued 
that greater competition for places between schools will improve the overall quality and 
standards in education.   
 A number of arguments are advanced against parental choice28 (Halstead 1994) in 
education. The dominant argument that is often used against the Muslim community is that 
increased parental choice will lead to greater social segregation - West (1994) describes this as 
the ‘good parent bad citizen’ paradox.  
 This section will highlight how Muslim parental choice on schooling is best understood 
as an intersectional discourse which juxtaposes ideas of race, class and faith. It demonstrates how 
                                                          
28 There are five general criticisms that Halstead (1994) cites. First, Choice of parents may go against the needs of 
the state with increasing faith or racial segregation. Second, increased choice could lead to greater social inequality 
as middle-class parents take up all the best schools. Third, autonomy of the child is seen to be compromised by 
parental rights.  Fourth, choice is largely determined by availability. In addition, Parker-Jenkins (2005) has also examined the relationship between parental rights and the rights of the child through exploring the ‘potential for ‘rights in conflict’. (Parker-Jenkins 2005:36).  
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mixed schools in affluent middle-class neighbourhoods are the most popular school choice 
because they are seen to provide ‘the best educational advantage for their child’s future’.  
Evidence provided in this section argues against the view that Muslim parental choice reinforces 
racial segregation. This was even the case for Muslim faith schools; the parents that expressed 
enthusiasm for Muslim schools were motivated by the desire to achieve integration through faith.    
 A strong theme associated with the overall discourse on schooling and segregation 
revealed the distinction between the ‘poor- and high-achieving’ schools binary. Schools with 
significant numbers of white pupils in a middle-class neighbourhood were perceived to be high-
achieving schools. Not all high-achieving schools were given serious attention by parents. 
Schools situated in middle-class areas, with a ‘reasonable intake of Muslim or Asian pupils’, 
were given serious consideration.  The following quote by a Muslim female parent with many 
years of teaching experience draws upon own her personal experience to highlight the intricate 
and intersectional relationship between race, class and faith, when choosing a secondary school.   
AF10:  3: Usually Muslim parents think of mixed schools when choosing schools        
4: for their kids. A school with more white kids and less Asian children        
5: are seen as ‘good’ schools. But when it’s the other way round - with       
6: more Asians and less white kids - parents are reluctant to send their kids      
7: such as schools in Coppice or Westwood because it’s almost 100%         
8: Asians. Also the fact that those schools do not produce good        
9: grades.  Because of this they think that a school with mainly white kids          
10: in a good middle-class area will have better education. This is not only    
11: a perception but a reality. You only have to look at the evidence.   
The focus on class in the above observation is salient, especially given how working-
class areas such as Limeside in Oldham featured prominently in the parental discourse of 
schooling. It highlighted the reasons why some parents would be reluctant to send their children 
to a school in a white working-class neighbourhood. The following example demonstrates the 
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element of class consciousness (Abbas 2000) in framing the schooling choice debate. Moreover, 
it demonstrates how geographical spaces based upon the social class distinction inform and 
influence Muslim discourses on school choice.  
 
AF10: 18: The reason why I say parents will be reluctant to send their children in   
 19: a school such as Limeside is because it’s a working-class area. The  
 20: kids in those areas don’t have good role models. They come from   
 21: shattered families and areas which are mainly made up of council  
 22: houses. The children have no role models don’t do well in school so, 
 23: Muslim parents will see this to have a bad influence.  
 
 
The above example highlights the importance of class as a crucial category influencing 
parental choice and schooling. In the following example, the ethnic and the religious make-up of 
the school are also given similar precedence; it highlights how Muslim parents are reluctant to 
send their children to state schools with over 90% white student intake, even if the school is a 
high-achieving school. Muslim parents maintain that schools with a 10 % Asian or Muslim 
intake are popular choices amongst parents29. Some of the concerns about sending children to a 
school with an Asian intake of less than 10% revolve around issues of security, identity and 
vulnerability.   
 
                                                          
29  The above observation also demonstrates how the ‘ethnic’ category of ‘Asian’ and the religious category of ‘Muslim’ are used interchangeably.  
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AF10: 46: Parents will not send their kids to any good school in a middle-class  
 47: area, for example when we were looking for a school for our children  
 48: there were a number of good schools that we considered. We rejected   
 49: those because they had no Asian or Muslim children. I guess the                 
 50:  school that we decided to send our children to is a school that has    
 51: around 10% Muslim kids. The reasons why we did this are clear, if the 
 52: school does not have a mix then we feared they will be singled out,   
 53: they will stand out.  Obviously there would be fears of bullying, racism,    
 54  Islamophobia. I think it’s important for our children to go to a                
 55: school that reflects the wider society. So in Oldham the population of    
 56: school that reflects the wider 15%.  If the child does not have their own 
 57: kind around, there are genuine fears that they will not relate to anyone,    
 58: they might feel that   they have to assimilate in order for them to be       
 59: accepted. They even might grow up rejecting or hating their identity. 
                                                                                        
                                           
The above observation highlighted the significant relationship between class, race and 
faith in determining parental choice in schools, with mixed schools seen as ideal spaces for 
schooling. The above example also demonstrates how an ideal ethnic mix of school is largely 
determined by the population of the borough. Thus, it was not surprising to note that a 
percentage of 10% was cited, which roughly corresponds to the size of the Muslim population in 
Oldham. The above example further demonstrates how mixed-school environments provide an 
ideal combination of security, education and nurturing of cultural identity. The importance of 
ensuring children have a firm foundation in their own identity was a key theme touched upon by 
a number of parents.  
 The avoidance of schools with 90% Muslim or Asian intake demonstrates the way 
‘hyper-‘asabiyya’ is framed. It is important to note that parental discourses  recognised the 
importance of ‘asabiyya; this is displayed by the fact that parents consciously decided to send 
their children to mixed schools while, at the same time, there was a realisation that hyper-
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‘asabiyya had negative impacts on schooling. This observation broadly supports wider academic 
study as demonstrated in Weekes-Bernard’s (2007) study of ethnic minority parents in the UK  
 
8.4: Cultural Capital and Mixed Schools.  
The above section explored the reasons why Muslim parents preferred mixed schools 
with an ideal Muslim cohort size of 10%.  Given the close association between residential area 
and schooling (Cantle 2001; Ritchie 2001; Clarke 2001), many Muslims found it difficult to send 
their children to mixed schools due to a combination of factors, including school allocation 
policies, availability of schools and socio-economic circumstances. 
Muslim parents’ discourse on parental choice and schooling unveiled three overarching 
themes. The first theme was associated with the cultural capital of parents. It has long been 
established that educational success is largely determined by the cultural capital of the parents 
(Abbas 2004). Sending pupils to a mixed school was closely allied with the cultural capital of the 
parents; in other words, parents who had the necessary skills and knowledge to seek out high-
achieving schools sent their children to mixed schools. Some parents complained of the 
educational jargon, complex league tables, selection policies and the school referral systems that 
were required to navigate and negotiate a good place for their child. They mentioned how the 
system was set up so that educated parents had the upper hand. This also confirms Brown’s 
(1994), notion of ‘parentocracy’. Brown (1994) noted how the educational system was grounded 
more on wealth and wishes of parents and less on pupil merit and ability.  
 
207 
 
The importance of ‘parentocracy’ was further supported by the following observation: the 
parent identifies wider socio-economic factors that determine the exercising of choice. Access to 
a car and, more importantly, the mother’s ability to drive were considered important factors in 
parents’ decisions to send their children to schools outside their residential area.     
AF11: 7: Distance matters depending upon circumstance; parents who   
 8:  want to send children to a good school, they will go out of their way   
 9: to send them to the best possible school. Our children travel five    
 10: miles to go to their school. It’s a primary school, we managed   
 11:  to negotiate a place, because the school is located in a posh part of   
 12:  Oldham. The school has declining numbers.  It took hours of searching  
 13:  in the library ploughing through figures and league table results. But we  
 15:  managed to get them in.  It’s a mixed school with approximately 15%  
 16:  Muslim children... Women’s role is important, you can’t rely on men - they 
 17:  are useless.  There are four other primary schools within close distance  
 18:  of our house. The closest schools are full of Asian children; we    
 19:  consciously decided not to send our children there. I’d rather       
 20:  home-school our children than send our kids to those schools. The other  
 21:  school is a private grammar school; we can’t afford to send our kids to  
 22:  that school. The other school is in a rough white council area - so that   
 23:  was out of the question.  The main person is the woman,                   
 24:  the men are useless you can never rely upon them. The fact that I can  
 25:  drive and I’m independent - this helps.  I know from experience that      
 26:  other parents would want to send their kids to the primary school that   
 27:  our kids attend. The fact that they don’t know how to drive or their    
 28: command of  English might not be great or their useless husbands     
 29: work in taxi   trade or restaurants so they sleep during the   morning.  
 31:  I know that most of the people in this area send their children not out of  
 32:  choice but out of convenience.   
The above observation is also supported by research conducted by Platt (2005). Platt (2005) has 
recognised the importance of a highly-qualified mother in the family in determining the levels of 
social mobility amongst BME families.  
The second factor that affects the choice of Muslim parents in schooling is faith schools. 
This is supported by research conducted by West et al. (2004) on faith school selection criteria. 
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West et al. (2004) noted how selection criteria can be used, by a range of faith schools, as a 
policy of social exclusion.  In the case of Oldham, two voluntary-aided CoE schools are very 
popular amongst Muslim parents; both of these schools are situated in mainly white 
neighbourhoods.  The allocation policies of both of these schools are targeted mainly at their 
Anglican cohort; despite this policy, a number of Muslim parents include at least one of these 
schools when completing the local authority form for secondary school options. The following 
observations shed light on some of the reasons why Muslim parents continue to put the CoE 
School down as a choice.  
AF13: 8: This year we were choosing a secondary school for our child. When we  
 9: received the form we put down Christ School as our first choice,     
 10: Chatterton as our second option and Hollings as our third – this is the  
 11: closest to our house. We have just received confirmation from the   
 12: Local Authority that we missed out on our first choice. This is not   
 13: surprising especially given that our child is a Muslim. We did this to  
 14: make a point; in the current debate about community cohesion we still  
 15: have schools that want to maintain the colour white. They refuse to let  
 16: any Muslims or even any Hindus for that matter. We felt that if more  
 17: people put that down as their first choice then some day they may   
 18: come to their senses.  
 
The above interviewee raised a very important point relating to parental choice of 
schooling, and the above example demonstrates how an increasing number of Muslims are 
choosing Anglican voluntary-aided schools as their first choice of school.  It was clear that 
parents did not see a contradiction in sending their children to a mainly Christian school. Neither 
did the parents feel that they were compromising their own religious faith by sending their 
children to a Christian faith school. This further supports Halstead’s (2009) dual faith school 
distinction, between ‘old and new’ faith schools, with the former displaying no overt religious 
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emphasis, compared to the latter. The following respondent elucidates some of the reasons 
behind this.    
AF8: 78: It’s all about how well the school does; if the school is a high-achieving  
 79: school then obviously it’s going to make a difference in the choice.   
 80: Most of these schools do not teach or preach Christianity, these are not  
 81:  madrassa schools for Christians these are just normal high-achieving  
 82:  schools.  We don’t see that our child’s culture would be compromised  
 83:  by sending our child to the school.   
 
The above observation was confirmed by a Muslim parent from Burnley who provided examples 
of how educational attainment of a given school plays an important role in shaping educational 
choice. 
AF 3: 23:  In the case of our school it was clear that one of the main reasons why     
23: it was so popular was because of the results. In those days it was a       
25: girls’ school in a very affluent middle-class neighbourhood. If a school           
26:  is doing well then parents will send kids to school. Now the same      
27:   school is amalgamated with the boy’s school it has very         
28:  poor results. Some Muslim parents are refusing to send their children              
29:  to the school and instead sending them to schools in neighbouring       
30:   towns. This does not mean that a school that is high-achieving                
31:   will naturally become an integrated school. This does not mean                  
32:  that culture and religion is not important. What I’m trying to say is that    
33:  educational result is an important variable along with the make-up of the        
34:  school and whether the school respects pupils’ cultural values. If you    
35:  have a high-achieving all-white school and your child is the only Black kid   
36:  or if you have a school that does not respect your culture or faith then             
37 obviously the parents would be reluctant to send their kids. But for      
38:  us everything was just right - the results, mixed school   and a school    
39:  that was very tolerant towards Muslims and people of   other faiths.   
These sentiments articulated by AF10 were further reinforced by two separate interviews. 
The first evidence was provided a Bangladeshi family in Burnley who highlighted how they send 
both of their daughters to a mixed comprehensive school in the neighbouring town of 
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Haslington; they explained how the school was a 40-minute drive from their house, and they felt 
that this was worthwhile because the school provided a ‘good education’, combined with an 
ethos which valued cultural difference.   In the second interview, a Pashtu community activist 
and businessman explains how he decided to send his girls to a privately-funded independent 
Muslim Faith School in one of the neighbouring towns. He highlights how the ‘Muslim’ element 
of the school was one factor that motivated him to send his daughters to the school.  
AF14: 7: You see in Burnley the local school have very poor grades. The girls’  
 8: schools used to achieve, it used to do well, so many of our girls   
 9: have gone on to do good jobs and that makes us proud that in   
 10: our community there are girls that are teachers and doctors, this   
 11: is our sense of pride. These are all our daughters. You see    
 12: now there is no choice, we looked at other schools and we    
 13: were not happy - so eventually we decided to send our    
 14: daughters to the Muslim school, at least there they will learn the   
 15: Deen [religion] most importantly they will have the chance to get good  
 16: grades. The school they go to is a very good school it is one of   
 17: the best schools in the area with top grades in GCSE. 
 
The above examples demonstrate the complex factors that shape parental choice when 
deciding on a secondary school for their children. The above examples further explain the role of 
the intersectional variables of race, class, faith and educational achievement in influencing 
factors associated with Muslim parental choice. Perhaps what is important to highlight is not 
what the parents said but, rather, what they did not say. One important factor that did not arise in 
the above discourse is the idea that parents were intentionally keeping their children away from 
the white or non-Muslim community. Instead, the above discussion reveals the conscious choice 
that parents are making in keeping pupils away from schools with a predominantly Muslim 
intake or from poorly-performing schools. 
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 8.5 Parental Choice and Mono-cultural Schools  
 The previous section (8.4) explored the relationship between school and cultural capital 
in influencing parental preference for mixed schools. This section rejects the idea of parental 
choice shaping school segregation by highlighting a range of factors associated with Muslim 
parents sending their children to mono-cultural schools.   
 It has long been established by academics that parental choice and schooling is a 
complicated phenomenon based upon a range of issues such as social capital, selection process 
and availability. The Muslim discourse on parental choice of schooling demonstrates an 
awareness of the idea of ‘weak choice’. For most parents, Halstead (2006) argues, when it comes 
to parental choice they have ‘weak choice’.  For most parents: 
 …this means expressing a preference between various state-maintained  schools in 
 their vicinity. Families are expected to make judgements  about  such  factors as 
 academic success, discipline, facilities and distance  to be travelled,  and then 
 act tactically to try to ensure that the child  is offered  a  place  at a school 
 that they could consider acceptable. 
         (Halstead 2006: 24) 
 Parents were mindful that the discourse on school segregation did not match the lived 
realities of ordinary people. Many parents felt that school segregation is more an outcome of 
school allocation policies and wider structural factors than of self-segregation and the parental 
desire for religious separatism.  Weeks-Bernard’s (2007) study also supports this observation. 
Her study showed how, in certain areas, BME parents were sending their children to mono-
cultural schools for practical reasons such as locality of the school, ease of travel and protection 
against racism. The following observation echoes the findings of Weeks-Bernard (2007): 
AF10:  25: You asked a very interesting question about school segregation.                  
27: In Oldham when you go past West or other schools you can say that               
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28: ‘yes there is self-segregation’ in operation. But in reality the picture is           
29: slightly complex. I know so many Muslims that put Christ                      
30:  School and other schools in Oldham as their first choice. You know as         
31: well as I do that those schools will not allow any Muslim children... Why?         
32: because of the school allocation policy. You see the schools that         
33: Muslim kids attend are not from choice but rather the schools that they    
34:  have no other choice but to send. You tell me who wants to send their    
35:  kids to crap schools! So I feel that the debate is rather unfairly targeted          
36:  against us. Let me make it clear - there is no self-segregation, people                  
37: want the best for their kids. It does not take Einstein to figure out, the             
39: current all-Asian schools produce failures. Now if the reverse was       
40: true if given a hypothetical scenario, if schools such as West with 100%         
41: intake of Muslim students were getting the best results then I would say          
42: for certainly there would be self-segregation that would not be due to            
43: culture, religion or racial factors but because of educational reasons.  
 
The above observation, whilst providing a useful outline of some of the wider factors 
associated with segregated schools, raised the following interesting and valid question - why do 
most mono-cultural racially segregated schools [in Oldham] produce poor results? Some parents 
argued that this was due to the social capital of the parents and their desire not to show any real 
interest in the child’s future. Thus, it was surprising to note that some Muslim parents decided 
not to send their children to mainly mono-cultural schools because they did not want their ‘child 
to socialise with those kids’. It is important to point out that ‘those kids’ that the parent was 
referring to were fellow Muslim children. In the following example, a Muslim parent reinforces 
this point further by stressing the importance of class consciousness in determining the nature of 
educational choice.  
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AF9: 11:  It was very clear to me that by hook or crook I will get my child into North    
12: or either that I’ll send my child to the Muslim girls’ school in           
13: Rochdale, there was no way that I’ll want my children to go to  West .  I        
14: don’t want my child to socialise with those kids. It sounds wrong but the        
15: fact of the matter is that kids that attend the school are not concerned             
16: about their future. The parents are not also concerned. They are          
17: relieved that the kids are away from home for 6 hours every day. I work         
18: in this school so I should know, you get some kids that don’t even bring         
19: a pen to school, not only that, when it comes to parents’ evening you     
20: struggle to get a handful of parents. 
Parental observations on mono-cultural schools in Oldham reveal many interesting 
insights into the reasons why some parents might send their children to a school with a 90%-plus 
Muslim cohort. The following example highlights the factors behind pupils attending mono-
cultural schools in Oldham.  
AF9: 28: You see in Oldham you have school such as West school that                  
29: are attended by mainly Muslims, in the case of West it’s 100%                      
30: Bangladeshi, Brozehill is full of Pakistanis the same is true for other       
31: schools. I went to West and it was a mixed school the year that I left in          
32: 1992 it was 60% White and 40% Bangladeshi, those days the area in     
33: Coldhurst and Westwood was also mixed, gradually more white people         
34: started moving out so that the growing Asian community in those areas          
35: started to buy the houses. So it’s not surprising the school is 100%.  
 
The above point provides an interesting account of mono-cultural schools; mono-cultural 
schools are not a product of conscious and collective action but rather a product of the structural 
issues arising from broader social change within the local community.  The following example 
develops this point further to illustrate some of the micro factors informing pupils’ attendance at 
the local schools. The observation below highlights the broader social factors in general and the 
cultural capital of parents in particular in shaping mono-cultural schools. Furthermore, what the 
point does not support is the parental desire to be separate. In essence, they argue that if the 
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circumstances were right, and parents had the ‘right’ to exercise strong choice, then Muslim 
parents would choose mixed schools with a reputable track record of delivering good educational 
results.   
AK8:  89 You see I went to West school I work   and I live in the local      
 90: area. So I have seen the school change. When you read       
 91: the papers and it says that Muslim parents choose to send      
 92: their kids to West. In reality nobody wants to send their kids to this     
 93: school. It’s personal circumstances that lead people, most of the time 
 94: I would say  it’s to do with parents’ circumstances. Parents will be  
 95: reluctant to send their kids to a faraway school because they might not  
 96: have the means to transport them. Also, if you have a large family   
 97: bus journey is very expensive business. I also feel that it’s an issue   
 98: with confidence; you see all the Bangladeshi live in this area, people      
 99: have a sense of confidence - there is always a fear factor especially you    
 100: know, are concerned about sending children to all-white school   
 1001: because of fear of  racism or you know prejudice against Muslims.  
As noted above, school choice is motivated by the desire for educational excellence; if 
schools are able to deliver this, then wider cultural and religious factors are negotiated in light of 
these changes. Parental understanding of choice did explore some of the reasons, or the logical 
thought process, behind this desire for educational excellence. What surfaces is the 
understanding that the British educational system fully understands and values the principles of 
multiculturalism. Moreover, they recognised that the educational system in the UK is based upon 
an economic model of schooling. That is to say, the objectives of the schools are to ensure that 
children are educated to fulfil an economic function within a free-market economy. Parental 
discourse viewed schools as secular institutions which transmit knowledge for the purpose of 
economics, and not for cultural or religious objectives.   
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  This economic perception of education meant that parents were less worried about 
cultural or religious exposure within state schools. This is perhaps one of the reasons why 
Muslim parents were interested in sending their children to an outstanding school so that they 
would be exposed to a positive and dynamic learning environment.  There is an acknowledgment 
that even faith-based Christian schools will not coerce or proselytize their children into 
Christianity. Rather, they felt the school would value, and if need be accommodate, their child’s 
religious and cultural needs. This argument broadly supports wider academic research by 
Weekes-Bernard (2007:35), who noted how some Muslim parents preferred non-Muslim faith 
schools over community schools.    
 It is this perception of educational institutions as multicultural spaces serving 
economic objectives that provides the confidence and assurances for parents to send their 
children to schools with a Christian or secular ethos. It was acknowledged that this perspective 
on education by Muslim parents gradually evolved, as more people went through the process of 
schooling. It was also argued that, were their child to be forced to participate in something that 
they were unhappy about, they had the fortitude and the political clout to address this issue 
through the correct civic channels. This is articulated very clearly in the following: 
AF9:  72: You see times have changed, we live in a multicultural society; the schools      
73: especially in Manchester  with a significant number of       
74: Muslim communities know about the Muslim community. My daughter         
75: goes to a mainly white school - the school has a policy that allows my           
76:   daughter to wear the hijab and wear jogging bottoms when doing games.           
77:  The school is mindful of these requirements. I can say that I                            
78: can send my children to any school in this area and they will allow         
79: her to exercise her religion. This is a blessing, I know of a school that            
80: provides a space for children to do Jumma prayer. What else can you              
81: ask for... If I had an issue with the school then, I will know who to                 
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82: approach, I can either talk to the head directly or speak to my local                
83:  councillor. I have faith in the system, I know it’s fair.  
The above issue raises a crucial point which it is important to highlight: this is the idea 
that Muslim parents feel that their children’s cultural or religious values will not be compromised 
by sending them to a non-Muslim school or even a Christian faith school. One of the many 
justifications offered was the recognition that most schools located in neighbourhoods with 
significant Muslim populations will operate and value the principles of educational 
multiculturalism. In fact, Cole’s (2008) work Every Muslim Child Matters, has provided a 
detailed account of how educational needs can be met within the confines of the state education. 
An important component which enhances parental confidence in the ‘system’ is Britain’s 
equality legislation.  The role played by the Equality Act in facilitating the process of integration 
is highlighted below.   
AF 13: 78: One of the many good things about this country is its law. For us,      
79:  the law against discrimination on religion and race is important.          
80: We know that the law will not allow any school to impose a different            
81: religion on our child. Children can practise their own religion, the law            
82 supports and protects people’s religion. We are confident            
83: and happy about this. We also recognise that, as far as education is          
84: concerned, our child is there to get good education. We know the              
85:   system of this country is fair; it gives people the right to practise their own         
86: faith. 
 
8.6 Framing Mono-cultural Schools 
 Parental discourse disclosed reluctance in sending their children to mono-cultural state 
schools due to their poor educational attainment. Muslim parents felt that the institutional 
policies, structures and procedures contributed towards the failure of Muslim pupils. It is argued 
that mono-cultural schools, like the schools in the US (Tough 2008), could raise educational 
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standards providing the appropriate strategies were adopted. This particular framing of the 
schools draws on principles that have been widely discussed by those advocating educational 
multiculturalism. This approach argues that higher educational achievements can be nurtured 
within schools providing a positive representation of Muslim history and culture is reinforced 
through the curriculum and teaching. This particular view is summarised clearly by the following 
observation: 
AF13: 78: Are you surprised that those schools does not produce any results. The     
79: school attracts all poor teachers after all who would want to come and           
80: teach in Moortown? For me I think it’s part of a bigger picture. The kids        
81: that go to those schools need to be part of something, you have NO                
82: BLACK OR MUSLIM teachers at the SLT (senior leadership team) my         
83: question is how they are making decisions about the future of our kids.         
84: The curriculum and the teaching methods are all Eurocentric.                          
85: Why can’t the kids study Islamic, Indian history, Islamic studies etc.             
86: West used to be a specialist art school, why couldn’t they do art which            
87: tells something about who they are?  It’s simple; you put a good                         
88: team of teachers at the top that understands the kids’ culture and                         
89: religion I can guarantee that you will get results.  At the end of the day               
90: our kids are good kids - if you know how to deal with them then you can           
91: get them to produce good results.  
The above observation summarises the key essence of the debate relating to mono-
cultural state schools, namely that educational policies which take into consideration the cultural 
needs of a child can be an effective tool in improving pupil attainment. In the following 
observation, a Muslim parent explains how the current educational policy fails to understand the 
cultural dynamics of Muslim pupils; the parent does so by questioning the logic behind some of 
the training packages for staff aimed at helping them understand the cultural backgrounds of 
their pupils.  
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AF20 7:   Every year I hear that teachers from Fartown will be going to Bangladesh              
8:    or Razewood teachers going to Pakistan. What is the point in going to                  
9:    these countries?  Why not just step outside their school and go into the         
10:   local neighbourhood?  These kids are British Muslims, most of them were         
11: born here; they have not gone abroad, what is the point in travelling              
12: thousands of miles when you can just step outside the school. All these          
13: teachers that go on this jolly live in posh villages and drive into our                
14: communities and drive back again. It never occurs to them that these kids         
15:  live in OLDHAM NOT PAKISTAN AND BANGLADESH. This is how far   
16:    removed the leadership team is in these schools. No wonder you have              
17: failures. It’s a joke, it makes me angry!  
The idea of disconnection between the school, educational policy and the lived realities 
of Muslim children whom it attempts to serve is further reinforced by the following:  
AF17: 52: I went to the school to deliver drugs awareness session to Fartown,     
 53:  the thing that struck me was that these teachers did not have any clue     
 54: about  the cultural backgrounds of the students, now I’m    
 55: not saying anything about religion but the social class that    
 56: these people came from. Perhaps the most worrying  thing was that  
 57: these people did  not care. To most of the teachers it’s simply a job,  
 58: as long as they are getting paid and enjoying their     
 59: holidays that’s what matters.  
Teachers’ often apathetic attitude toward the education of Muslim children was a strand 
within the parental discourse. The lack of Muslim teachers in general and Muslim teachers at the 
SLT level in particular was cited as an example of potential contributing factors towards the 
underachievement of Muslim children. It was felt that teacher empathy and ability to display a 
detailed understanding of the socio-cultural and religious needs of children is absolutely vital in 
nurturing the educational spirit amongst young people. This point was further clarified by a 
behavioural mentor working in a mono-cultural state school, through sharing his experience of 
occasionally taking R.E lessons in school. He showed how. even after the end of his lesson, 
children continued to ask him questions about various aspects of Muslim history and culture.  He 
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uses this example to demonstrate how these children have an eagerness to learn about issues with 
which they have a cultural connection. He goes on to add that this interest in Islam is largely 
been brought about by the media attention on Islam and Muslims. Many felt that the 
unprecedented attention paid to Islam and Muslims in the media has allowed the Muslim 
community to think about their identity in great detail. Thus, it is not surprising that even 
children in secondary schools are always willing to listen to anything about Islam or Muslim 
identity.   
Muslim parents acknowledged that the educational provisions in mono-cultural state 
schools did not produce high-calibre students. The reasons for this were twofold. First, the 
schools did not fully embrace a multicultural vision of schooling. Secondly, due to the mono-
cultural make-up of the pupil cohort, some teachers developed apathy towards teaching. One of 
the reasons for the parental desire for mixed schools was not because they provided multicultural 
education but because mixed schools in affluent neighbourhoods had greater levels of 
accountability demanded by ‘pushy’ middle-class parents to ensure that success was achieved. 
This point is further articulated below. 
AF14:  15: Schools in mainly Muslims areas can get away with anything, people     
16 don’t know how to complain or influence policy. The school will have a        
17: token uncle on the governor’s body. Things are different in the school           
18: that my child attends; if the school is seen to slack there would be                
19: parents banging at the head’s door. Having accountability to the local            
20: community is important. In this school there is only 20% Muslim                 
21: children, the school will have no option but to work hard to ensure                  
22:  ALL the kids also do well. In the previous mainly Asian school that my        
23:    child went too, the teachers could not give a damn, to them all the kids              
24: were losers so what is the point. In this school the teachers have to                 
25: work hard, if they neglected any of the children the results of the                  
26: overall group would be questioned.  
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8.7 Muslim Faith Schools and Integration: Nurturing Cultural Identity  
 The intersectional nature of the Muslim discourse on integration was a dominant theme 
highlighted in the above observations. Parents realised the importance of the cultural recognition 
of one’s identity within the public domain.  Cultural identity was not viewed as something which 
should be kept within the private domain; rather, they recognised the role cultural identity can 
play in the process of integration. Parents felt that a child needs to have a strong cultural identity; 
this, they feel, will allow them to have a strong foundation, confidence and motivation for the 
future. If students are deprived of this learning, it is argued, that they will experience 
ambivalence towards their own heritage, and also the overall values of British society. An 
educational system which nurtures a person’s cultural identity will help facilitate the process of 
integration. The importance of recognising this distinction is highlighted below. 
AF14:  17:  When you drive around the streets in Burnley you see all the plastic          
19: gangsters thinking that they are part of some hip hop movie. It is very            
20:  worrying. They have no sense of self or any direction that is why they’re      
21:  behaving in the manner that they do.  It is clear that if these children    
22:  had a strong sense of self or the schools provided a good foundation              
23:  about their religion - this would help them… I can give you          
24:  so many examples of how children that live in this area with good                 
25:  knowledge of religion are making positive contributions through                  
26:  voluntary work. I believe that a strong sense of self helps you go                  
27:  places. I am a simple person but I’m sure if you look you will find                  
28:  evidence for this. That is why I don’t object to parents sending kids to      
29:  Muslim schools because at least they get to learn good manners and      
30:  have a positive identity. 
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The above observations summarised the objective behind choosing a faith  
school.  Parents did not wish to send their child to Muslim faith schools to maintain a  
separate or parallel life; rather, they felt it would facilitate the process of integration  
through good character. In order to maintain the balance between religious obligation  
and collective civic duty, some parents sent their children to a Muslim faith school  
during the day and then to the Brownies in the evening. This is further  
articulated below: 
 
AF8:  30:    We have a young daughter and we have placed her in an Islamic school,      
31:  this decision was not easy we thought about it long and hard. So it was           
32: difficult, the area that we live is all-white. In this school she attends is            
33: 100%  Muslim but the thing is that there are children from different              
34:  cultural backgrounds such as Algeria, Arab, Pakistani, and                             
35:  Bangladeshi etc.  So she has a very strong sense of the Muslim identity, and I  
36:  think that is important for her future, but we realised that this did not              
37:  do anything in the short term as far as  getting to know the wider              
38:  community. After a long thought we decided  to send her to the           
39:  Brownies so that she gets the integration. This has been our rational               
40:  choice; this we feel gives her full experience of diverse Muslim                       
41:  communities and also the local non-Muslim community. 
The above highlights the importance of the dilemma facing some Muslim parents: the 
importance of Muslim children developing a good understanding of the internal diversity of the 
Muslim community which covers the experiences of the global ummah, while at the same time 
recognising the importance of understanding the local non-Muslim community. It is clear from 
the above observation that the question of diversity plays an important part in the wider thinking 
process of educational upbringing. 
The importance of recognising one’s cultural difference as a way of directing positive 
future prospects was further highlighted below. It is highlighted in the following example, by 
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drawing upon the respondent’s family experiences and how sending their child to a Muslim girl’s 
school did more for the process of integration through nurturing positive self-confidence.  
AF8: 6:    My brother sent their children to the Muslim Girl’s School. The girl’s                   
7:  school is in Manchester and did not have a sixth form college. So he sent         
8:  them to local Sixth Form College. They did not experience any                        
9: problems in integrating with the non-Muslim students. We are hoping           
10: by sending our daughter to the same Muslim school and also the same            
11: Sixth Form College, hopefully our daughter would do the same. We               
12:  think that this  strategy will work with our own daughter. This has been          
13:   the upbringing of my father. He taught us and I always take this principle        
14:  with me. Always make sure that you have a strong sense of                           
15:  who you are, but at the same time do your best to integrate with the               
16:  wider society. One of the main reasons why my brother and I have                   
17:  decided to send our children to Muslim faith school is not to be                       
18:  separate instead we feel that having a good sense of who you are                      
19:  helps you connect and integrate with British society.  
 
The above principle of sending children to Muslim faith school based upon the idea that 
this will help them integrate into wider society is further reinforced by the works of Short (2002). 
For Short (2002), faith schools ‘enhance pupils’ academic attainment, self-esteem and sense of 
cultural identity and that the result of such enhancement is the strengthening of inter-communal 
ties (Short 2002: 560).  
In the case highlighted below, further evidence can also be seen to emerge in support of 
the above argument. In this case a parent compares his experience of sending his son to the 
Manchester Muslim School for boys with that of students who attend mixed state schools in 
Oldham. 
AF18 102: In Oldham there is clear evidence of segregation, look at the schools            
103: also the neighbourhood, it won’t take you long to figure that out. I have         
104: only one child. I am a taxi driver so I’m not that very well off. But we          
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105: decided to send him to the Muslim Boys School in Manchester. I tell              
106:  you it was not that easy - I drove him down every day and picked him    
107:  up. This was a good experience he was able to learn and have a       
108:  good understanding of his faith. More importantly he had the chance to              
109:  mix with different Muslims from different parts of the world such as      
110: Arabs, and White Muslims etc. He would not have had that chance to           
111: meet with these types of people living in Oldham. Now he is at the     
112: Sixth Form College he has a mixed set of friends mainly white kids.      
113: Compare that with the other Pakistani and Bangladeshi kids they all       
114: stick together. So I feel that the experience of attending a Muslim faith            
115: school did him a world of good. The question is all the other Muslim   
116: kids went to either to a school with 100% Asians or a mixed school yet             
117: they still stick together. I think my son’s experience has helped him             
118:  integrate into Britain. He is a strong Liverpool fan, we travel together up              
119: and down the country and even go and watch matches outside the    
120: country.  
 
 
Both of the above observations (AF 8 and AF 18) demonstrate the importance of framing 
Muslim faith schools not as a separatist discourse but rather as an experience that will help 
children integrate in the future. This idea of faith schools as institutions that delay the process of 
integration is an important and crucial theme that was highlighted by a number of parents. 
Moreover, the importance of ‘seeing’ how this process works within immediate and extended 
families provides a useful route for parents who are concerned about the cultural and religious 
identity of their child and at the same time are conscious about the importance of integration. 
The fact that none of the faith schools within the Manchester area is voluntary-aided or grant-
maintained means that parents who want to use the idea of ‘delayed integration’ (Meer 2007) can 
only do so if they have the financial means. Many parents expressed an interest in the option of 
sending their child to a Muslim school, but financial circumstances and the number of children in 
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the household meant that the option of sending all of their children was not a realistic or viable 
financial option.  
 
8.8 Conclusion 
  There are a number of parallels between pupil and parental discourses on schooling. 
Perhaps the important feature of this is the way in which religious identity and the need to belong 
to a wider community of believers is seen as essential features of self-construct. Parental 
interviews confirmed how integration is seen as a natural and a gradual process, resulting from 
the desire to succeed but also to be seen as succeeding. This recognition and affirmation of 
integration is an important mechanism through which status is gained within the community. 
Parental discourse explored the distinction between maintaining the importance of ‘asabiyya, 
whilst rejecting the problematic idea of hyper-‘asabiyya based upon un-critical tribal solidarity. 
This broadly supported existing research in the UK (Weekes-Bernard 2007) and America 
(Cashin 2004).  
 Chapters 1 and 2 of this thesis demonstrated the political capital invested in ensuring that 
certain areas with high concentration of Muslim communities have ethnically mixed schools. 
These schools were seen as a liberal ideal which would not only reduce social disorder but also 
seen to lead towards greater stake in Britishness (Cameron 2011). Parental choice in schooling is 
seen as a contributing factor in maintaining ethnic school segregation (Dench et al 2006; 
Weekes-Bernard 2007) in some English towns.  Empirical evidence presented in this chapter saw 
parental discourse on schooling reject the notion of self-segregation and accept the importance of 
recognising the intersectional nature of class, religion, race and educational achievement of a 
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given school in determining parental choice. Evidence presented in this section rejected the self-
segregation thesis and the idea that Muslim communities develop conscious racial boundaries 
with a willingness to create their own ghettos (Philips 2005; Carey 2008; Nazir-Ali 2008; Ali 
2010). Instead, it highlighted integration as a lived experience and it further supported the thesis 
developed by Simpson (2008) and others (Finney & Simpson 2009) that Muslim communities 
are best described as shifting geographies of ethnic settlement, signified by the movement out of 
traditional areas into more mixed and diverse neighbourhoods.  
 Parental choice of school was presented as a complex inter-sectional process between 
race, class and faith. It demonstrated how class consciousness (Abbas 2004) and levels of 
parentocracy (Brown 1994) of Muslim parents allows mixed schools within affluent ‘middle-
class’ areas  to be considered as most popular school choice; this is because  ‘integration or 
living in an integrated community is practically the only route black people have to escape 
concentrated black poverty (Cashin 2004). Thus, Muslim suburbanization was characterised by 
the motivation by the aspiration to exit the ‚hood‛, which was represented by rising crime and 
failing schools.   
 Parental discourse on Muslim faith schools accepted the idea of integration through faith 
(Jay 2005). It also noted that parents felt the need for their children to be in a mixed school 
environment; they recognised the need for group solidarity whilst rejecting the idea of hyper-
‘asabiyya as found in state mono-cultural schools. This section supports the pupil discourses on 
mono-cultural schools as a deficit model, at the same time confirming the importance of 
nurturing cultural identity as a way of encouraging integration (McLaughlin 1992; Meer 2009; 
Jay 2005). 
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Part 4: Chapter 9: Political Framing of ‘Integration’: Muslim Deconstruction 
 
9.0 Introduction 
The previous two sections of this thesis were concerned with exploring the interconnected nature 
of Muslim discourse and education. Both of these sections demonstrated how integration was 
viewed as lived experience. In addition, they highlighted the importance of considering religion 
and group solidarity whilst debating integration and schooling. The meta-narrative used by both 
parental and pupil discourses rejected the idea of ‘self-segregation’, and further questioned the 
construct of binary opposites in framing the debate on integration.  
   This chapter explores Muslim responses to the public framing of integration; it provides 
a critical reading of this public debate by lending support to Kundnani’s (2007) idea of 
integration as a form of anti-Muslim racism.   
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9.1 Integration as Anti-Muslim Rhetoric   
 The public debate on integration is seen by many respondents as a political construct that 
is used by the media and politicians as a tool to refer to minority communities in general and 
Muslim communities in particular. Integration is viewed within this context not as a process that 
minority communities undergo over a period of time  but rather as a way in which Muslim 
communities are ‘framed’ (Fekete 2008). 
The major theme arising from the parental interviews was that the idea of integration was used as 
a political tool ‘to beat Muslims’. This notion of integration as a ‘political tool’ was a major 
theme arising out of the parental discourse.  Muslim parents viewed the debate on integration as 
counterproductive; many even saw it as an extension of racism and anti-Muslim prejudice. This 
is clearly articulated by the following:  
AF1: 43: Like I say, the term integration is used to stir up racial hatred and really            
 44: it is a term that is used by the media and the political class to BEAT  
 45: people with. Integration is  a very good  story for the press because it  
 46: has become a noted issue. If you look at integration the automatic     
 47: thing that comes to your mind is (.1)<Islam> and the way in which  
 48: people dress. So I would say that integration is a BIG BIG BIG   
 49: PROBLEM.  
 Many Muslims realised that the ‘problem’ of integration as manifested in the public 
realm did not reflect the lived experience of Muslim communities on the ground. That is why 
many considered that the objective behind the popular discourse on integration was not to 
motivate or encourage Muslims to be active citizens but to continue to demonise and essentialise 
the Muslim community. These attitudes were based upon the idea of Islam being obscurantist 
and essentially different (Said 1979, 1997; Sardar 1999; Malik 2009). This has led many 
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Muslims to draw the conclusion that the public debate on Muslims and integration is hampering 
the process of integration and ‘pushing’ Muslims to adopt a ‘rejectionist’ stance on Britishness. 
Moreover, this has led many to believe that the discourse of integration is essentially a rhetoric 
that aims to further marginalise Muslims in a reified white, Anglo-Saxon, protestant, secular 
society.   
 Muslim parents recognised that the public framing of integration is often conducted in 
opposition to the Muslim world-view. They argued that the debate is structured in a way that 
puts Muslim communities in one camp and the British secular identity on the other. This 
particular bipolar framing of Islam and the West is considered by many to be deeply problematic, 
as it pushes Muslims to choose a cultural identity based upon the idea of loyalty. The case of 
Jack Straw and the niqab issue was cited by a number of respondents to further reinforce the 
point:  
AF 18: If you recall the Jack Straw case, everyone knows that the niqab within  
 19: the Muslim community is hotly contested. You will get a majority   
 20: opinion that says that niqab is not necessary in the West. This is a   
 21:  scholarly opinion but you  know that the vast majority of the Muslims  
 22: would say that people should not  wear the niqab. But the way in which 
 23: Jack Straw made the comment and how the media and other   
 24: racist scum came to support Jack meant that Muslims were pushed to  
 24: support the Muslim women wearing the niqab, even if they  didn’t   
 25: agree with it. As a matter of principle you have to, at times you have to  
 26:  put your differences aside.  
 
 Another respondent from neighbouring Manchester, drawing upon the recent niqab 
debates in France, echoed similar sentiments. She reminded her listener that, despite a small 
number of women wearing the niqab in France, it was projected as a threat to secular republican 
values. The point is made using very strong emotions: 
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AF2: 17: On the niqab issue in France I have very strong views, my wife does  
 18:  not wear the niqab, and neither does anyone of my family members.  
 19:  But like many others I took great offence at what I saw in France partly  
 20:  because it felt like an attack on all the Muslims and on our civil liberties.  
 21: You see in these circumstances you have no options but to defend the  
 22:  niqab, you see the niqab  issue is just a mask to cover the hatred for  
 23:  Muslims.   
 
 The above discourse on integration supports the works of Marranci (2004). According to 
Marranci (2004), Islam in Europe acts as transruption to the Judaeo-Christian secular heritage. 
The function of Islamophobia in Europe ‘stems from the defence and resistance against the 
possible effects of real multicultural contacts between Islamic values and European–Western 
ones’ (Maranci 2004:105). The conceptualisation of integration sees Islam as a socio-political 
threat to the Western secular values; it consists of ‘any series of contestory cultural and 
theoretical interventions which, in their impact as cultural differences, unsettle social norms and 
threaten to dismantle hegemonic concepts and practices’ (Hesse 2000:17). 
Hesse’s (2000) and Marranci’s (2004) idea of transruption is evident in the public debate 
in some Western European countries, such as the case of the minarets ban in Switzerland, or the 
outlawing of the niqab in public places in France. For the Muslim discourse, these political 
events act as important themes of debate, which influence the way Britishness, loyalty and 
acceptance is debated. This is further evident in the following observation: 
A7: 18: Islam is seen as challenging the West, Muslims are blamed for all the  
 19: problems in society, any overt or covert signs of Islam are seen as    
 20: problematic, but are also seen as challenging the fabric of British   
 21:  society. There are so many examples - some of them are well-known,  
 22:  but at a local level, every year during the local election period there is  
 23:  always a scandal involving Muslim men and vote-rigging. It is projected  
 24:  as Muslims putting an end to British democracy. Instead what they     
 25:  should be open and balanced and say these are individuals that are   
 26:  trying to play the system. I can’t see these people that do this acting in  
 27:  the name of Islam.   
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8.2  Integration and Historical Memory in Shaping Prejudice  
 The Muslim community discourse draws upon the historical treatment of other minority 
groups in the UK, particularly the treatment of Jewish, Irish and black immigrant communities. 
The current political rhetoric against the Muslim community was seen as a manifestation of 
historical forms of prejudices experienced by other minority communities (Curtis 1968, 1997; 
Meer 2008; Bhatcharyya 2008). 
 Integration has always been a ‘hot political’ issue; in fact, the idea of integration as a 
political tool has a long socio-cultural history. This has been highlighted by a number of 
academic studies covering the extensive literature of anti-Semitism, racism and anti-Irish 
prejudice (Curtis 1968, 1997; Hall et al. 1978; Frankel & Zipperstein 1992; Gilroy 2002). More 
particularly, Meer (2008) has shown how the concept of integration in the context of the Jewish 
experience in the nineteenth century focused on the question of Jewish loyalty to Jerusalem; in 
the same way, the contemporary question of Muslim loyalty is framed around the Tebbit Test. 30 
 The history of anti-terrorist legislation, especially that used against Irish dissidents 
wrongly convicted of IRA terrorism, such as the Guildford Four, was cited as experience within 
the parental discourse in order to draw parallels between the current situation of Muslims and 
past experiences of the Irish community. The high-profile role of Gareth Pierce, who defended 
the Guildford Four and other leading Muslim suspects charged with terrorism, including the 
                                                          
30 The Tebbit Test was an expression developed by the Conservative politician, Sir Norman Tebbit, in April 1990. 
Tebbit suggested that immigrant communities in Britain should have strong loyalty to the country they have 
migrated to, and not the country that have migrated from.  Tebbit used the analogy of cricket, particularly looking at 
which side immigrant communities support as a way of measuring loyalty. He further argued that a large proportion 
of British Muslims would fail to pass this test.   
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Guantanamo inmate Moazzam Begg (2006), has played a crucial part in placing the ‘Muslim 
struggle’ within the broader Irish experience.31  
 The current Muslim experience of anti-Muslim prejudice is located within a continuum of 
old forms of hatred; the reason for this is summarised by the following narrative. It demonstrates 
how the sheer size of the Muslim population, combined with the twenty-four-hour news 
broadcast media, means that the attention focused on the Muslim community takes an 
unprecedented form. 
AF6: 56: Integration has always been a hot political issue, if you look back at  
 57:  history you will find that it has always been a political issue, because  
 58: whenever you have had large-scale migration into UK by people                          
 59:  coming from overseas to settle in any given land whether this be UK or  
 60: many other countries you will have cultural clashes. You will also get a  
 61:  set of myths that will contribute towards  those clashes. You will have  
 62:  myths that will generate hate, whether they are the myths of the Jews  
 63:  sacrificing the children of the Christians which is a  famous myth   
 64:  that grew and which was used to persecute the Jews. Or if it’s the myth  
 65:  around the modern age around Islam advocating the forced      
 66:  marriage of women. So these are myths that can be used to whip up  
 67:  fear or strife or social tensions. The reason why we have so many   
 68: myths around Islam and Muslims today compared with the past I would  
 69: say is the prevalent nature of the mass media and also introduction of  
 70:  various new  media.  
 
 The above example demonstrates how integration is used by political and media sources 
as a way of talking about minority groups. Parental discourses, as demonstrated above, see the 
Muslim communities as ‘folk devils’; there is a long history of ‘folk devils’ being used to 
generate moral panics (Cohen 1980; Alexandra 2000).  
                                                          
31  For a detailed example of this see, the following interview of Gareth Pierce by Moazzam Begg 
http://www.cageprisoners.com/our-work/interviews/item/117-moazzam-begg-in-conversation-with-gareth-peirce.  
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 The above experiences of anti-Muslim prejudice (Malik 2009) in the form of political and 
media discourses (McCreary et al 2007) are seen as an important factor shaping the Muslim view 
of integration. The current tensions around Islam in the UK, following the events of 9/11 and 
7/7, has deeply politicised the Muslim community. Some parents felt they were being ‘pushed’ 
into a corner and forced to take a ‘stance’. Taking a stance requires an active role, which nurtures 
the collective Muslim ‘asabiyya to respond to external political events; this often requires them 
to take an opposite position to that of the status quo. This is further articulated below:  
AF6: 18: Well the obvious question is 7/7 and 9/11, people have been pushed to  
 19: one corner you will find that people have been forced to take side   
 20: and take a  stance. People need a common enemy; today the   
 22: Muslims fit that bill. You  have to act against your  enemy, when  
 23: the government does something  against the common enemy it makes  
 24: you feel safe and secure - well that’s been a part of it. When we   
 25: look at stop and search we know that certain  communities are  
 26: targeted by the authorities.  
[And]: 
AK 7: 101: You see I am sick and tired of the way in which the government is   
 102: lecturing us on integration, take Cameron’s recent speech on   
 103: multiculturalism, integration and Britishness. I have one thing for   
 104: Cameron he can shove his liberalism up his backside. I am sick to   
 105: death, I have realised one thing even if we all became liberals   
 106: overnight, if we all went to the pub for a swift half. They will still call us  
 107: a Paki bastard. So I might as well be a Paki with principle. One thing  
 108: that I know for sure if you stick to who you are, you will get respect at  
 109: the end.  
 
 The above observations provide a clear account of the way in which political debates on 
integration are dismissed and resisted, based upon a wider framework of social acceptance and 
rejection. One of the key comparisons offered by a number of Muslim respondents focused on 
the importance of maintaining and nurturing one’s cultural identity and maintaining the spirit of 
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‘asabiyya. This is further articulated by the following example which drew upon the ‘Michael 
Jackson paradox’:    
AF7:  108: You have to realise that we can never all be the same, you see Michael  
 109: Jackson tried changing his colour to white. My question is, did that earn  
 110: him more or less respect by the white community? The answer is less.   
 111: The point is this when he was Black he was not accepted and even   
 112: when he changed is colour he wasn’t. He should have realised that his  
 113: fans liked him for what he was that was his music.  So staying true to  
 114: who you are is very  important. There is no point changing for the  
 115: political masters. At work there is this guy that likes to go to the pub, he  
 116: likes to stay away from the Muslims or the Asian community. He thinks  
 117: that this will get him more respect. At  the  end of the day people  
 118: should respect you and accept you for who you are. I  won’t change for 
 119: no-one 
 The wider political rhetoric on integration was considered by many Muslims to be one-
dimensional. It involves the government in general and the media in particular ‘telling’ the 
Muslim community to integrate. This one-dimensional debate on integration does not provide a 
space for Muslims to convey apprehensions or concerns they may have over certain practices 
within the wider society. Respondents felt there was no room for the Muslim community to 
participate in the debate on integration; any genuine criticism of certain experiences is 
discredited in the name of ‘segregation’ and ‘disloyalty’.  The following respondent argues the 
need for a debate on integration based upon a negotiated debate on shared values. A negotiated 
approach to shared values sees social values not as an absolutist dominant set of majoritarian 
values but as a collective and inclusive negotiated activity (Haydon 1987; Leicester 1989; 
Halstead1995).  
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Ak15: 18: Shared values seem to be in fashion as far as the debate of    
 19: integration is concerned. I see this discussion to be problematic, it does  
 20: not help anything. I have been in this country long enough to realise that this 
 21: discussion is a non-starter. My socialist friends in our trade union   
 22: will object to Cameron’s set of values. So let’s not have a set of values  
 23: which are pushed on us, instead let’s have a mature debate about   
 24: these  values and try and mutually agree on these values.   
 
9.3 Black Muslim Convert Discourse on Integration 
 The majority of the Muslim communities in UK consist of the dominant South Asian 
ethnic cohort. Recently, following the events of 9/11 and 7/7, the convert community in general 
and the Black convert Muslim community in particular have been a focal point in the media 
debate. The role of Jermaine Lindsay, one of the 7/7 bombers, and Richard Reid, the shoe 
bomber, together with the active role played by the Brixton Mosque in combating extremism 
have placed the Black Muslim convert community in the national spotlight (Reedie 2009). The 
broader appeal of the Black Muslim aesthetic within the ‘Hip Hop’ industry (Miah & Kalra 
2008) combined with the growing academic literature articulating a Black-American cultural 
experience of Islam (Jackson 2005) have contributed to the importance of studying the Black 
Muslim convert community in the UK (Reddie 2009). In addition, unlike the white Muslim 
convert respondents, the Black convert experience provided a distinctive cultural reading of 
integration within the context of the Windrush experience.  The convert discourse focused 
primarily on racism, and the way in which the white host society failed to accept a Black 
Christian community travelling to the ‘motherland’. This is further articulated below:  
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AF4:  79: At the end of the day it’s all about understanding, when our parents first  
 80: came  here on the Windrush, there were a lot of concerns about ‘these’  
 80: foreigners  who came in on the Windrush. Our community faced a  
 81: great deal of hostility, despite the fact that they were Christians   
 82: travelling to the motherland. This continued when we went to   
 83: school, we realised that all the minority  communities had the same  
 84: difficulty with racism and harassment. We also  realised that it wasn’t  
 85: only the racist kids in the school that was giving us grief it was the   
 86: system. We realised that it was the government that run the system  
 87: and it was almost that they were stoking up fears of Black men that   
 88: created a culture of resentment.   
 The above observation highlighted how a belief in Christianity, together with a broader 
conceptualisation of Britishness, was not sufficient for the Windrush community to be socially 
accepted. This further motivated many Black community members to establish Black Churches 
in the UK (Reddie 2009). The reason behind developing Black Churches, as pointed out by one 
of the respondents, was ‘not because they wanted to display signs of self-segregation’ but rather 
a consequence of the rejection by the mainstream host community’. Black convert responses 
developed their narratives of integration by drawing upon the above Windrush experiences to 
shape their understanding of integration.  Many argued that they were in a privileged position to 
articulate a nuanced Muslim perspective on integration. This is clearly articulated as follows: 
AF4:   18: You see we are quite lucky because we were born Christians but    
 19: decided to convert or revert to Islam. When people talk about    
 20: integration we know it’s a  joke. After all we were Christians and spoke 
 21: English even our names were anglicised. But despite all this integration  
 22: where did it get us! You see at the end of the day even if you behaved  
 23: like the average white man - to them you are still an outsider. You will  
 24: still get stopped in the street by the police. So I  say you can keep your 
 25: integration we know it’s a con and a joke.  
 The above observation further captured the experience of the Black convert perspectives 
on integration. It showed how, despite attempting to integrate into British society, they were left 
with a feeling of rejection and isolation. Many argued that the question of integration should not 
be whether ‘Muslims were willing to integrate into British society’ but whether there is a 
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‘willingness to accept Muslims as British citizens’.  It was clear that this particular group of 
Black Muslim converts felt that the Muslim youths had already integrated into the host 
community; they highlighted the prevalent consumption of alcohol and abuse of drugs, combined 
with various sexual activities, as examples of integration. In light of these practices, the convert 
Muslim responses articulated the idea of ‘dis-integration’, meaning that too much integration 
was having a detrimental impact on the Muslim community. The idea of ‘dis-integration’ is 
clearly articulated in the following observation: 
AF4: 19: You see all this talk about integration and how Muslims aren’t   
 20: integrated is  nonsense, you tell me which young people that you know  
 21: of is not integrated? As a parent and a youth worker I can tell what  
 22: young people are  really up, the alcohol, the drugs and sex - these  
 23: practices are not from the  Muslim tradition.  As someone that   
 24: converted to Islam I can say that what we need is a debate on   
 25: dis-integration not integration.  
 
9.4 Integration as Gradual Process 
 The idea of integration was based upon a firm understanding and realisation that 
integration is a new topic of discussion. The Muslim community in the UK is a relatively new 
community, which migrated after the post-war boom. The nascent nature of the community is 
further demonstrated by the fact that many first-generation Muslims are still active, even though 
they are ageing and rapidly decreasing in number.  
 Many argued that the political discourse on integration attempted to enforce an 
immediate process of change on the Muslim community, which other communities, such as the 
Jewish and the Irish communities, had generations to achieve.  It was clear that a strong 
commitment to integration is a relatively new idea, which had its inception following the 
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summer riots of 2001 (Sardar 2010), in fact, prior to the events of the northern mill town riots, a 
number of local authorities were very content to maintain high levels of residential and school 
segregation (Ritchie 2001). In fact, many parents put forward the idea that, had the history of the 
first decade of the 21st century been different and the events of 7/7 and 9/11 not taken place, the 
debate about Muslim integration would not have been so prevalent.  To reinforce this point about 
the shifting priorities of integration and segregation, the following observer evaluates the way in 
which the idea of self-segregation is publicly debated: 
AF7: 21: I have difficulties with self-segregation; when I applied for a flat, this  
 22: was before the riots, I was given a house in Coldhurst. When my   
 23: brother was of school age he was given a primary school with all   
 24: Bengali’s, similarly with the secondary school.  How can the council  
 25: then turn around and blame us for being segregated. I’ll give you   
 26: another example; the council help set up a Youth Association   
 27: specifically for Bangladeshis, the council even funded many   
 28: projects that reinforced a sense of Bangladeshi national identity. Look  
 29:  at them now: the hypocrites blame us for being segregated. At the   
 30: end of the day it’s a big political game they play, we are just disposable  
 31: pawns.  
 
 
 The above example demonstrates how the Muslim community has become politically 
active and politically mature following the key landmark events of the last decade. Muslim 
community discourse demonstrated a strong critical assessment of and political maturity towards 
the government policies relating to integration and segregation. Many saw the political and the 
policy rhetoric of integration fostering a sense of uncertainty about government agendas.  Many 
even considered the political attention on Muslims as a positive step, given that that it has 
politically mobilised a generation of Muslims. This point is clearly articulated by the following: 
AF10:   17: One thing you have to say is that the last decade has been a testing       
   18: time for Muslims and at the same time it has also been a blessing. You     
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   19: see God works in mysterious ways. The Muslim community is a highly   
   20: politically literate community following the war on terror. The BBC no   
   21: longer controls our opinion, we consult a range of sources when it    
   22: comes to Muslim issues…You can’t say that years of government            
   23: counter-terrorism strategy, the Prevent initiative and the policies on           
   24: stop and search is not going to have an effect on the community. You          
   25: must be daft to think that. An entire generation of Muslims are now   
   26: politically astute. If the government is going to think that we are going   
   27: to dance to its tune its got another think coming.  At the end of the day   
   28: which Muslim living in the UK does not want to integrate. If    
   29: they didn’t, they should be on the plane back to Dar al Islam. You have   
   30: to give the community the space and more importantly TIME to    
   31: integrate; all the rhetoric of  integration is going to have the opposite   
   32: reaction.  
 The above final remark regarding providing a ‘time and more importantly space’ for the 
community to integrate is an important feature in the way in which the Muslim community 
frames integration. It is only through a process of inevitable gradual change that the community 
is going to develop. External socio-political and cultural interference will only undermine the 
direction of this trend. In fact, it was clear that the parents felt that, within a short period of time, 
the Muslim community had gone through significant changes compared with other minority 
groups.  
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9.5 Conclusion 
 
Chapter 8 considered parental discourse by examining the concept of integration as a social 
category. It was particularly interested in the ways in which integration was talked about in 
general and within schooling in particular. This chapter was concerned with exploring parental 
discourse as a political category of integration. Two key themes were explored in this chapter.  
 The first was the idea that the political framing of integration constituted a form of anti-
Muslim rhetoric (Kundnani 2007), which was predicated upon the assumption that Islam and 
Muslim communities acted as a transruption to Judaeo-Christian secular heritage of British 
political landscape (Hesse 2000; Marranci’s 2004) The starting premise of this discussion 
revolved around the idea of a disconnect between the political rhetoric of integration and the 
lived experiences of Muslim communities, who felt they had either integrated into the British 
society or saw the idea of integration as a gradual inevitable process (Cessari 2004). Given this 
observation, Muslim parents argued that external political intervention especially by political and 
media actors only undermined the process of integration bringing about counterproductive 
results, as it forces Muslims to take an oppositional stance toward Britishness.     
 Second, rhetorical framing of integration and Muslims was seen to draw on historical 
memory from the current guise of anti-Muslim racism to anti-Irish sentiment (Curtis 1968, 1997) 
anti-Semitism (Meer 2008; Bhattacharyya 2008) and racism against the black community (Hall 
et al. 1978; Gilroy 2002). In doing this the Muslim parents located current trends of anti-Muslim 
prejudice within a continuum of old forms of prejudice. The current political manifestation of the 
debate on integration, revolved around the idea of integration as a ‘political tool which is used to 
beat Muslim’. Thus, integration was viewed  not as a cultural process that minority communities 
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undergo over a period of time  but rather as a way in which Muslim communities are ‘framed’ 
(Fekete 2008).  
 Parental discourses on integration, within this chapter viewed the concept of integration 
as an analytical category and not as a cultural process. The objective behind the political 
discourse of integration was not to promote a greater sense of Britishness or patriotism. Parents 
felt that the framing of integration revealed dormant prejudices against the Muslim communities, 
parents often described ‘integration’ as a political tool which is used to ‘beat’ minority 
communities in general, and in recent years, the  Muslim communities in particular. The politics 
of integration was seen as a wider European phenomenon of anti-Muslim prejudice which was 
encouraging a sense of Muslim solidarity based upon the experience of marginalisation - the idea 
of Muslim group solidarity or ‘asabiyya is further discussed in light of Ibn Khaldun’s 
sociological framework in the following chapter.  
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Part 5: Chapter 10: Interpretation of Findings: Khaldunian 
Sociology 
 
10.0 Introduction 
There is a plethora of books on the topic of integration and Muslim communities in Western 
European societies. In light of a review of these books, chapter one of this thesis noted the 
scarcity of empirical studies exploring what integration means to Muslims and what role it plays 
in framing the debates on schooling.    
 Parts four and five of this thesis have attempted to bridge this gap by exploring the pupil 
and parental discourses on integration and schooling.  The pupil focus groups highlighted three 
dominant and ambivalent narratives of integration and mixed schooling. Firstly, Muslim pupils 
tended to view schooling as a dialectical multicultural experience where ‘people can get to know 
each other’. Secondly, pupil narratives in light of experiences of racism and anti-Muslim 
prejudice used the idea of group solidarity or ‘sticking-together’ as a dominant meta-discourse. 
Finally, the perception of mono-cultural schools recognised the potential impacts on language 
and future employment prospects while at the same time appreciating the positive experiences, 
especially in faith school contexts. These positioning of schooling and integration help 
deconstruct the binary opposites of the mono-cultural and integrated school policy imperatives.  
The parental focus groups also examined the notion of integration in schooling through the idea 
of embourgeoisement and also the desire to achieve integration through faith. The dominant 
theme, arising from both of the focus groups and the one-to-one interviews, is the importance of 
‘asabiyya to fellow Muslims, along with the rejection of the principles of hyper-‘asabiyya.  
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 This section will discuss the concept of ‘asabiyya in light of Khaldunian sociology. The 
first section will provide a brief overview of Ibn Khaldun’s work on group solidarity by applying 
a careful reading of the Muqaddimah, together an examination of the social, political and moral 
typologies of ‘asabiyya as discussed by Rabi (1967). The second section intends to apply the 
concept of ‘asabiyya to the pupil and parental discourses on integration.   
 
10.1 Ibn Khaldun and Group Dynamics 
Contemporary discourses on group dynamics are usually associated with negativity or hostility; a 
quick survey of the perception of group dynamics within the black (Hall 1978; Gilroy 2004) or 
Muslim community (Alexandra 2000) reveals how both of these groups have been associated 
with hyper-masculinity and gang culture respectively.  In fact, this follows a particular trend in 
the study of group dynamics within social psychology.  As early as 1896, Le Bon (1896) 
discussed the idea of the ‘group mind’ to refer to the way in which groups carry a ‘collective 
mentality’, which allows them to act in irrational ways (cited in Brown 2000). In addition, 
Zimbarde (1969) argued how group behaviour allowed individuals to carry out crimes, such as 
riots and revolutions, because it allowed members to separate individualised actions through a 
‘cloak of anonymity’ (ibid.).   More recently, Brown (2000) has also confirmed the above 
observation, by demonstrating how group behaviour or any forms of group unity grounded upon 
common, mutual or collective purpose or action have often received a negative press. He argues 
how group behaviour is often associated with ‘social un-desirable aspects – de-individualisation, 
prejudice, social loafing and group think, rather than more positive aspects of team spirit, 
intergroup cooperation, group productivity and collective problem solving’ (Brown 2000:xiv).  
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 The Khaldunian imagination of ‘asabiyya sees group cohesion not only as highly 
desirable but also as natural and essential for any civilisation (Fromhertz 2011). This idea, as 
already noted in chapter three, encompasses a classical Islamic world-view, which is supported 
by a number of traditions attributed to the Prophet Muhammad (saws), such as the often-quoted 
authentically collected sources: ‘stick to the group and beware of being separate’ (Tirmidhi, no 
date) and ‘the group is a mercy and separation is torment’ (Hanbal no date ). For Ibn Khaldun, 
‘asabiyya provides a source of social identity; it plays a crucial role in defining the way people 
conceptualise their world and, most importantly, how the ‘out-group’ is perceived. Ibn Khaldun 
further articulates the importance of group solidarity by drawing upon the famous story of Joseph 
and his brothers in the Quran:  
They said to their father: ‘If the wolf eats him, while we are a group, then,   
 indeed, we have lost out’. This means that one cannot imagine any hostile  
 act being undertaken against anyone who has his group feeling to support  
 him. 
       (Ibn Khaldun 1998 Volume 1: 263) 
10.2 Rabi’s (1967) Typology of ‘Asabiyya 
   Fromherz (2011a), in a recent paper presented at Cambridge University, argued that Ibn 
Khaldun’s writings should not be seen as theoretical principles that transcend time and space; 
rather they should be interpreted as political tools used by Ibn Khaldun to pursue his political 
objectives.  This view is widely contested and rejected by a number of writers; among those 
discussed in this thesis are Gellner (1981) and Ahmed (2003, 2005). More recently, this view has 
been challenged by Ravetz (2011), who has used Khaldunian sociology as a way of 
understanding the Arab Spring.  
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 Following the same scholarly tradition, Rabi (1967) assesses the impacts of ‘asabiyya as 
a sociological tool in understanding the nature of group solidarity. Rabi (1967) extracts the 
following three themes associated with Khaldunian sociological theory to help explain the 
politics of group dynamics.   
 ‘asabiyya as a social force  
 ‘asabiyya as a political force 
 ‘asabiyya as an ethical and moral principle 
 
Social force 
The central tenant of ‘asabiyya is based upon a social bond between people of shared kinship or 
cultural ties. The social bond, with its emphasis on fellowship, partnership and association, gives 
energy and momentum to group solidarity. Moreover, the inevitable power of association, 
affiliation and attachment to the group is crucial for the strength and longevity of the group (Ibn 
Khaldun 1958). For Ibn Khaldun, group solidarity is a product of the social environment, with 
group solidarity playing a vital, tenacious and powerful function, first in rural communities then 
in urban societies. This point is further reinforced by Rabi (1967) who states: 
Its function as a social bond and a coordinating power is, then, an attribute of a particular 
stage of group development which again proves one of the assumptions reached in 
discussing Ibn Khaldun’s method. That is to say, that his analysis shows a tendency in 
favour of giving priority to the same way of living, as an important factor in determining 
the shapes, circumstances, and roles of ‘asabiyya.  
          (Rabi 1967:67)  
The function of ‘asabiyya acts as a form of unity and consensus for group dynamics; it also helps 
by providing the group in question with clear objectives and a sense of direction.  For Rabi 
(1967) ‘asabiyya as a social force has two distinctive objectives. Firstly, it nurtures solidarity and 
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vigour to one’s own group as a result of the aforementioned ties; secondly, it unites people by 
mere force, to compromise the conflicting ‘asabiyyas, to form one great and powerful group’ 
(Rabi 1967:65).   Ibn Khaldun argues that the absence of coordinated cooperation and group 
solidarity may give rise to disintegration, internal division and discord between groups, which 
may often lead to bloodshed and violence.  
Political Force 
Ahmed (2005) views the concept of ‘asabiyya as a vehicle for political action; this is confirmed 
by Fromhertz (2011), who has argued that ‘asabiyya is a driving force for history, and most 
importantly, the mechanism through which the fates of empires and political dynasties are 
determined. Lawrence (1984), in a detailed study of the Muqaddimah, has also recognised the 
intricate relationship between the practice of ‘asabiyya, the nature of power and Islamic 
ideology. Moreover, Rabi (1967) has shown how ‘asabiyya is principally a vehicle that is used to 
‘establish political power either within the limited group or over the whole community’ (Rabi 
1967:61).   
 All political action encompasses a principle, cause or a set political objective that a group 
is intending to achieve. ‘Asabiyya plays a crucial role in achieving these objectives through the 
process of group solidarity. Moreover, during times of political upheaval, ‘asabiyya can also play 
a vital function in defending the group against external forces by reinforcing and stabilizing the 
influence of religion within the group.   
 The success of the political demands made by groups is largely determined by the 
harmony, consensus, and cohesion of those groups. If the ‘asabiyya is strong and versatile, the 
group is likely to be successful in achieving the desired political goals or objectives. One of the 
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key aspects of achieving political goals is based upon the idea that strong ‘asabiyya, will enable 
the group in question to state certain claims and demands. Ibn Khaldun (2005), in the following 
observation, further reinforces this point: 
  ...group feeling produces the ability to defend oneself, to offer    
  opposition, to protect oneself and to press one’s claim…people whose   
  group feeling cannot for its own defend them against oppression    
  certainly cannot offer any opposition or press any claims. 
        (Ibn Khaldun 2005:111) 
Moral Value    
Rabi (1967), drawing upon the works of Ibn Khaldun, makes the distinction between two types 
of ‘asabiyya – the pre-Islamic and Islamic forms of ‘asabiyya. The pre-Islamic concept of 
‘asabiyya is based upon blind, unconditional support for a group, which often means carrying out 
actions without due regard for ethical considerations or the ‘justice of its cause’ (Rabi 1967: 49). 
For Ibn Khaldun, pre-Islamic forms of ‘asabiyya are a product of Jahilyya, or pre-Islamic 
ignorance, which is antithetical to the Islamic world-view (al-Mubarakpur 1995; Lings 1998). 
The pre-Islamic acts of Jahilyya are contrasted with Ibn Khaldun’s understanding of the 
primordial nature of humans, who are innately inclined towards righteousness; this is 
summarised by the following observation: 
  In view of his natural disposition and his power of logical reasoning, man   
  is more inclined towards good qualities than towards bad qualities,   
  because the  evil in him is the result of the animal powers, and in as much  
  as he is a human being, he is more inclined towards goodness and    
  good qualities.  
        (Ibn Khaldun 1958:291) 
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 The principle that Ibn Khaldun uses to navigate between pre-Islamic and Islamic ideas of 
‘asabiyya is judged by its objectives or consequences of human action; for Rabi (1967), the 
exercise of power and the pronouncements  of group feelings of solidarity should be determined 
by their objectives. If these are conducted in compliance with religious principles associated with 
the common good or even meaningful secular objectives, then ‘asabiyya is acceptable.  Rabi 
(1967) further concludes that ‘in this way, Ibn Khaldun was able to utilise the idea of ‘asabiyya... 
to differ categorically and purposefully from those reflected by the old tradition. It is in this 
sense that his idea of ‘asabiyya can be considered as a constructive moral concept’ (Rabi 
1967:68).  
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 10.3 ‘Asabiyya and Pupil Discourse on Schooling 
This section will attempt to provide a theoretical interpretation of the key findings on Muslim 
discourse on schooling in light of the Khaldunian sociology of ‘asabiyya. It aims to do this by 
applying the typology of ‘asabiyya as understood by Rabi (1967). The first section will focus on 
the pupil discourses on integration and schooling, whilst the latter will evaluate the parental 
discourses.  
Two key themes emerged from the pupil discourses on integration. Firstly, the meta-narrative of 
‘sticking together’ within the context of mixed schooling is based upon the principles of group 
solidarity based upon religious identity. The second theme associated with pupil discourse 
focused upon the idea of ‘getting to know each other’ as a moral imperative. Both of these ideas 
will now be discussed in light of Rabi’s (1967) typologies of ‘asabiyya.   
 
 Pupil discourse as social ‘asabiyya  
The concept of ‘asabiyya is best used to explain and understand the idea of ‘sticking together’ 
within pupil discourse. As noted, ‘‘sticking together’’ was a dominant and recurring theme in 
most of the focus group interviews.  In light of the interview data, it was clear how the idea of 
‘sticking together’ emerged as a social category which nurtured ‘asabiyya through the sense of 
‘group solidarity, loyalty and group consciousness’ (Daood 1967 in Ibn Khaldun 2005: :xIi).    
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 One of the key features which shaped ‘sticking together’ was based on the notion of 
‘commonality’, which was grounded in a strong social bond nurtured by a range of variables,  
including humour, shared experiences and, most importantly, religion.  
 Ibn Khaldun clearly demonstrates how one of the social features of ‘asabiyya is that it 
provides group protection against external threats, be they actual or perceived. In fact, ‘asabiyya 
was used by Muslim pupils to challenge and resist racism and anti-Muslim prejudice in schools 
from both teachers and pupils. Moreover, ‘asabiyya in the form of ‘sticking together’ provided a 
stable base for group solidarity and pursuing of a collective purpose; in the absence of ‘asabiyya 
Muslim pupils in mixed schools expressed strong feelings of isolation and were vulnerable to 
anti-Muslim prejudice.  
Pupil discourse as political ‘asabiyya  
 The discourse of ‘asabiyya in the context of schooling can be seen to play an important role in 
the daily lives of Muslim pupils. The idea of ‘sticking together’ was clearly visualised as a 
process aimed at achieving certain objectives. One of the most important objectives that the act 
of ‘sticking together’ was seen to achieve is group protection against external threats, both in 
school and also whilst travelling to and from school. This observation is supported by Ibn 
Khaldun, who has argued that group solidarity ‘produces the ability to defend oneself, to offer 
opposition, to protect oneself’ (Ibn Khaldun 2005:111). The specific comments made by the 
young Yemeni Muslim (see 6.6) demonstrates clearly how ‘asabiyya based upon religion plays 
an important role in achieving group protection. Furthermore, the experiences of young Muslims 
in the Manchester focus group interviews also pointed to ‘asabiyya as a way of generating 
support and feelings of stability  
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The pupil experiences revealed how the crucial events of 7/7 and 9/11 have created a 
sense of uncertainly and instability in schools. The pupil discourse clearly demonstrated how 
‘asabiyya helped them to navigate through their schooling experience in a climate of hostility. 
Any attempt by teachers to break down ‘asabiyya within schools simply wasn’t effective, as we 
have seen how, in the absence of these obstacles, ‘asabiyya functions as a normalizing presence.  
Perhaps one of the important features of political ‘asabiyya is the idea that groups have 
the ability to make certain demands. Once again the pupil discourses provided useful narratives 
to show how young Muslims would use ‘asabiyya as a way of symbolising through numerical 
size of the group, to signal how racism and or anti-Muslim prejudice will not be accepted. Once 
again, the Manchester Muslim focus group showed how this was achieved using a very strong 
language of masculinity (See 6.6 and references to how Muslims will finish anyone who showed 
any signs of racism).  
Pupil discourse as moral ‘asabiyya  
Pupil discourses on schooling were associated with a strong moral dimension; group cohesion or 
group solidarity was talked about as a mechanism that provided support to young people. The 
‘asabiyya was not referred to as a gang, neither were any references made to any form of 
criminal acts. When references to violence were pronounced, this was done with a reactive force, 
whereby young people were responding to an external stimulus. In fact, what emerged was the 
importance of ‘asabiyya in the process of schooling for Muslim youths.  
The pupil discourses on the Muslim ummah, especially in light of the political events in 
Palestine, also demonstrated how political interest in social injustices around the world is 
debated through the idea of ‘asabiyya. This particular way of talking about global injustices was 
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clothed in religious speech; this very much connects to what Rabi (1967: 67) referred to as moral 
dynamics of ‘asabiyya with overt religious connotations.  
Moral aspects of pupil discourse also took the form of religious and secular underpinning. 
The desire to know each other, the imperative to socialise and interact with non-Muslims and 
with a willingness to see social spaces as multicultural spaces of hope where interaction and 
exchange can take place all carried moral underpinnings. This is a clear demonstration of the 
recognition of ‘asabiyya and the rejection of the notions of hyper-‘asabiyya. The desire to know 
each other further echoes March’s (2009a) work on Islamic citizenship discussed in section 3.4, 
pages 87-88. 
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10.4 ‘Asabiyya and Parental Discourse on Schooling  
The first and perhaps most important theme arising from the parental interviews was the 
importance of ‘asabiyya and rejection of hyper-‘asabiyya whilst discussing issues associated 
with schooling and parental choice. Second, the Muslim parents recognised the need to nurture 
cultural and religious identity in their children. Finally, Muslim parents expressed a strong desire 
to send their children to mixed schools, thus providing them with the right balance for 
multicultural citizenship. Each of these themes will now be considered in light of Rabi’s (1967) 
typology of Ibn Khaldun’s ‘asabiyya.   
Parental Discourse as Social Asabiyya  
 The meta-discourse revealed the desire to move into white middle-class areas; this process 
signified a desire among those who had financial capital to participate in what sociologists have 
described as a process of embourgeoisement. The discourse of embourgeoisement recognised the 
importance of ‘asabiyya, thus clearly demonstrating the desire to move into mixed areas or 
neighbourhoods which already had cultural diversity.  
 There was no desire within the parental discourse for assimilation or the appetite to 
abandon religious or cultural differences. Rather, parental observations revealed interesting ways 
through which ideas of ‘asabiyya, based on religion, are nurtured. Two important themes of 
‘asabiyya were discussed. Firstly, the idea of ‘asabiyya endowed the process of 
embourgeoisement with status and a sense of recognition for those living in mixed 
neighbourhoods. The intersectional nature of parental discourse was predicated upon the notions 
of ‘asabiyya and class consciousness. Secondly, ‘asabiyya played a crucial role in determining 
the parents’ choice of school for their children. This was made clear by the fact that parents were 
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keen on choosing mixed schools or schools with a population ratio that corresponded to the BME 
size of the borough. This, they felt, provided a correct balance in nurturing one’s cultural 
identity, creating resistance to racism and providing an opportunity for educational success.  
 
Parental Discourse as Political ‘Asabiyya  
Political ‘asabiyya was a key feature in parental discourse and was clearly demonstrated by the 
way in which parents framed their conversations around the choice of neighbourhood and also 
their choice of schools for their children. Mixed schools and mixed neighbourhoods featured 
very prominently within their discursive framing of integration.  One of the main reasons 
provided for this was based upon parental desire to see their child succeed, but also to ensure that 
their cultural identity together with their safety were not compromised.  
 Expressing a desire to send their children to mixed schools was based upon the 
recognition that ‘asabiyya provided a mechanism for protection against racism and anti-Muslim 
prejudice. Parents did not like the prospect of sending their child to a school where their presence 
would attract undue attention. It was felt that sending a child to an entirely white school would 
be too much of a sacrifice of personal security. The role of political ‘asabiyya in this context 
provided a symbolic protection through safety in numbers rather than physical protection. 
Mixed schools also provided a medium through which cultural identity is maintained and 
sustained; it was argued that children in mixed schools will not feel the need to assimilate and 
lose their cultural identity in order to feel accepted.  
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Parental Discourse as Moral Asabiyya  
Ibn Khaldun’s theory of moral ‘asabiyya makes the crucial distinction between pre-Islamic 
‘asabiyya, which was based upon uncritical acceptance of traditional values, and Islamic 
‘asabiyya, which is based upon the ideas of social justice, as seen through the contemporary 
works on the maqasid al-Shariah.   Pre-Islamic ‘asabiyya accepted certain values even if these 
values were against moral sensibilities. Parental discourse demonstrated a desire to move in a 
direction that is considered in the best interest of their children and wider society. They 
expressed strong emotions regarding communities or schools comprising hyper-‘asabiyya. The 
parental discourses constantly balanced and negotiated the desire to maintain ‘asabiyya through 
nurturing a strong sense of self, through ensuring that their child had a strong training in Islamic 
values and the desire to integrate into British society. Even those who decided to send their 
children to Muslim faith schools did so from the point of view of ‘delayed integration’ and not 
through the desire to live separate or ‘parallel lives’. Parental discourses also revealed how 
strong religious values will help children to become better citizens. No contradiction was noted 
in the desire to simultaneously maintain a religious identity within a British national identity. 
  Muslim parents demonstrated the ability and flexibility to adjust to new surroundings by 
maintaining and sustaining the need to belong to a religious community. This point was further 
reinforced by the parental desire to send children to ‘mixed’ schools, because mixed schools 
allow students to maintain ‘asabiyya and also to draw on it, for social and political benefits.10.4  
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10.5 Conclusion  
The discourse of group solidarity within the context of political philosophy is particularly 
crucial, especially given that some liberal thinkers (Okin 1999; Barry 2001) reject the idea of 
multiculturalism, with its emphasis on group rights. Instead they call for a greater emphasis on 
liberal individualism. They argue that a recognition of group rights within public policy 
discourse tends to undermine the most vulnerable and weak members, such as women and 
children, of minority communities.  
 This chapter has stressed the importance of group solidarity within the sociology of 
Muslim communities, by drawing upon the works of Ibn Khaldun, Rabi (1967) and others. It has 
rejected the notion that group solidarity as an essentially hostile and oppressive idea. In doing 
this it has further supported the idea of group rights as advocated by Modood (2005; 2007) in the 
study of multiculturalism.  
 The first part of this chapter provided a brief overview of Ibn Khaldun’s work on group 
solidarity by applying a careful reading of the Muqaddimah, together an examination of the 
social, political and moral typologies of ‘asabiyya as discussed by Rabi (1967). This chapter 
provided a unique theoretical contribution towards Muslim group dynamics by using the works 
of Ibn Khaldun. It demonstrated the importance of group solidarity, both as a textual and 
sociological imperative, and argued how ‘asabiyya is a crucial source for social identity; playing 
an important role in defining the way people conceptualise their world and, most importantly, 
how the ‘out-group’ is perceived.  The importance of Muslim ‘asabiyya, from a Khaldunian 
perspective did not translate into separatism or self-segregation; instead it recognised how 
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‘asabiyya can nurture the common good (March 2009, 2009a) even within the context of 
meaningful secular objectives.  
 The second section of this chapter provided a theoretical and sociological interpretation 
of parental and pupil discourses on integration and schooling based upon the writings of Ibn 
Khaldun (Rabi 1967).  Pupil discourses on integration and schooling highlighted two key themes 
which were discussed in light of Rabi’s (1967) typology of ‘asabiyya.  Firstly, the meta-narrative 
of ‘sticking together’ within the context of mixed schooling and experiences of racism and anti-
Muslim prejudice were based upon the principles of Muslim identity and group solidarity.  The 
second theme associated with pupil discourse focused upon the idea of ‘getting to know each 
other’ as a moral imperative, which allowed school pupils to ‘do multiculturalism’. Both of these 
perceived paradoxes were negotiated through the construct of ‘asabiyya.  Similarly to the pupil 
experiences of integration and schooling parental discourses stressed the importance of ‘asabiyya 
based upon Muslim identity, whilst rejecting the idea of hyper-‘asabiyya. In light of this, Muslim 
parents expressed a strong choice in sending their children to mixed schools, thus providing them 
with the right balance for multicultural citizenship.  
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11. CONCLUSION  
The key momentous political events of the last decade, such as the 2001 riots, 9/11 and 7/7, have 
provided a major impetus for a number of publications that have attempted to articulate a 
perspective on the question of Muslim integration and segregation (Caldwell 2009; Santiosis 
2004). A range of policy debates on schooling and the Muslim communities in Britain since 
2001 have played an instrumental role in the ways Muslims are positioned within public 
discourse (Gilborn 2008; Tomlinson 2008). This thesis has explored three aims associated with 
the Muslim positionality. Firstly, it has examined the school policy of desegregation, as 
developed by New Labour and endorsed by the Conservative-led Coalition government, by 
focusing on four northern mill towns in England. Secondly, it has attempted to bridge the lacuna 
in empirical studies through an emic subaltern position (Young 2003), which allows Muslim 
communities to take ownership of their own discourse on the topics of schooling, segregation 
and integration.  Thirdly, in order to contextualise the Muslim discourse within a broad 
theoretical perspective, this thesis has used Ibn Khaldun’s concept of ‘asabiyya to interpret the 
major threads connected with Muslim group dynamics (Ibn Khaldun 1953; Rabi 1967).  
 The analysis of focus group and one-to-one interviews drew upon the content analytical 
tradition of discourse analysis (Mills 1997), based upon the works of Potter & Wetherell (2010). 
Discourse analysis as understood in this study saw discourse as a social construct, which can be 
analysed as a source of empirical data to reveal interesting insights into aspects of a person’s life 
(Gilbert & Mulkay 1984). This approach allowed this doctoral study to provide a ‘voice’ for 
Muslims to articulate what integration means to them, especially in light of the framing of 
Muslims within public and policy discourse. The importance of this approach has been supported 
by a number of academics including Delgado (1995) and Fekete (2009). 
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 The first section of this thesis highlighted the policy of School Academies, used by four 
towns in the north of England, as a way of addressing the question of problematic monocultural 
schools created through school merger or closure. The meta-narrative arising from the 
government discourse on segregation is based upon a binary approach to schools, with ‘Muslim’ 
monocultural state schools viewed as highly problematic and mixed schools considered as the 
antidote to social unrest (Davies 2009; Taylor 2009).  This section concluded by arguing that the 
contemporary policy of desegregation aimed at tackling monocultural state schools attended by 
mainly Muslim students is based upon the following:  (i) A ‘community-relations’ approach of 
tackling violent extremism through the principles of shared values, citizenship and Britishness 
(McGhee 2008; Kundnani 2009); (ii) a policy based upon ‘aggressive majoritarianism’, whereby 
prejudices against Muslims are justified in the name of security and cohesion (Gilborn 2008); 
and (iii) the fact that  the mixed schools arising from either school mergers or the closure of 
monocultural schools are highly problematic especially in light of the conditions required for the 
social contact hypothesis (Hewstone & Brown 1986; Short 2002). Furthermore, in light of 
interviews conducted for this thesis, there is a possibility that segregation between schools will 
be replaced by segregation within schools.  
 The second section of this thesis explored the pupil discourses on monocultural and 
mixed schools, using in-depth, semi-structured focus groups and one-to-one interviews with 
Muslim pupils, factoring in issues such as gender, ethnic group and geographical location. The 
empirical data, highlighted in this thesis,  ruptured the binary opposites of segregated schools as 
‘bad’ and integrated or mixed schools as ‘good’ (Philips 2009; Ramadan 2009). Instead, pupil 
discourses used a range of repertoires to explore and examine their experiences of schools, based 
upon the notions of ‘mixing’ and ‘sticking together’. Muslims attending both monocultural and 
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mixed state schools welcomed the opportunity to ‘mix’ and to take an active role in ‘doing 
multiculturalism’. The idea of ‘integration as performance’ was also discussed through the 
Quranic lenses of ‘getting to know each other’. Muslim pupils felt that mixed schools were an 
ideal space that would allow them to engage with multicultural citizenship. ‘Sticking together’ 
was an equally dominant repertoire used within the pupil discourse to explore the centrality of 
group solidarity and belonging to a collective body of Muslims. The ‘collective group’ was 
constructed through the religious categorisation of Muslim ummah, which was largely a response 
to the experiences of racism and anti-Muslim prejudice within schools, combined with the 
depiction of Muslims within the public domain as having a problematic presence (Shain 2003; 
Crozier & Davies 2008) 
 The third section considered the parental discourse on integration, choice, and type of 
schooling. In order to achieve this, a range of Muslim perspectives were explored, including 
gender, ethnicity and geographical location. This section examined how integration is seen as a 
natural and gradual process, resulting from the desire to succeed but also to be seen as 
succeeding. It was clear from the evidence presented in this section that Muslim parents rejected 
the notion that Muslim communities develop conscious racial boundaries with a willingness to 
create their own ghettos. Instead, it supported a conception of Muslim communities based on 
shifting geographies of ethnic settlement, signified by the shift from traditional monocultural 
Muslim neighbourhoods into more mixed and diverse areas (Finney & Simpson 2009). Parental 
attitudes to residential integration were closely associated and inextricably linked with ethnically 
mixed schools, with parents’ desire to move into middle-class suburbia predicated on the social 
and economic success of their children (Brice 2009; Finney & Simpson 2009).  Parental choice 
of mixed schooling and even Muslim faith schools is best interpreted through the 
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intersectionality of race, class and faith, which was constantly negotiated in the light of 
maintaining and nurturing cultural and religious identity with integration and multicultural 
citizenship (Meer 2010).   
 The dominant theme arising from the focus groups and the one-to-one interviews with 
both the parents and the pupils focused on the importance of ‘asabiyya to fellow Muslims, and 
the rejection of hyper-‘asabiyya (Ahmed 2003, 2005). The Khaldunian understanding of 
‘asabiyya sees group solidarity or group feeling based upon religion as necessary and essential 
for Muslim communities (Ibn Khaldun 1958; Rabi 1967). The concept of ‘asabiyya was central 
to the parental and pupil discourses. Both of these groups used it to conceptualize their 
understanding of social reality, albeit for different purposes.  
 ‘Asabiyya as understood by Muslim pupils within the experience of ‘sticking together’ is 
based upon the following Khaldunian premise – ‘one cannot imagine any hostile act being 
undertaken against anyone who has his group feeling to support him’ (Ibn Khaldun 1958: vol1. 
263). For the Muslim students, this premise of ‘asabiyya was fundamental for navigating through 
mixed schooling, especially within a hostile environment marked by anti-Muslim prejudice 
following the events of 9/11 and 7/7 (Allen 2011). In light of these ‘difficult periods’, group 
solidarity plays a vital purpose in defending ‘the group’ against external forces by reinforcing 
and stabilizing the influence of religion within the group.  
 Pupil discourse of ‘asabiyya revealed it to be an essentially productive and worthwhile 
feature of school experience. It was clear from the pupil discourse that ‘asabiyya did not 
correspond to segregation: in fact, Muslim pupils rejected the idea of hyper-‘asabiyya. They felt 
that the mixed-school experience, despite its difficulties, also provided the opportunity to mix 
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and to get to know each other. Whilst these experiences may appear to be contradictory, it was 
felt that ‘asabiyya facilitated the process of mixing from a position of self-assurance.  
 The most important theme arising from the parental interviews, similar to the pupil 
discourses, was the importance of ‘asabiyya and rejection of hyper-‘asabiyya whilst discussing 
issues associated with schooling and parental choice. The Muslim parents recognised the need to 
balance the importance of nurturing cultural and religious identity in their children with the 
imperative of integration and multicultural citizenship. This balancing act was evident not only 
in parents educating their children within the state system but also in parents who chose Muslim 
faith schools. The meta-discourse was largely shaped by the understanding that integration 
within Britain can be achieved through religion. In doing this, parents did not envisage a 
contradiction between religious and national identity, both of these being crucial for the future of 
their children (Ramadan 2009, March 2009). In fact, parents maintained that religious values will 
help children to become better citizens.  
 Parental views on schooling were shaped by race, faith and class Intersectionality. The 
choice of mixed schools, by Muslim parents, was based upon the realization that ‘asabiyya 
provided a mechanism for protection against racism and anti-Muslim prejudice. Parents did not 
like the idea of sending their child to an all-white school, which would put unnecessary pressures 
on them to assimilate (Tibi 2002, 2008) or abandon their cultural frame of reference.  Parental 
discourses indicated a desire for educational success; this was represented by a strong investment 
in their children’s education which would determine a prosperous and stable future. This success 
could only be achieved through flexibility in adjusting to new surroundings by maintaining and 
sustaining the need to belong to a religious community.  
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 By highlighting the above points, this thesis has generated new knowledge which has 
aided the empirical and theoretical understanding of the question of integration within the 
context of schooling.  At the empirical level, it has furthered the complex and dynamic 
understandings of schooling, integration and Muslim identity - both from the point of view of the 
parents and, most importantly, from the pupils’ perspective. This knowledge will assist in the 
analysis of educational policy approaches to race relations in the UK. At the theoretical level this 
thesis has explored key issues associated with religious identity, group solidarity and integration 
by drawing upon Muslim intellectual history. In doing so, this thesis has further contributed 
towards the growing scholarship of Khaldunian sociology in the West.  
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